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ABSTRACT
Two major themes dominate the contemporary discussions of American
post-secondary education. One is the theme of resource utilization, the
other that of institutional reform and innovation. The first indicates
a concern for the effectiveness with which administrators, faculty, stu-
dents, and society in general employ financial and human resource in pur-
suit of their many goals. The second indicates a concern for the defini-
tion and selection of the goals themselves. Thus, the two themes comple-
ment each other as the two aspects of an ends-means analysis intended to
make post-secondary education an ever more productive, more responsible
sector of American and world society.
This is a case study of an organization in American higher edu-
cation, the School of Education at the University of Massachusetts. The
aim is to shed some light on the question of how resources can be used
to promote innovation and reform in higher education. Specifically,
the study analyzes the role of funds received by the School from sources
outside the State-allocated University budget. Such funds typically came
from federal and state government agencies and private foundations for
vii
specific projects operated as part of the School organization. During
the years immediately following the arrival of a new dean in 1968
,
the
School developed a national reputation for innovation simultaneously as
it recruited up to two-thirds of its budget from external funding agen-
cies for on-campus and off-campus projects.
The thesis of the study is that outside funding made possible
the development of an institutional reputation for innovation and reform,
given the interests and abilities of people at the School, given a market
for educational innovation and reform which existed outside the University,
given the willingness of University officials to endorse the pursuit of
School interests through the market mechanism, and given the presence of
structural controls which permitted flexible uses of resources for pro-
ject purposes while still asserting sufficient centripetal pressures to
direct those applications towards broader organizational purposes.
Relationships between projects, School, University, and outside
agencies were the subjects of over one hundred focused interviews with
project directors and staffs. School and University administrators, and
several agency officials. Analysis of records and documents complements
the interviews. Literature related to the School specifically and the
problem of the study generally is reviewed.
The exchange, or flow of resources is the underlying paradigm
used to describe and analyze the role of project resources within the
School, seeing those resources as sets of incentives generating both ad-
ministrative structures and member behavior. The development, absorp-
tion, and utilization of outside funds constitute the basic divisions
viii
of the case study. The concept of "reputation" is found to be crucial
for an understanding of how resource flow is initiated. Four configur-
ations of that concept are drawn from the reported histories of thirty-
nine School projects successfully funded and in operation during fiscal
1971-1972. University and School procedures for the official approval
of funded projects are described and analyzed as strategies for the ab-
sorption and control of external influences and for the establishment
and continuous redefinition of institutional identity. The uses of pro-
ject resources within the School itself are described in a context of
informal expectations which guide personal motivations to participate
in project activities, authority relationships within the organization,
and the overall coordination of projects as contributors to an institu-
tional reputation for innovative goals and practices.
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CHAPTER I
INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE — A PROPOSAL
Introduction
Two major themes dominate the contemporary discussions of American
post-secondary education. 1 One is the theme of resource utilization, the
other that of institutional reform and innovation. The first indicates
a concern for the effectiveness with which administrators, faculty, stu-
dents, and society in general employ financial and human resources in
pursuit of their many goals . The second indicates a concern for the
definition and selection of the goals themselves. Thus the two themes
complement each other as the two aspects of an ends-means analysis in-
tended to make post-secondary education an ever more productive, more
responsible sector of American and world society.
The aim of the present study is to shed some light on the question
of how resources can be used to promote innovation and reform in higher
education. The School of Education of the University of Massachusetts
will be examined as a case study of a strategy designed to give members
of the School "maximum positive impact upon educational thinking, train-
ing and practice. . . [Allen, 1970, p. 1]." Specifically, the study will
describe and analyze important relationships between this intention and
funds received by the School from sources outside the State-allocated
lnPost-secondary education" is a classification which goes beyond
the colleges and universities of "higher" education to include external
degree programs
,
proprietary institutions , and the whole range of alter-
native systems of learning, teaching and certification after the high
school diploma or its equivalent.
2 .
University budget. Such funds typically came from federal and state
government agencies and private foundations for specific projects oper-
ated as part of the School organization. During the years immediately
following the arrival of a new dean in 1968, the School developed a
national reputation for innovation simultaneously as it recruited up to
two-thirds of its budget from external funding agencies for on-campus
and off-campus projects.
Advocates of more effective uses of educational resources have
urged higher education policy makers to turn financial adversity into
virtue by reassessing educational needs and initiating appropriate manage-
ment reforms. The successes of the 1960's—absorbing massive new student
populations, raising faculty salaries and status to attractive new heights
within American society, increasing the nation's commitments to higher
education from about 1 percent to about 2.5 percent of the gross national
product—were seen as once heady victories with hidden costs now emerging
as a new decade began. The mood of the new decade was one of financial
stabilization. The slower pace of financial growth had brought on a
period of caution, even crisis, in institution after institution (Cheit,
1971; Hudgins & Phillips, 1971). Higher education was urged to adapt to
the new situation as a long-range fact and not treat it as a temporary
lapse in support. "Higher education," warned the Carnegie Commission on
Higher Education (1972), "may be reaching a ceiling in the amount of money
it can expect from society [p. 2]."
Advocates of programmatic reform and innovation also saw in the
triumphs of the 1960 's the causes of essential restructurings (Heiss
,
1973). The bulk of the new student clientele could not be integrated
into the scholarly research orientation which came to dominate faculty
3 .
ambitions during the previous twenty years (Cross, 1971, 1973). Remedial
assistance was as important as scholarship aid to the success of many
"new" students. A faculty which had gained organizational ascendance
by promoting the research ethic was seen as a tenured obstacle to the
successful accomplishment of the changed tasks which society now set be-
fore higher education (Newman et al.
,
1971). Moreover, these people had
trained a surfeit of younger researchers out of line with the directions
of the national economy (Cartter, 1971; Glenny
,
1971). The yeasty financ-
ing of higher education in the 1960 ’s had raised expectations of contin-
ued comforts which only made more divisive and difficult the necessity
of restraining growth while adapting to new expectations, new tasks.
Given what they saw as the "homogenization" of higher learning, advocates
of reform wondered if educational institutions would be able to break
away from old commitments in order to acquire resources needed to pursue
new objectives. "The growth of these [multi-campus] systems and the re-
sulting budget and political problems make it ever more difficult," as-
serted the Newman task force (1971), "for even the most enlightened State
administration to avoid a damaging and self-reinforcing cycle [p. 72]."
In essence, the reformers proposed new shifts in the balance of
power within post-secondary education, shifts within the established col-
leges and universities from faculty to administrative and student influ-
ence on policy-making and shifts from the near-total dominance of higher
education to a larger role for other sectors of the post-secondary spectrum.
No sooner was the "academic revolution" completed, a revolution which
gave professionalized faculties control of higher education organizations
previously ruled by lay boards of trustees (Jencks & Reisman, 1969), than
4 .
the very concept of collegial governance borne of that triumph was sub-
jected to unbearable pressures. Collegiality was found wanting in cohe-
siveness and inclusiveness, neither able to formulate and coordinate joint
faculty goals nor able to accommodate the tensions created by heterogenous
student populations and changed expectations from the general public (B.
Clark, 1971).
Proposals for reform were plentiful. They ran the gamut from
formulas for federal aid intended to reward developing institutions and
institutions enrolling low-income students, as in the Higher Education
Amendments of 1972, to detailed suggestions on how to fight the "financial
pinch" (Academy for Educational Development, n.d.), and from shopping
lists of techniques to encourage programmatic reform (AED, 1972) to broad
strategies for total system change (Newman et al.
,
1971).
The ecological context for post-secondary education in the early
1970's, a context bounded by the two themes of resource utilization and
institutional reform, held two reminders, two messages, for all persons
concerned about the delivery of educational services. The first reminder
was to reawaken complacent or forgetful minds to the central role played
by resources and the patterns of their distribution in the life of any
organized educational venture. Whatever the appropriateness or popularity
of particular goals, their chances of being attained hinged on the avail-
ability of resources. The second reminder, related to the first, was to
establish in the consciousness of educators and public the concept of a
marketplace for educational reform. Whatever the general availability of
resources within a society or within an organization, some ideas were
more likely to receive support than others. The crucial role of the ad-
vocate for reform was to provide rationales capable of convincing funding
5 .
sources of the mutual values which could be gained by investments in
improved or wholly new programs.
Resources
Resources are shaped by ideas . But without resources ideas
flounder far short of implementation. In the years immediately follow-
ing the American Civil War, for example, leading educators sought to in-
troduce to the United States the scientific perspective and intellectual
opportunities they had found in European university organization. Accord-
ing to Veysey (1965) :
Earlier efforts at innovation in the field of American college edu-
cation had proved abortive in large part because there had not been
money to sustain them. ... In the post-Civil War years, the uni-
versity could not have developed without the Cornells, Hopkinses,
and Rockefellers, without the taxpayers of Michigan and Wisconsin.
Wealth was a necessary precondition but not a sufficient cause for
the academic change which took place [p. 3].
Without resources, as Jencks and Reisman (1969) also noted, scholarship
in America before the Civil War never developed into a distinct profession
capable of supporting its needs for personnel training or research inves-
tigations. The early founders of universities changed all this by linking
convincing rationales of purpose to philanthropists, public and private,
willing to invest in the articulated purposes.
It is important not to state the matter too crudely, but the as-
sumption of any funding strategy is that if substantial resources are
made available for some general or specific purpose, takers will be found.
As likely as not, the purposes for which resources are offered have been
defined in consultation with the views of potential users, as when
Congress invites interested parties to comment on proposed legislation.
the varied interests and interest groups to whichBut once available to
6 .
they are directed, resources take on a life of their own. It remains
for the individual professor or administrator to display a sense of in-
tegrity enabling him to by—pass opportunities whose goals are divergent
from his own or those of his institution (Corson, 1960 ). Even with in-
tegrity applied, resources build a momentum of their own, typified in the
1960’s by the unprecedented growth and excitement of university science
(National Science Foundation, 1971 ; Orlans , 1968 ).
From this perspective it is not surprising that Hefferlin ( 1969 )
would emphasize the role of resources discovered during a study of "in-
stitutional vitality" that surveyed academic reform in 110 American col-
leges and universities during the period 1962 to 1967 :
The flow of resources—their extent, direction, and limitation
—
inevitably is the prime determinant of academic change. The ma-
terial and attitudinal resources that are made available to col-
leges and universities, or that they can make available to them-
selves, will determine their programs [p. 34].
But this finding would only have been expected to those who understood
the societal context for educational reform in contrast to the exclusive
attention to the supposed inherent greatness of a particular idea or a
particular person. The idea, the human personalities and abilities, and
the societal context for resource availability must all be taken together.
Before the Civil War, as we have seen, even the presence of well-articu-
lated ideas backed by talented individuals could not succeed in gaining
sustained attention and resources from American society.
Market for Reform
The educators of the post-Civil War era found a wealthier, more
amenable market for their ideas and quickly learned to use the opportun-
ity. Their innovations relied on state and private funding,
philanthropy
7 .
in the sense that it asked little by way of immediate return on capital,
receiving rewards instead in the satisfaction of reputation attached to
the philanthropic act and the belief that the long-term consequence would
be social progress (Veysey, 1965). As for the participants in the new
academic research profession, the institutions developed with this ex-
ternal support "provided employment for men who did research and provided
substantial rewards for those who did it well," as Jencks and Reisman
(1969, p. 237) have observed.
Much the same could be said about the market for higher education
reform in more recent times. "During the twentieth century," Hefferlin
concluded:
the states and the philanthropic foundations have underwritten the
major innovations in higher education. The foundations have sup-
ported the development of new professional specialties, championed
the performing arts in the curriculum, and. . . underwritten new
academic disciplines [p. 37].
Foundations and other investors in educational innovation and reform have
seen themselves as taking risks that institutional administrators hemmed
in by immediate commitments and organizational politics have been unable
or unwilling to take. The general strategy of giving has been to use
"seed money" for projects of relatively short duration but with the po-
tential for major long-range impact once intellectual viability has been
proven and maintenance costs absorbed by the "parent" institution (Andrews,
1965; Woodring, 1970).
The early educational foundation executives knew well the power
of resource availability to gain attention for an idea and the power of
market dynamics in promoting reform. Recalling the first great educa-
tional foundation, the General Education Board formed in 1902 with
Rockefeller millions, Hechinger (1967) wrote:
8 .
Its dollar gifts were used as carrot and stick, in an effort toput a stop to chaos and aimlessness. Rather than dispensing char-ity, the board demanded proof that the college which sought" finan-
cial aid stood ready to move in the direction of quality and sta-bility [p. 411].
The fact that outside funding could be used to promote reform, that the
promise of money could galvanize human performance within institutions
of higher education, substantiated the strategic assumption that there
were things faculty and administrators wanted to do and could be induced
to do, but for which institutional resources were not available.
The internal resistances to budgetary redistributions within or-
ganizations generally, and higher education specifically, have been
described repeatedly. Addressing the problem of waste in the financing
of higher education, Harris (1969) noted an endemic proliferation of
courses taught:
Anyone who has been involved in college administration or who has
studied the history of higher education knows only too well that
to drop a course is virtually impossible. Each faculty member gets
protection for his empire with the implied promise that he will
help his colleague to preserve his. . . . One observer quoted Ray
Lyman Wilbur who once said that it was harder to change a curricu-
lum than to move a graveyard [p. 489].
By this process "innovation" would be restricted to changes and additions
of courses initiated by individual faculty according to their changing
professional interests rather than in response to any external market-
place for ideas and training.
With interests vested in this manner at every level, whether in-
dividual faculty or academic department or university college, the bound-
aries on internal distribution of resources become quickly fixed, and once
fixed, reallocated with difficulty (Bennis , 1970; Caplow & McGee, 1965).
"An existing program," Hefferlin (1969) generalized from his evidence.
9 .
. • . will continue to exist as long as it can find support. A
new program will be tolerated if it costs no money or brings its
own support. It will be resisted if the new funds it requires
could be used for the expansion of existing programs. And it
will be actively opposed and accepted only under duress if exist-
ing resources must be divided to include it [p. 39].
Outside funding, however, provides an escape from the pressures of inter-
nal interest groups.
The diversity and depth of outside funding in American higher
education has been given credit for the relative openness to innovation
of American universities in comparison to their European counterparts
(T. N. Clark, 1971; Yates, 1971). In this view, openness to innovation
varies with the amounts of outside support specifically assigned to inno-
vative activities, with an organization's security in wealth and prestige
(more security resulting in less fear of risk-taking)
,
and with the ex-
tent to which the organization is forced to compete in major markets for
students, faculty and funds.
Financial resources from many directions— foundations, federal and
state government, student tuitions, alumni contributions, private corpor-
ations, religious groups— are delivered in differing ways, some reinforc-
ing institutional autonomy, some reinforcing dependence on the source of
support. General purpose endowment gifts epitomize the first tendency.
Large-scale, annually renewed, program-specific allocations epitomize
the second. We would expect authority relationships within an organiza-
tion to become more centralized if resources from outside agencies are
placed at the discretion of the chief administrators, and more decentral-
ized if placed at the disposal of individual members. Dependence or in-
dependence at the organizational level, then, will be a function of the
scale of support, the time period over which support is assured, and the
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relative extent to which resources must be spent on discretionary or
mandated purposes. At the level of the individual member, dependence
or independence will be in part a function of where in the organization,
and to whom, outside resources are allocated.
Resources and Change in a School of Education
Funded projects are themselves small, temporary organizations
designed to carry out limited purposes. Within a university, projects
are dependent upon a more permanent organizational structure for many
essential services. We will examine and try to understand how one school
of education in a major state university developed a national reputation
for innovation with the help of substantial outside funding for its pro-
jects. "Much innovation," John Gardner (1963) has observed: ". .
.
goes
on at any first-rate university—but it is almost never conscious innova-
tion in the structure or practices of the university itself. University
people love to innovate away from home [p. 76]." Essentially, this study
will describe an organization in American higher education which went to
the marketplace in order to find support for structural and programmatic
innovation both "at home" and away.
In the 1971-1972 fiscal year during which information for this
study was collected, the School of Education at the University of
Massachusetts was the operational base for projects with awards totalling
nearly $4,600,000. At the same time, support received from the State-
allocated University budget amounted to less than $2,400,000. The de-
velopment, absorption and utilization of these outside funds will consti
tute the basic phases of the case study.
11 .
The exchange, or flow, of resources is the underlying analytic
paradigm which we will use to describe and analyze the role of project
resources within the School, seeing those resources as sets of incen-
tives generating both the structure of the organization and the behav-
iors of its members. Human organizations generally may be seen as com-
plex forms through which coalitions of interests are created, where the
perceived benefits of membership outweigh perceived disadvantages or
costs. Total membership commitments to specific organizational goals
is not assumed. Membership implies only that individuals perceive suf-
ficient rewards and opportunities to justify their initial and continuing
participation in some of the organization's many activities. Similarly,
outside agencies from which financial resources have been received or
recruited seek identification with only selected organizational objec-
tives. The flow of resources from external to internal control leads
to the differentiation of the basic, raw resource—typically money—into
the many specific incentives which organizations can provide their mem-
bers. Member participation in project tasks, in turn, provides the pro-
duct for which funding was sought and awarded. The willingness of the
larger society to invest in the organization's product thus initiates a
cycle whereby raw resources are transformed into organizational activity
resulting in products which, if appreciated by the larger society, en-
courage further investments of resources. The paradigm is drawn from
the literature of organizational systems (Allport, 1962; Bertalanffy
,
1969; Cyert & March, 1969).
Although focusing the attention of the reader upon money as a
central organizational resource, we do not want to underestimate the
crucial roles of other resources such as human skills and attitudes,
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societal recognition and support, or technological contributions. In-
tertwined with these other resources, money represents the ability of
social groups to make exchanges which purchase participation in specific
activities. Money becomes important as a means to individual and group
goals, not as an end in itself.
The Importance of the Study
The importance of the study lies in two directions. First is
the need for studies which detail the flow of resources in higher edu-
cation organizations. Dalton’s (1959) Men Who Manage
,
with its close
observation of interplay between official and unofficial incentives in
industrial settings, has no duplicate in education. Regretting this
lacuna
,
Lonsdale (1964) commented:
A correspondingly realistic study of the incentive system in. . .
institutions of. . . higher education would be not only revealing
but also more explanatory of the total range of materials, social
and psychic inducements included in the motivational pattern of
those organizations [p. 164].
While not expecting to be definitive in this regard, the study will try
to identify many of the incentives made available to university parti-
cipants by outside funding.
However, in the process of describing the flow of resources, we
may expect to encounter patterns of incentives and disincentives related
to the bureaucratic nature of the university. Resources are channelled
by administrative policies and procedures which legitimize particular
ways of getting and spending. These structural attributes of organiza-
tional life are human inventions designed to control the many internal
and external pressures to which organizations are vulnerable. According
to Perrow (1969)
:
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The type of goals most relevant to understanding organizational
behavior are not the official goals, but those that are embedded
in major operating policies and the daily decisions of the per-
sonnel. Second, these goals will be shaped by the particular prob-
lems or tasks an organization must emphasize, since these tasks
determine the characteristics of those who will dominate the or-
ganization [p. 369].
In other words, studies of resource flow will provide information about
organizational goals in terms of approved patterns of rewards within
organizations
,
approved tasks for members
,
and approved ways of perform-
ing those tasks. Thus, while a major intent of this study is to describe
the flow of resources within a particular organization, the expectation
is that the study will provide insight into the relationships of those
resources to many other aspects of human behavior within organizations
generally
.
The difference between rhetoric and action often can be judged
by the willingness and ability of advocates to embody their ideas in
policies and procedures; that is, in organizational structures which ef-
fectively promote participation in those ideas. The structure of an or-
ganization, to state the issue more succinctly, is a strategy for action
(Chandler, 1962). Understanding how rhetoric becomes operational within
the complex organizations of higher education is an essential step in
the pursuit of reform.
The study's importance lies also in its intent to examine in de-
tail one specific type of financial flow, project money received by a
school of education from agencies outside the university.
There is nothing new about project funding as a phenomenon in
American higher education. The project concept—a specified sum of
money given to support the pursuit of specified goals over a specified
period of time—has been at the heart of most foundation giving since
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the days of the General Education Board, as we saw earlier. Aside from
student aid programs, federal government support for higher education
has been almost exclusively of a project, or "categorical," nature (Wolk,
1968).
What is new in 1973 is the increasing respectability of project
funding not simply as a technique of achieving short-term goals for
funding agencies and their grant recipients, but as a strategy for pro-
moting innovation and reform at an institutional level throughout post-
secondary education. This increasing respectability is itself related
to an increasing awareness and understanding of the market forces oper-
ating in post-secondary education and a willingness on the part of policy
makers and administrators to submit educational services to those forces.
Innovation and reform has been in the past very much a secondary,
even unintended, purpose of federal funding of projects based in higher
education institutions . Past federal expenditures have aimed primarily
at developing the existing university system as an instrument of national
research policy (Rivlin, 1961). The effects of abundant and intensive
funding of federal research projects, especially in the physical sciences,
were impressive. Facilities were constructed, faculties hired, students
supported, empires (both personal and institutional) created. Federal
project funding in the 1950's and 1960 's, according to Orlans (1962),
improved the quality of some universities, reduced teaching loads, con-
centrated the number of scientists in leading universities, led to dif-
ferentials in status and rewards favoring the sciences over the humani-
ties within university faculties, and "accelerated the long-standing
depreciation of undergraduate education [p. 134]' among other things.
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Orlans, it might be noted, found that in 1957-1958 there were twenty-
five universities reporting the receipt of four million dollars or more
in federal funds. For fiscal 1971, however, the National Science Founda-
tion (1973) found there were ninety-seven colleges and university campuses
receiving over four million dollars for federal research and development
alone. In terms of total federal obligations, even the hundredth ranked
institution received over 9.5 million dollars. Within this latter cate-
gory, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst was ranked ninety-seventh.
It should not be surprising that this expansionary phase coincided with
the culmination of an academic revolution" of professorial status and
control of higher education, for it was the research professoriat which
benefitted most directly from the contracts and grants linking universi-
ties with federal agencies. More importantly, from our present point of
view, this revolution, which owed so much to the fact of predictable,
large-scale, professionalized funding, was neither the intended purpose,
nor an intended consequence, of federal policy regarding higher education
(Jencks & Reisman, 1969).
Outside project funding from both private foundations and the
federal government has induced change in higher education organizations.
But the policies of foundations more frequently have seen innovation and
reform as their purpose while those of government—much the larger source
of funding—have seen institutional change as a side effect of spending
for the participation of colleges and universities in various national
priorities
.
In a period of financial stabilization, advocates of reform,
well aware of the vested interests found within higher education organi-
zations, have turned to the marketplace as the testing ground for calls
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on the nation's resources. All forms of financing are being examined
not only in terms of the populations most immediately served, but also
in terms of institutional consequences. Federal and state aid to educa-
tion, for example, could be distributed to the institutions directly or
through student tuitions and service charges. Forms of financing which
reinforce freedom of choice for students are central to various reform
P^o§^3ms intended to let students conduct the search for lower costs,
higher quality and greater diversity [Carnegie Commission, 1972, p. 23]."
Similarly, project funding is now being seen as an available
strategy for major institutional reform rather than as merely an instru-
ment for the achievement of more limited tasks. If each state, suggested
the Newman task force (19 71):
would view itself as a funding agency responding to proposals from
individual campuses, flexibility and coordination could both be en-
hanced. Each campus needs the assurance of a base budget, but
probably at least a third of the funding needed could be supplied
on a project basis [p . 74].
Moreover, the task force concluded that "the foremost task for public
policy is to create conditions under which new educational enterprises
can be founded and can endure [p. 63]," and recommended the use of a
competitive proposal grant system as the best means of implementing
that conclusion. Responding to these suggestions. Congress in the higher
education amendments of 1972 authorized the use of grants and contracts
to encourage "the reform, innovation and improvement of post-secondary
education [U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973, p. 5]."
Contemporary proposals for reform in higher education are essen-
tially structural in nature, directed toward changes in patterns of so-
cial interrelationships within organizations rather than at changes in
the personalities of individuals. The proposals would provide incentives
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for institutional rather than personal reform. In the present study,
we will be examining how one organization recruited and employed out-
side project funding as the key resource in its own program of innova-
tion and reform. In so doing, we may come to a better understanding of
some of the opportunities and problems associated with the project stra-
tegy within a university structure.
Purpose of the Study
This is a case study of an organization in American higher edu-
cation, the School of Education at the University of Massachusetts.
Specifically, the study analyzes the role of funds received by the School
from outside the University budget. Such funds typically came from fed-
eral and state government agencies and private foundations for specific
projects operated as part of the School organization. During the years
immediately following the arrival of a new dean in 1968, the School de-
veloped a national reputation for innovation simultaneously as it re-
cruited up to two-thirds of its budget from external funding agencies
for on-campus and off-campus projects.
Outside funding became part of the budgetary base for the accu-
mulation and deployment of more differentiated resources in the forms
of faculty positions, graduate student stipends, secretaries, travel and
telephones, supplies, office space, opportunities for research, consul-
tantships
,
and publications; in short, for all the kinds of activities
associated with organizational maintenance and organizational change.
As an easily exchanged resource, money represented many of the instru-
mental incentives which organizations can provide their members. These
incentives could make both personal and organizational goals attractive
to and attainable by individual members.
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Mediating the flow of incentives between individuals and between
organizations were formal and informal structures; that is, routinized
patterns of behavior established by either officially approved procedures
or unofficial sets of expectations. Applied with varying degrees of ri-
gorousness, these procedures and expectations determined how and to whom
resources would be distributed. Describing some of the many processes
and protocols of exchange which characterized this flow of incentives
within one organization in American higher education will be the major
focus of this study.
The thesis of the study is that outside project funding made pos-
sible the development of an institutional reputation for innovation and
reform, given the interests and abilities of people at the School, given
a market for educational innovation and reform which existed outside the
University, given the willingness of University officials to endorse the
pursuit of School interests through the market mechanism, and given the
presence of structural controls which permitted flexible uses of resources
for project purposes while still asserting sufficient centripetal pres-
sures to direct those applications towards broader organizational purposes.
The Case Study: Limitations
The present study will be a case study. No attempt is made to
"prove" generalizability . The institution being studied was chosen spe-
cifically because of its reputation for innovation, social action, novel-
ty, loosely-structured internal organization, and outward flamboyance.
The School of Education at the University of Massachusetts main-
tained relations with a wide number of funding agencies and project cli-
ents throughout the world. It was also a young, growing institution in
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a field long characterized by low professional prestige, low per capita
investment in training, research and development, and low public visi-
bility. While the field of education grew significantly in the past
decade, the School gained attention by its own rate of growth and the
directions of its programs. Thus, the unit of study was selected as
much for its possible contrasting qualities as for its parallels with
comparable institutions. This was done on the assumption that there may
be more to learn from the study of an "alternative" than of a "typical"
organization. At least in this case no misleading presumptions of typi-
cality should interfere with the conclusions.
The School advertised itself as a living case of an "alternative"
organization still in its formative stages. But how was this alleged
alternative, this newly evolved species, able to survive and prosper?
The dean readily acknowledged that outside funding was the key element
in a strategy to establish the School as a viable institution. And it
was self-evident, by the very fact of outside funding, that general so-
cietal conditions had created opportunities for change that some individ-
uals knew how to grasp. At the organizational level, it was apparent
that an assortment of administrative intentions and procedures were em-
ployed to shape the School's responses to these external opportunities.
These procedures and intentions were the established or emerging ways
by which the organization tried to cope with the many demands placed be-
fore it and upon it. But beyond these gross observations, very limited
descriptive information about the School could be found, none of it seri-
ously tackling the problem of understanding how crucial resources were
related to the creation of an institutional reputation for innovation.
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For such a study the case method seemed appropriate. The value
of the method has been argued with particular cogency by Baldridge (1971):
A case study is an intensive investigation of one organization in
a field setting. Like an anthropologist in a foreign land, the
case study researcher tries to find out how the local situation
ticks. He
.
lives among the natives," compiling evidence and ideas
and acquiring a "feeling" for the dynamics of the situation. He
is not bound by one method, but capitalizes on any approach that
might help unravel a new puzzle; for example, he might first use
interviews with the "natives" to probe his topic, then move on to
construct a questionnaire and finally supplement both techniques
with participant observation and a study of documents. ... It
is particularly useful: (a) if there are few data assembled on
the topic, (b) if the research is basically exploratory, (c) if
the objective is research in depth, and (d) if change and dynamic
processes are crucial to the investigation [pp. 31-33],
Quite aside from the general limitations and advantages of the
case study method, there are several restrictions governing this spe-
cific study.
First, much of the study will be based on the experiences of
persons who were successful in having their proposals funded. To con-
centrate on successful projects inevitably overlooks much organizational
activity which would not take place but for the promise, the chance, of
support. Leaving unfunded proposals unexamined may leave hidden crucial
criteria which are revealed only to the rejected. To meet this contin-
gency persons associated with several unsuccessful proposals were inter-
viewed.
A second limitation is that this study is not a strict historical
study. A historical overview is provided but not with a thoroughness
that would report on all of the School’s funded projects under Dean Allen.
Because the focus of the study is on the uses of outside funds rather
than on the history of their development, this limitation is not seen as
harmful to the study. The projects which form the core of this study are
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those which were operational at the School during the academic year of
1971-1972. Several of these projects had histories ranging back as
much as five years prior to that period. To the degree that records,
participants and memories remained, information of a historical nature
was sought and used.
Third, the study is limited by its attention to outside funding
received only for recognized School of Education projects. Other out-
side financial arrangements such as consulting, personal services con-
tracts, workshops, scholarships, and gifts were not considered part of
the study. The decision to limit the study in this way was made for
two reasons. One is that these other relationships were tangental, even
peripheral, to the behaviors and strategies being described and analyzed.
Though they often competed for the time, valuable time, of School's mem-
bers, these other sources of funding tended to apply to individuals
rather than to the organization as a whole. The second reason is that
because these relationships were individual, information about them was
even more fugitive and hearsay than was information about projects with
formal proposals, contracts and administrative files.
Finally, the study is limited in that it only partially examines
the external relationships created by outside funding. The relationships
existing between an organization and its external environment, its market-
place, leave an extraordinarily fertile area for further study. In this
study, these relationships—with foundations, government agencies, the
university structure, project clients—are described in varying detail,
but always with an emphasis on the point of view of those within the or-
ganization which is the unit of study. Further research describing the
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many organizational points of view within the national and international
network of educational governance and funding is called for and encour-
aged.
The Case Study: Assumptions
Once the topic itself was selected and conceptualized, the rough
data of the study were shaped by a three-step process of (1) observe,
(2) describe, (3) analyze. The application of this process was guided
by three assumptions drawn from the literature of organizations.
First, in an essentially sociological orientation, the assumption
is made that human behavior is conditioned by characteristics of a situa-
tion which lie outside the individual and adhere instead to the nature of
the social task. Thus the process by which outside funds are obtained
and used by members of an organization must be seen as a series of tasks
which require specific sets of relationships and expectations among groups
of individuals. These relationships and expectations could be as basic as
the routine procedure of submitting a proposal or contract to the deans
for their approval.
While the assumption of conditioning characteristics may seem
self-evident, there are benefits in an explicit recognition of the issue.
For example, such recognition increases the ability of individuals to
recognize and consciously identifying institutional and behavioral boundar-
ies and devise alternative actions which reach beyond those boundaries.
This assumption, therefore, directs observation, description and analysis
toward those critical junctures shaping individual behavior within a
context of the specific concern of organizational flow of resources.
Conditioning characteristics are well-recognized in the litera-
ture of organizations. Sarason (1971) calls these extra—individual
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conditions "programmatic regularities," "the predetermined characteris-
tics of the setting [p. 371]." March and Simon (1969) and most other
social scientists refer to the structural attributes of a task or organ-
ization
:
Organization structure consists simply of those aspects of the P at-tem of behavior in the organization that are relatively stable andthat change only slowly.
. . . Organization will have structure.
. .insofar as there are elements of the situation that must be or arein fact taken as givens, and that do not enter into rational calcu-
lations as potential strategic factors [p. 371],
Similarly, Bakke and Argyris (1954) examine the concept of social organ-
ization, stating that "the organizational structure is the organizational
activity in its stable state, and the organizational activity is the or-
ganizational structure in its fluid state [p. 6]." These stable or slow-
ly changing patterns of behavior, being "taken as givens" and identified
with the organization, shape individual behavior, The new employee
learns 'the ropes" of his job because the organization requires predict-
able behavior in order to coordinate its many tasks. Around these "ropes"
of organizational structure flows the day to day life of individual mem-
bers .
The second basic assumption concerns the psychological motivation
process which is assumed to guide the behavior of people in an organiza-
tion. Although there are innumerable ways in which individuals may be
differentiated from each other, we often look to general characteristics
of the human species to help us diagnose, understand and predict their
behavior. One of these often-assumed general characteristics might be
called "the way we think." Any assumption about a general theory of
motivation will affect the study by directing attention toward presumed
patterns of individual perception and action.
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In this study, it is assumed that individuals hold goals for
their behavior, that they intend, consciously, to achieve a variety of
outcomes by that behavior. Further, they select this or that means
toward an end because of a judged expectation that the chosen path will
take them to their goal. As events and judgment change, both the value
of the goal and the expectation associated with any path may be revised.
But, we assume, the process of selecting goals and associating them with
specific means is a process consistent both with individuals over time
and among any group of individuals. These ideas have been reviewed and
utilized by Georgopoulos
,
Mahoney and Jones (1970), Vroom (1964), Lawler
and Porter (1970), and Hunt and Hill (1969), all drawing on the earlier
research and conceptualizations of Lewin
,
Tolman and Atkinson.
This 'path-goal" model of motivation emerges from cognitive
theories of behavior which emphasize the conscious rather than unconscious
determinants of individual behavior. Regarding the relationship between
motivation and performance, Georgopoulos, Mahoney and Jones (1970) pro-
pose:
Motivation to produce at a given level.
. . depends upon: (a) the
particular needs of the individual as reflected in the goals towards
which he is moving, and (b) his perception regarding the relative
usefulness of productivity behavior as an instrumentality, or as a
path to the attainment of these goals [p. 238],
In other words
,
the model assumes that "behavior is in part a function
of rational calculability
,
or decision-making in terms of goal-directed-
ness [p. 238]."
The importance for this study of the assumption of such a cogni-
tive model lies in the implied relationship between individuals and the
regularities or structure of organizations. Being the creations of
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human activities, these structures may be thought of as means to indi-
vidual and group ends. The basic task of the researcher, once he has
been able to describe any particular structure, is to ask two questions:
(1) for what goals was this means designed, and (2) is it acting as a
path to the attainment of these goals? Using the example cited earlier,
the researcher would want to know why proposals need the approval of the
deans and whether this approval structure does in fact serve the intended
purpose
.
The third assumption concerns the interaction of individuals and
situational characteristics in social organizations. Experiments con-
ducted by Tajfel (1970) indicate that the mere fact of division into
groups is enough to trigger participant-perceived differentiations be-
tween in-group and out-group, the "in-group" being valued more highly,
better, than the other. Groupness
,
suggests Tajfel, may be a universal
norm ordering our "social construction of reality [p. 96]." Homans (1969)
observed that mere social interaction has implications which go beyond
task necessities. "Social life," he writes, "is never wholly utilitarian;
it elaborates itself, complicates itself, beyond the demands of the ori-
ginal situation. The elaboration brings changes in the motives of indi-
viduals [p. 185].
The assumption drawn from these observations holds that task in-
teraction leads quickly to the perception of boundaries. The perception
of boundaries by the individual leads, in turn, to some kind of identifi-
cation with both his own work group and with the formal organization of
which the work group is a part. Perception of boundaries and self-iden-
tification with a group become basic factors affecting the individual's
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selection of goals and expectations of their attainability. In a word,
the recognition of boundaries affects motivation.
In this case study, it is assumed that the legal definitions of
a school of education within a public university are supplemented by
varying strengths of individual identification with the school and the
projects with which persons are directly associated. Boundaries around
units of study are reinforced by both official organizational categoriza-
tions and by the perceptions of persons interviewed. Any organizational
"regularity" may be interpreted differently depending on whether it is
identified in reference to the goals of an individual, a program or work
group, the school as a whole, the university administration and so on.
This means that it will be desirable to account for the various views
of persons whose organizational roles place them in differing relation-
ships to the problem of outside funding.
The Case Study: Definitions
Some terms used repeatedly throughout the dissertation need to
be defined:
State — where capitalized, the State of Massachusetts. Used in
reference to its official policies and procedures and to iden-
tify monies allocated to the University from the annual State
budget
.
University — where capitalized, the University of Massachusetts,
Amherst campus, Amherst, Massachusetts. The University of
Massachusetts also included campuses in Boston and Worchester
at the time of this study. Statistics on budget, student
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enrollment, outside funding and so forth apply only to the Amherst
campus. The term "University" is used to refer to the decisions
and policies determined and administered by the chancellor, vice-
chancellors and other administrators on the Amherst campus except
in those paragraphs and sentences where the decisions and poli-
cies of the University Board of Trustees and the office of the
president of the University are indicated specifically. Where
not capitalized, the term refers either to the general concept
of a university' or to the generic category of "universities"
in American higher education.
S chool where capitalized, the School of Education, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts. The term will also be
used in an active sense, for example, "the School sought.
.
.,"
as a general indicator of decisions and policies of the dean and
those acting with his delegated authority.
Center — capitalized only as part of a title, for example, the
Center for Humanistic Education, of a specific "learning center"
within the School of Education. Where not capitalized, the term
will refer either to the School's many centers in general or to
a specific center under discussion depending upon the context of
the sentence. Center membership includes faculty and students
sharing interests in the content area broadly identified by the
selected center title. An individual's membership in one center
does not preclude membership in another, although the responsi-
bilities of membership may have that effect:
Typically the staff of each center engages in teaching,
research, advising, and service; offers degree programs
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at the graduate and undergraduate levels; and provides con-
s u!tation to other centers and groups in the School and in
1971b]
[University of Massachusetts, School of Education,
Funding agency — any non-University local, state or federal gov-
ernment administrative unit, or international organization, or
private profit-making or private not-for-profit organization
providing moniss for specified project purposes*
Outside funding — monies paid to the University or members of
the University by funding agencies. Although this term can in-
clude monies paid for projects organized as personal consulting
arrangements of School members, as used in this study it will
normally refer to funds awarded with University approval and
administered through University accounting channels.
Funded project — any activity or sets of activities of faculty
and students of the School of Education for which outside fund-
ing has been granted or contracted by a funding agency.
Project director — the faculty or student member of the School
programmatically responsible for the implementation and admin-
istration of a funded project. This person may or may not also
be the "principal investigator."
Principal investigator — faculty members legally responsible for
the expenditure of grant monies. Where a single person occupies
both roles, this term is used interchangeably with that of "pro-
ject director."
Innovation — a change of goals or method of implementing goal-
directed behavior which is new for particular individuals, a
particular institution, or for society as a whole.
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Ref2rH — a change which "re-forms," amends, redirects, existing
goals and methods. Where the distinction between newness and
redirection is not self-evident, "reform" and "innovation" may
be used interchangeably.
Description of the Chapters
The present chapter states the general problem of how resources
may be distributed in order to encourage innovation and reform through-
out American higher education. It also introduces the purpose of the
study, that of examining the role of outside project funding in a single
school of education. Limitations and assumptions concerning the case
study method are also described.
Chapter II, The School of Education in a University Context,"
reviews the reputation of the School of Education, University of
Massachusetts, after the arrival of a new dean in 1968. Prominent char-
acteristics and concerns of the so-called "new" School under its new
dean are compared with those of the "old" School under its dean.
Chapter III, "Finding Project Support: The Reputation Game,"
after reviewing briefly some of the literature of grantsmanship
,
describes
four general patterns of behavior which conceptualize the apparently
whimsical factors affecting the funding of projects operating at the
School during 1971-1972.
Chapter IV, "Funded Projects and University Review," describes
both the formal structure of project approval within the University and
the experiences of project staffs seeking approval for their proposals
and for decisions related to the implementation of their projects once
funded.
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Chapter V, "Project Resources in a School of Education," re-
lates outside project funding to the problem of organizational authority
in higher education. Centrally established expectations regarding the
use of project resources within the School are described, as are some
of the consequences of these expectations for projects and their inte-
gration into the School organization.
Chapter VI, "Incentives to Innovate: A Summary," summarizes
the study, draws conclusions, and makes recommendations for further re-
search
.
CHAPTER II
THE SCHOOL OF EDUCATION IN A UNIVERSITY CONTEXT
A Reputation for Innovation
Three years after the arrival of Dwight Allen on the University
of Massachusetts’ Amherst campus as dean of the School of Education,
Daniel E. Griffiths (1971) offered an observation to the dean of the
University’s Graduate School. "I doubt," he wrote, "that any school
of education in the United States has ever undertaken so radical and
far-reaching a number of changes as has yours [p. 1]."
Griffiths view was not unusual among the professional educators
and other observers who knew the School. 1 But as dean of New York
University’s School of Education and as a leading advocate of the appli-
cation of systems theory to the study of educational organizations, he
had both the administrative and scholarly experience appropriate for such
a judgment. While he could not approve of all the changes he saw,
Griffiths acknowledged feeling "an exciting atmosphere" there during a
two-day visit to "a university in the midst of tremendous growth, and
a school in the throes of radical change [p. 1]."
The image of the School of Education as an organization undergo-
r
ing radical experimentation and restructuring was an image shared by both
Griffiths, along with David R. Krathwohl, dean of the School of
Education, Syracuse University, and William D. Rohwer, Jr., professor of
education at the Berkeley campus of the University of California, was an
outside commentator on two School proposals for new degree programs.
Krathwohl and Rohwer, while more circumspect in language and tone, ap-
peared to share the general impression (Krathwohl, 1971; Rohwer, 1971).
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proponents and opponents of the School's course during Allen's deanship.
It was an Image first articulated by Allen and the students and staff
he assembled for the "planning year" of 1968-1969. So Ill-disposed were
they to the perpetuation of existing educational formulas, these plan-
ners named their in-house journal the Tabula Rasa and assigned themselves
the ambitious task of designing not only a new school of education, but
also a series of new definitions of the entire field of education as a
profession.
With highly visible gestures including cancelling all courses
and degree requirements during the first year, considering faculty and
doctoral students as hierarchical equals in the community of educators,
flying the entire "community" across the nation to a distant week-long
retreat, aggressively establishing many contacts between the School and
other educational agencies, the School’s members began to attract na-
tional attention which reinforced this self—anoited image of radicalism.
Indicative of this attention was an article (Roberts, 1969) which appeared
in January of 1969 in the Saturday Review
, concluding:
The slate has been wiped clean at UMass
,
but that does not mean that
some of the traditional assumptions won’t be affirmed. It is just
that nothing is being taken on faith and that everything is being
re-examined from an empirical point of view in an attempt to find
techniques and structures that speak to contemporary educational
needs [p. 63].
The School's radicalism at this initial point consisted less of
dogmatic solutions to drastic problems than of this working assumption
that the School could itself be rid of its institutional rigidities and
rebuilt in a manner which would permit its members to explore all issues
afresh. The key to this approach was in addressing the organization of
the School as an experiment, always subject to testing, rather than in
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using the School only as a fixed base from which to experiment with solu-
extemal problems. In this mood and perspective, the "planners"
were acutely sensitive to the charge that higher educators were notori-
ously lax in reforming their own organizations while simultaneously in-
vestigating and criticizing all others (for example, Kerr, 1966).
They were also well aware of the academic traditions surrounding the pro^
duction of "pure" knowledge, traditions which produced many ideas, much
rhetoric but which, from this perspective, left the professional schools
of education out of touch with the many clients and changing issues they
were meant to serve. Putting their School of Education into touch with
its environment was seen as the necessary prelude to defining solutions
rather than the last step in a research progression which left children
and teachers as the guinea pigs of scholarly experimentation (University
of Massachusetts, School of Education, 1971a).
Reviewing the "planning year," Allen (1970) reaffirmed the mean-
ing of a strategy of experimentation.
We are not seeking to find, define and refine the best way to edu-
cate children. The turmoil in our schools and universities indi-
cates to us that students will no longer tolerate a Procrustean
system of education. What we seek are demonstratively useful edu-
cational alternatives, and, beyond them an overall educational
framework which will allow these alternatives to exist within an
atmosphere of choice [p. 2].
The radicalism which Griffiths and others found at UMass
,
then, was not
a radicalism of absolute answers and dogmatic stances, not an argument
that said, "This is right and that is wrong." Instead, Allen and others
at the School found strength in admitting to a certain degree of ignor-
ance, and in claiming that because no sure answers were available for
many crucial social needs it followed that risks of failure had to be
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taken if there was to be progress. Existing knowledge could only be
applied with inexactness, but more could be learned from dealing con-
cretely with human problems than by distant theoretical research. The
uncertainty of the consequences made an experimental attitude essential.
It justified a tolerance, even encouragement, of any project which could
find for itself intellectual and financial support. Possible failure
among these diverse efforts was a greater virtue than assured success
because large and important problems justified the inherent risks.
Wrote Allen:
We are committed to a course of rational and strategic activism with-in the field of education. ... We are
,
first of all, interestedm producing a maximum positive impact upon educational thinking,
training and practice as they obtain within our purview as a School
of Education and within our reach as concerned professionals aware
of the educational crises facing our nation. In choosing such a
course, we have had to leave the safe harbors of institutional re-
spectability as that has been traditionally defined.
. . . Our
mission is not modest, and we may well fail. Others before us have
tried and failed. ... . Nevertheless, while we continue to seek a
variety of successes, we remain committed above all to a full and
vigorous process of experimentation and search [p. 2].
Both the message and its tone were carried beyond Allen's artic-
ulations into the official literature of the School, into its proposals
for support from outside funding agencies, into the reports on the School
which appeared in national magazines, and even into the skepticism of its
critics. Portraying the School to a potential funding agency, one pro-
posal writer (Christensen, 1971) stated:
Our pioneering venture is based on the belief that today’s educa-
tional system is locked into a monolithic structure. We must not
only develop alternative components for this system, we must create
completely alternative systems. . . .
One of the most glaring deficiencies of current education is its
inflexibility: inflexible administration, inflexible staffing pat-
terns, inflexible curriculum. This rigidity prevents education
from responding to the needs of students and to the needs of so-
ciety [p. 1].
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Meanwhile
,
the School's official "Profile" (University of Massachusetts,
School of Education, 1971b), an elaborated catalog published as the
fourth Allen year began, promised prospective students a commitment
to rapid and thoroughgoing change":
W rn Tr M 3 "3JOr and thorou«hg°lng reform of con-
?
st ucture
. inor repairs and maintenance will only beharmfui, smce they put off the inevitable day when the major issuesof educational reform must be confronted by the total society.
"A little change hurts. A lot of change hurts only a little more" was
one of the mottos of this folio of School commitments. Translating
"noble language into active professional life" was another.
In fact, over the course of four years, the "new" School of
Education was able to make "active professional life" its hallmark.
"At UMass," reported an article (Resnik, 1972) in the Saturday Review
,
"activism is central to the whole concept of curriculum [p. 50]. Re-
porters in national magazines Saturday Review
,
Time, Change—were quick
to cite the five million dollars that Allen and others at the School had
raised during the first three years from government and private sources
as evidence of wheeling-dealing activism. The literature of the School
willingly admitted to entrepreneurship but emphasized the intended re-
sult of many project involvements established with change-seeking educa-
tional groups in the United States and abroad. The essential purpose of
internal restructuring was to provide mechanisms for incorporating these
projects, making them the guts rather than the appendages of the organi-
zation's goals. The "Profile" reported this purpose:
A school of education which aspires to have a powerful and produc-
tive impact upon the educational system in this country cannot re-
main isolated from it, but must maintain a broad network of mutually
productive relationships with schools, public and private; school
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systems; and other agencies involved in Hip rlation
. The building of this network has W ducatlon of our popu-the School. ... been a ma3 or Priority of
andViversitv'or-f ^ ?
C?°01 ° f Educati°a derives from the range
than anv single n
S SEe
?
la Py°J ects and programs. More important
to Se chafed hv sTr ,
15 3 that encourages new directions
edition fp 31 H 39J.°r COrS "h° Ch3nge ln AmeriCan
Taken together, these hopes and claims promote the image of an
ambitious and vital, forthright and flexible organization. Many observers
thought that turning the image into reality was more than could be hoped
for and said so. But in doing this, they also conceded that the world
had been forced to take notice of UMass. "There can be no question that
Dwight Allen has succeeded in putting the UMass School of Education on
the map [p. 50]," concluded the Saturday Review article in 1972. But in
the minds of the national magazine writers, the cause of the new-found
celebrity lay in radicalism or sensationalism of verbalizations and in
the yeasty atmosphere of the School community rather than in anything
the School had accomplished during its first few years of social activism.
Inotherwords
,
the public image of the School of Education after four years
was still one of promise rather than fulfillment. The School was being
portrayed as "a brash newcomer" in the words of one writer (Resnik, 1972)
and contrasted with a pre-Allen School that was eminently "forgettable"
according to another (Time, 1970).
Much of the drama, the journalistic excitement of the "new"
School was built around this contrast with an "old" School that was
never examined in any depth. It was an image which Allen and others at
the School cultivated, and was epitomized by the concept of the planning
year with its theme of total rejection of the existing structure.
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Allen had made a point of stating that existing patterns of be-
havior were not necessarily harmful but that they should not be per-
mitted to continue without being tested with the same rigor, the same
doubt people applied to new ideas. Both the new and the old should be
required to prove their validity for current and future conditions.
The New School of Education and the Old
The existing structure at the School of Education was not total-
ly rejected. The "new" School of Education at the University of
Massachusetts was new in leadership and style but not in the very basic
and important fact of its existence within a state university. Allen
and his recruits inherited from the previous dean, Albert W. Purvis, a
history of organization which covered Purvis' thirty-one years on the
campus. During those years, the education faculty had grown from two
to thirty-eight positions and from no support staff to a staff of eleven
secretaries and seven technicians. Education had graduated from the
status of a minimal program with two offices, one classroom, "practically
nothing in equipment," and no education books, to recognition since 1956
as a doctorate-granting professional school with its own large building
complete with attached experimental elementary school, a University
branch library of almost twenty thousand books, and, according to Purvis
(1967)
,
"one of the best equipped Schools of Education on the eastern
seaboard [p. 8]" in terms of media equipment.
In his final annual report as dean in June of 1967, Purvis was
proud of this growth, which, he thought, argued for more University sup-
port than the School had received. The graduate program he noted had
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expanded from a "meager" beginning to become "second only to Arts and
Sciences in enrollment and second to very few in quality [p. 13]."
Nonetheless, the School was receiving the lowest per student aid of
any school on the campus, $149 per Education graduate student compared
to a campus average of $1,270 for each graduate student. Of the School’s
$52,000 for graduate assistants, one-half of this amount came from the
School's several outside funded projects. Furthermore, he complained,
the numbers of students served was increasing at an annual rate of
twenty-three percent since 1964-1965 while faculty growth was limited
to four percent, and financial support for operations had been cut by
fifteen percent. The contrasts Purvis wanted to demonstrate are more
apparent in the absolute figures of Table 1.
TABLE 1
Changes in School of Education Budget, Personnel
and Enrollment—1962-1967
1962-1963 1964-1965 1966-1967
Operational budget:
School of Education
Audio-visual Center
39,100
9,480
68,730
18,350
57,700
19,100
Personnel—Teaching
:
All positions 21 29 38
Personnel— Support
:
School of Education 5 8 13
Audio-visual Center 6 7 7
Enrollment (Spring Semester):
Undergraduate 814 1,035 1,449
Graduate 323 665 942
Total 1,137 1,700 2,391
Source: A. W. Purvis. Annual Report, School of Education, 1966-1967.
Unpublished report, University of Massachusetts, 1967.
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Purvis knew that the contrast between the School's increasing
responsibilities and relatively decreasing University support signaled
an organizational crisis. Since early 1966, he had been awaiting the
appointment of a new dean, but he outlined in his final report what he
saw as the necessary steps for the University administration to take:
If the University wants a strong School of Education, one which
will make a real impact on the education of the state and which
will bring prestige to the institution, it must provide adequate
support in terms of facilities, faculty and operational budget.The time has come when some hard and firm decisions must be made
IP. 22].
The core element in the desired support, and in Purvis’ thinking the
source of institutional prestige, was to be the provision of a high-
quality faculty. He emphasized the need to fund positions at the level
of full professor in addition to the three the School enjoyed at the
time.
Finally, Purvis suggested the possible directions and choices
which he thought would confront a new dean. For two years, he reported,
a Future Developments Committee at the School had taken "a long look into
the future." The result was the identification of three alternative
routes. First, the School could cancel all undergraduate teacher edu-
cation and concentrate on graduate programs. This route seemed inappro-
priate because:
the University should be in the vanguard in improving teacher edu-
cation. . . . the innovator of new ideas and new practices, the
place where new suggestions can be implemented, and the place where
students are educated to be agents of change in a changing society.
. . . the School has done very little. . . not because of lack of
motivation, but because the facilities and budget and faculty posi-
tions were not available [p. 21].
Another option was to drop all specific career programs even on the doc-
toral level, concentrating instead on educating top-level researchers
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and statesmen. Purvis thought this second option a narrow concept "not
appropriate to a State university with State responsibilities.” The
School should instead perform this high-level planning in addition to
its other functions. Finally it seemed that all roads pointed to the
third alternative, to move ahead at all levels, "as we are now doing
[p. 22]."
In his rhetoric of the University as the vanguard, innovator and
implementor of new ideas and of its students as agents of change, the
Purvis deanship of 1967 might be mistaken for the Allen deanship of 1968.
But in little else would similarities be found. Both in goals and means
the two periods were distinctly, even radically, different.
The differences can be itemized:
1* Purvis saw room for improvement in the world at large but with
the University acting as a screen to test new ideas carefully
before letting them loose, protecting the world. The "new"
School held a different footing, as Allen explained to one re-
porter (Nathan, 1971):
If you start with the premise that I do, that education
stinks, then you see that there is a rather substantial
purpose which is served by experimentation. But there is
a price to that: some experimentation can be done in the
laboratory; experimentation in education has to be done
with real people and real consequences [p. 52].
In other words, while the School had professional standing and
responsibilities, one of those responsibilities was to try out
untested ideas in the pressures of the real world.
2. Although the School under Purvis administered a government-
funded institution development project in Uganda and a Regional
Media Center for the Deaf, Purvis’ vision was clearly limited
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to Massachusetts and New England as the geographic area the
School should serve. After Allen, as we have begun to see, the
School took on national and international obligations with vi-
gor, actively seeking the widest possible impact while focusing
primarily on American education.
3. If the School was to serve the New England area, then it seemed
to follow that the chief source of support for the School should
come from New England agencies. Purvis emphasized his place in
a state university and laid the responsibility for financial sup-
port with the University administration. Allen, as we shall see,
relied on University support to form the core of his organization
building, but refused to limit his activities to the boundaries
of University budgets. In fact, Allen used outside funding as
leverage to argue for the equal support of Education in compari-
son to other University units, an equality Purvis had long and
unsuccessfully sought.
4. Purvis’ argument for equal status with other departments was
based only on a call for fair and equal treatment according to
statistics of growth in clients served and of relative share of
the University budget. This argument had never served the edu-
cation profession well for higher status fields found it easier
to demonstrate a need for low student-faculty ratios and suppor-
tive services and equipment. Allen did not neglect the "equal
treatment" argument, but his strongest approach would be to ex-
hibit his achievements, point out the benefits received by the
University and thus demonstrate what the University had to gain
by its support of the School.
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5. For prestigious accomplishments, Purvis looked to his faculty
and the prospect of hiring more highly-paid faculty whom the
University community would respect. The "new" School would
turn this method on its head, putting faculty on a social and
programmatic equality with students by investing large portions
of its outside funding in student support and by offering stu-
dents responsibilities elsewhere reserved for faculty.
6. Planning under Purvis was relegated to a faculty committee which
in two years time came up with a report and suggestions. The
suggestions, as Purvis admitted, were general and useless with-
out University encouragement. Planning under Allen became a
year-long adventure for the entire School and was directed both
internal organizational changes and external directions
. Goals
as such were not set for the School. Instead, interest groups
were allowed to flourish and compete. Allen (University
of Massachusetts, School of Education, 1971a) told the "commun-
ity" mid-way in the planning year:
We have made more progress than I, or anyone else, could
have predicted precisely because we have not set our bound-
aries, limits, and organizational structure in advance. . . .
This is not to say that structure, organization, and the
setting of limits to our pursuits are alien to the planning
as a whole. The limits are being set, priority areas are
being defined, and organizational structures will emerge as
they should— out of the work and interests of all of us [n.p.].
Goals in this setting were identified by individual and group
commitments to action.
The narrative to this point has tried to establish two important
considerations underlying the direction of the remainder of this study.
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First, it should be recognized that the School during the first four
years of the Allen era promoted an image of radicalism, "controlled
chaos" in the new Dean’s words, an image which was accepted by and large
by the professional education community and by both public and profes-
sional journalism. Second, it should be recognized that the phenomenon
of change which was the "new" School took place in an institutional set-
ting, that of an on-going School of Education within a major state uni-
versity, as well as within the setting of national visibility. Both of
these environments, the national and the university, played crucial roles
in the development of the School after Allen’s appointment as dean in
late 1967. In detailing a strategy of organizational change, we will
see how the key to successful "revolution” lay in the School’s ability
to draw upon both environments for resources and recognition, building
a recirculating flow of incentives for institutional innovation while
achieving a viable degree of independence from each environment. To be-
gin this analysis
,
we should first look at the University of Massachusetts
as a base of operation for a school of education. The University as well
as the School was in a period of transition when Allen arrived in 1967.
The School of Education in an Expanding University
The dramatic growth of the School of Education during the Allen
years could appear more frothy than real if the fact were that the rest
of the University was growing at the same or faster pace as the School,
and doing so without attendant hoopla. In point of fact, the University
and its Amherst campus were expanding vigorously during the Allen years.
But also in point of fact, the School was the most vigorous unit of the
University once Allen became Dean.
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As Purvis well knew from his thirty-one-year career on the cam-
pus, the University of Massachusetts as a whole had entered a period of
unprecedented, well-financed growth during the 1960’s. Between fiscal
1965 and fiscal 1971, the State's appropriations for the Amherst campus
rose from $17,077,000 to $51,386,994 (Johnson, 1967, 1971). Even before
these dates, during the decade of the 1950 's, the campus had almost
doubled its full-time equivalent (FTE) student population from 3,376 to
5,873. The graduate student portion of these totals had increased grad-
ually from eight to eleven percent. From the time in 1960 when the
School of Education was housed in its own building to the time of Purvis’
retirement in 1967, the momentum of student growth increased with great-
er speed, bringing the University from a century of modesty into an ac-
tive competition for attention as a major American university. Amherst
campus FTE enrollments jumped from 5,873 in Fall, 1959 to 14,570 in Fall,
1967. Growth in undergraduate enrollments was the largest portion of
this increase, but graduate enrollments moved at the greatest rate, al-
most four-fold to 2,314 in Fall, 1967 (see Table 2).
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TABLE 2
Full-Time Equivalent Enrollment
University of Massachusetts, Amherst Campus
1950-1971
Year
(Fall Semester) Undergraduate Graduate
Stockb ridge
Ag. College Total
1950 est. 2,751 252 373 3,376
1955 est. 3,633 274 252 4,159
1959 est. 4,911 635 327 5,873
1963 est. 6,991 1,061 389 8,441
1967 11,673 2,314 583 14,570
1968 12,745 2,512 59 3 15,850
1969 14,326 2,854 625 17,805
19 70 15,262 3,236 620 19,118
19 71 16,212 4,079 618 20,909
Source: University of Massachusetts, Office of Budgeting and Institu-
tional Studies. University of Massachusetts enrollment data—
all campuses. Amherst, Massachusetts, Author, November 2, 1971.
These institutional statistics reveal that the absolute physical
expansion of personnel experienced by the School under Allen was not a
radical departure from either School or University patterns during this
period. The continuation of the pattern was made possible not only by
the activity of the "new" School, but more crucially by the policies of
an expanding state university which encouraged growth among all its sub-
units .
Yet we must also acknowledge statistical indications that the
new administration of the School probably was responsible for the degree,
if not the direction, of growth as compared to earlier years. Comparison
of the "head count" and "instructional student" enrollments in Tables 3
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and 4 demonstrates two important points. First, in absolute numbers,
especially at the graduate level, the School's growth continued unabated
with an especially large jump in enrollments following the 1968-1969
"planning year." Secondly, of those students who enrolled in the School,
both graduate and undergraduate, more and more became active "instruc-
tional" students carrying at least eight and fifteen credits respective-
ly each semester. By Fall of 1970, the School of Education accounted
for almost one-third of the "instructional" graduate students on the
entire Amherst campus, over twice the proportion found in 1965.
TABLE 3
Head Count Enrollment
School of Education, University of Massachusetts /Amherst
1965-19 71
Year
(Fall Semester) Undergraduate % of UM/A Graduate % of UM/A
1965 695 7.63 489 21.83
1968 972 7.57 737 23.72
1969 1,213 8.39 1,050 27.72
19 70 1,371 8.92 1,277 28.61
19 71 1,660 8.71 1,421 29.82
Source: University of Massachusetts, Office of Institutional Studies.
1971-1972 UM/A data sheets . Amherst, Massachusetts: Author,
June 1972.
47 .
TABLE 4
Instructional Students Enrollment
School of Education, University of Massachusetts /Amherst
1965-1971
Year
(Fall Semester) Undergraduate % of UM/A Graduate % of UM/A
1965 244 2.4 315 14.8
1968 469 3.4 467 17.3
1969 982 6.6 849 26.8
1970 1,197 7.4 1,266 30.1
1971 1.492 8.4 1,394 28.6
Source: University of Massachusetts, Office of Institutional Studies.
71~19 72 UM/A data sheets . Amherst, Massachusetts: Author
June 1972.
Clearly
,
Purvis fears of institutional inconsequence had not been
realized. And apparently, the resources had been found enabling stu-
dents to make a more concentrated commitment to graduate education.
Meanwhile, the School was also attracting a greater proportion of the
University’s undergraduates. And it was issuing an ever larger share
of the University's degrees (see Table 5).
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TABLE 5
_
,
Degrees Awarded
School of Education, University of Massachusetts/Amherst
1968-1971
1968-1969 1969-1970 1970-1971
Education: -
Bachelors 249 332 402
Masters 149 236 285
Doctors 12 29 68
UM/A Total:
Bachelors 2,539 2,980 3,143
Masters 599 660 802
Doctors 120 153 263
Source: University of Massachusetts, Office of Institutional Studies,
1971-1972 UM/A data sheets. Amherst, Massachusetts: Author,
June 1972.
Mandate and Resources for a "New" School
The new was a continuation of the old. But the central issue of
our story is an understanding of how the new differed from the old and
how that difference was made possible. As we have already seen, Dwight
Allen brought with him a high level of ambition for the impact the School
would have on the education profession and society as a whole. So urgent
was the need for change, he said, that any change was good when it awak-
ened people to the opportunities that could be found in an experimental,
risk-taking mode of operation (Nathan, 1971, p. 51).
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The first step in building an organization which would reflect
this mode of operation and pursue the goal of dramatic change was find-
ing an environment willing to support such a venture. In fact, the ini
tiative came from the University. In September of 1966, the president
of the University of Massachusetts, John Lederle, announced the retire-
ment of Dean Purvis. Appointed chairman of the search committee was
Oswald Tippo, then provost of the University. Allen’s was among the
names suggested to the committee and it was Tippo who went to visit
Allen at Stanford in early 1967. Recalling that first interview, Tippo
said (in Tippo, 1972) he "was impressed by his articulateness and Intel
ligence, his dynamism, and generally liked everything about Allen.
Here was a man we should look into [p. 11]."
To Tippo in 1966, the School was dull, pedestrian, uninspiring,
and non-progressive. It lacked "great visions and goals for itself."
The School, he thought:
should have better over all quality, become interested in innova-
tion and experimentation, and tackle some of the major social and
educational issues of the day. In other words, "jazz it up,"
open doors and let some new, fresh air in [p. 10].
By May of 1967, the search committee had decided on Allen as the new
dean.
The University administrators gave Allen resources and indepen-
dence that Purvis had not even imagined, much less asked for. Where
Purvis had requested and not received a few more faculty positions,
especially at the level of full professor, Allen entered the "planning
year" with seventeen new positions including four new professors. Ex-
isting vacant positions at the School gave the new dean the opportunity
to recruit a majority of a new faculty. Where the School had enrolled
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about sixty full-time graduate students under Purvis
recruit another sixty with university stipends that
ber from 1966 to 1968.
,
Allen was able to
had tripled in num-
Allen had convinced the University administration that the key
to his ability to reshape the School of Education lay in his ability to
find and recruit people who shared his desire to reshape American educa-
tion. The leverage needed to change the direction of the School could
only be found in creating an overwhelming majority interest in change
among the School's members.
Allen was himself young, just thirty-five when he arrived in
Amherst in January of 1968, and the people he hired between then and
September of 1968 were also mostly young and unknown. He sought people
setting out on their careers rather than those who might be tempted to
rest on their accomplishments. They were people with ideas and ambition
whose personal careers could be tied to their contributions in creating
a new School of Education. They were people who, according to one re-
told story, would respond positively when they got a late night phone
call from a person who said, "Hello, This is Dwight Allen. Would you
like to join a revolution [Nathan, 1971, p. 52]?"
Because of the University's backing, this appeal to adventure
could be coupled with incentives of professional career advancement.
Seeking a young, ambitious staff, most of whom could be hired at the
lower levels of the academic hierarchy, meant that available resources
could be distributed more widely. The number of assistant professors
increased from 10 1/2 to 16 1/2, and lecturers from one to seven during
the single year preceding September of 1968. Similarly, the variety of
incentives, the mixtures of promotions, salary, and responsibility, made
51 .
hiring of a younger staff a more flexible administrative policy. Bank-
ing on the enthusiasms and energies of a young staff, and employing re-
cruitment incentives to tie these energies to the fate of the "new"
school, Allen encouraged an anticipation of success and an excitement
in the opportunities, as well as the struggles, which now lay before the
assembled "community" (see the School’s annual Reports: Allen, 1968,
1969
,
1970, 1971, 1972).
Likewise, graduate students were offered more than the rhetoric
of active participation in a major academic reform. Some were told as
well that they might receive stipends of six thousand dollars, twice the
size of stipends found at other graduate schools or in other parts of
the University of Massachusetts. In addition to stipends, the in-coming
planning doctoral students, could expect to participate as equals on a
one to—one or two—to—one ratio with faculty in the business of designing
a school which would attempt to set the pace of innovation for the educa-
tion profession. To this end, the new doctoral students would be able to
design their own graduate programs free of any restrictive requirements
and would be encouraged to explore the most diverse topics and formats in
their dissertations.
This brief discussion of the new Dean's recruitment strategy has
begged the question of how the resources which be so generously distri-
buted came to rest at his discretion. We know already that the University
administration had allocated substantial resources of money and positions
to him. But had they done so on any stronger grounds than a sense of
conviction that Dwight Allen was the man to revitalize the School of
Education? If various concrete inducements were used to balance the
risks of experimentation for the newly recruited faculty and students,
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then what evidence could Induce persons as publically responsible,
visible and vulnerable as University administrators to accept those
risks? What would lead such persons not only to accept risk but to
abet it with stipends, faculty positions, and temporary waivers of uni-
versity policy to authorize the ferment of the "planning year" and its
consequences ?
Also, other than a strong sense of self-confidence, why would a
group of young, relatively inexperienced faculty and students be con-
vinced that once brought together in rural Amherst, Massachusetts, they
could produce programs with national impact?
As would be the case with any good administrator, the new dean
had to gain viability in the eyes of his superiors and his subordinates
in order to merit the respect and cooperation of both. The basis for es
tablishing these two new relationships can be described in four words:
past and present performance. While Allen could point to several major
areas of accomplishments
,
the immediate focus of attention was on his
success as a grantsman, as a university-based educator capable of gener-
ating substantial financial support for the risk-taking ventures with
which he was associated. A history of success with funding and admin-
istering large-scale projects in teacher training, computer applications
in school administration and other system-changing applied research had
given Allen a national reputation within his own profession. More sig-
nificantly, the new dean would be bringing with him both projects he was
now directing and the presumed potential to expand his fund-raising ef-
forts once appointed. Potentially more significant yet, although cer-
tainly more speculative, was the expectation that with his visibility
and formal authority as dean of a School of Education committed to
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innovation, Allen would be able to find people as well as money and that
the multiplied product of this interaction between people and financial
resources would contribute to useful social change outside the univer-
sity, academic reform and vitality within and the prestige and national
recognition which a growing university needed and sought. Moreover,
these opportunities personified in the new dean meant that the University
could seek these large objectives at only partial cost to itself. A
basic investment would be a sign of the University's support for the
people and ideas of the "new" School. Outside agencies, seeing this
commitment, would be more likely to invest their own resources in a School
which could anticipate University support for innovative activities.
Finally, the University would see its own scarce resources supplemented
by both project awards and general overhead funds.
line of reasoning consisted almost entirely of sets of ex-
pectations regarding future events. The expectations of both University
administration and the new School's new staff were founded on the belief
that the new dean's record of past performance would be substantiated
again (for example, Gluckstem interview, 1972). In this, as events
followed, they were not misled during the first years. Where Purvis in
his final report had counted five outside-funded projects in which the
School was involved, Allen (1968) was able to report twelve such projects
at the end of his first semester on campus. Projects sponsored directly
by the federal government had increased from three to seven. By the end
of the 1968-1969 "planning year," Allen (1969) could report on twenty-
three funded projects, seventeen of them newly funded that year. Within
the first full year of Allen's tenure as dean, outside sources added
over one million dollars to the School's budget, about twice the amount
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of the years immediately preceding his arrival. But more than half the
total amount was attributable to Allen and the faculty he had recruited.
Equally significant as the scale of new outside funding was the
pattern of involvements established in these early projects. Outside
sources financed the Colorado "retreat" which initiated the "planning"
year. A private foundation supported a Hartford, Connecticut pilot pro-
ject of the School's new Center for Urban Education, most of the funds
financing five graduate students who organized the project. An office
of Education contract placed returning Peace Corps volunteers in a cross-
cultural teacher training program created by the School’s Center for
International Education and located in Worcester, Massachusetts. An-
other Office of Education contract provided both program content and
financial support to the many students who contributed to the design of
a model elementary teacher education program. These and other funded
projects brought real-world and real-time involvements to the School.
They signaled an intent to be activist in action as in words. They showed
an ability to bring the School to the attention of national funding agen-
cies and to the attention of educators outside the boundaries of western
Massachusetts (Tippo
,
1972; J. Woodbury, 1970).
Four years later, these new directions remained central to the
mission of the School. School of Education projects could be found in
California, Florida, Washington, D.C., New York, and the six New England
States as well as overseas in Ecuador and Uganda. Other, non-project,
involvements covered a wider area still. And if the School had not
achieved the prestige given to Stanford or Harvard or Chicago, it had
communicated its intentions and expectations of challenge to those es-
tablished institutions. By 1970-1971, the scale of outside funding it
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received challenged that of the schools of education at Harvard and New
York University. 2 Education writers reported that the UMass School of
Education was no longer "forgettable [Time, 1970]."
Summary
This brief portrait of the School within its University context
has emphasized the achievements of a group of people over a short period
of time despite our normal expectations of the small and large misdirec-
tions and misjudgements found with any venturing from routinized paths.
While noting in his fourth annual report as dean that "we still cling
tenaciously to the right to fail," Allen (1971) stated firmly: "There
can be little question, however, that the School of Education has demon-
strated the viability of an institution devoted to constructive innova-
tion and experimentation [p. 5]." It was our purpose to contrast the
images, the reputations, which separated the "old" from the "new" School
of Education, and to indicate the extent to which that contrast was based
on substance. The* evidence presented should demonstrate that, first, the
contrast did exist both as image and substance
; that, second, the School
exhibited ample competency both in dramatizing the contrast it wished to
portray and in fulfilling the broad promise of intended performance; and
that, third, the crucial means of attaining these goals was the use of
resources made available by outside funding.
Harvard’s School of Education reported more than $2.8 million
(about forty percent of its total budget) received from federal grants
and contracts (Sizer, 1972). New York University reported just over
$4.5 million received from "funded research and service" during 1970-
1971 (New York University, School of Education, n.d.). At UMass, the
School recorded funded activity of over $2.4 million for fiscal 1971,
$ 1.4 million from federal sources (Roop, 1971).
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Soft" money was essential. It was eQcpnH,i ^ssential to a strategy which
aimed to institutionalize a process of change nf rP fn • u •man
,
ot reform, within a pro-
fessional school of education. Using allocations from the University
budget as a core resource providing physical facilities, administrative
services, and a core supply of faculty and student manpower, Allen sought
to develop outside funding as the venture capital required if the School
was to establish itself as a major force for reform within the education
profession and the society. Outside funding was to do more than make
possible individual projects. As the proportion of fudning came to dom-
inate the School's total budget, and as the School came to contribute a
major portion of the University's overhead from federal grants and con-
tracts, funding was to give the School political leverage in its nego-
tiations with the University administration. This political leverage
could provide the margin of argument needed to establish a new internal
policy or procedure, admit an unusual "breed" of student, put the School
and thereby the University in an unprecedented relationship with the
world outside. The success of the School in following this strategy
would be a strong incentive for further University support in both policy
and finance. Success was meant to breed success during these years.
But it is time to take a closer look at the strategy of outside
funding, at the University’s absorption of the administrative and pro-
grammatic challenges that strategy presented to its own structures and
policies, and at the complex mixtures of incentives which this strategy
offered its participants. We will seek insight into these issues by
asking three questions which trace the path of funding through the School
organization. First, how did money for project activities come to the
School? Second, how did prospective projects become approved as official
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University activities and how did that aDnrm, i uPP oval shape the uses of out-
side funds? Third, how was this money transform •y ansformed into human behavior
both at the project level and at the level of the Srh i1 r cn c ool as a whole?
These three questions will be the subjects of the f n •j c following three chap-
ters
.
CHAPTER III
FINDING PROJECT SUPPORT: THE REPUTATION GAME
Hew did money for project activities come to the School of
Education of the University of Massachusetts? In this chapter, we will
analyze the fund-raising experiences of projects found at the School
during 1971-1972 in search of any common pattern or patterns helping
to answer this question.
The 1972 annual report of the School of Education listed forty-
four projects funded outside the University during the preceding academic
year (Allen, 1972). Actually, three of these projects were merely the
budgetary tail-ends remaining from previous grants and contracts. In
two other cases pairs of separate grants were listed even though they
were combined administratively to fund single projects. In another case,
a four-month grant was received several months after the January 1, 1972,
date arbitrarily used to identify active funded projects for the purposes
of this study. Finally, in a probable oversight, one active project was
omitted from the annual report, although it was included in the study.
The total of thirty-nine funded projects formed the population from which
information for this study was gathered.
Some Perspective on Grantsmanship
Why do some people in higher education get money while others in
the same field do not? Why do funding agencies give money to some people
and not to others? Before looking the experiences of specific School
projects, we should pay at least passing attention to some of the
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general views of these questions. Essentially two views of the funding
process may be found in the literature. One of these we will call the
rational approach because It depicts a series of orderly steps and ra-
tional decision-making. On the other hand, there is what we will call
the reputation approach because it is based on a series of assumptions
about the applicant and the applicant's project and institution, assump-
tions which are not derived from evidence associated with the specific
project proposal process.
The Rational Approach
The rational approach might also be known as the official approach
because it mirrors the ideal sequence of steps described in funding agency
publications. One student of philanthropic foundations (Andrews, 1956)
found in one annual report the following description of the agency’s task:
The right to give for the benefit of others imposes an obligation to
be as fully informed as possible about the probable consequences of
a gift.
. . . Sooner or later, specific choices are necessary at a
series of levels down to the point where cash expenditures are made
for rent, food, books, microscopes, and the like, by individuals
whose skills, planning and judgment determine the ultimate return
on the philanthropic dollar.
. . . This means investigation of the
utility and feasibility of the objectives, of the integrity, of the
technical skills and of the operating efficiency of the receiving
agency [p. 2],
The thorough examination called for at the foundation’s end of the rela-
tionship was not the only test of a proposal and its intended implementor.
Colleges and universities endowed proposals with credibility by first
screening them through their own review structures. One university presi-
dent (quoted in Andrews, 1956) described how proposals for outside funding
were handled at his institution:
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Careful scrutiny of proposed projects by both the initiating institution
and the funding agency would be intended to weed out poorly designed
projects or projects not appropriate to the standards or the priorities
of either organization. The standardization of quality control review
is one of the chief characteristics of the rational approach to funding.
Another chief characteristic is the presentation of the process
as one which is open to all proposals equally. Broad criteria may be
set defining appropriate classes of applicants, with official program
statements and brochures inviting proposals from all sources within the
broad classification. Awards under one federal program during 1971-1972,
for example: ".
. . are made to local education agencies, institutions
of higher education, and State education agencies [U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, Bureau of Educa-
tional Personnel Development, 1970, p. 19]." Proposals for another pro-
gram:
. . . must be submitted jointly by colleges or universities and
associated local school districts or, in the case of corrections
programs, such other agencies or institutions approved by the
Commissioner. Proposals must be approved by respective State
departments of education [p. 5].
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Presumably, all proposals congruent with the stated criteria would be
considered on merit. Therefore, the key to funding according to the
rational approach Is a clear understanding of the criteria associated
with specific agency funding programs and the incorporation of that clear
understanding into a first class proposal.
The proposal, according to one writer (Urge, 1972) on the art of
obtaining grants, is:
fiil'th
™ docu,"ent
c
^tailing need and describing a program to
it shonS r
6
?' i a '
P°inl: ° f °ne submi tting the proposalould be looked upon seriously as a professional document whichprovides a solid frame of reference.
. .
. From the viewpoint ofthe government agency, it is interpreted as a direct reflection ofyour interest, professionalism, and dedication [p. 1].
The proposal was seen in a similar light by the U.S. Office of Education,
which identified it as the vehicle for the researcher's efforts "to con-
vince your peers that you know what you are doing and that it needs to be
done [quoted in Urgo, 1972, p. 10]." Telephone calls and other personal
contact with the agency were recommended by this writer to help clarify
the interpretation of guidelines. But the advantages of this contact
were seen only in terms of an improved proposal. Political backing could
be helpful in some circumstances, but the user of such backing was warned
not to compensate for a weak proposal by relying on "pressure." Politi-
cal pressure would only arouse strong reaction from agency reviewers in
the form of meticulous documentation of a proposal's weaknesses.
The careful consideration of project quality and the unbiased
selection of superior proposals are the two chief characteristics of the
rational approach to funding in higher education. To a large degree, this
approach seems to be one which is publicized by funding agencies, whether
public or private, and believed in by unsophisticated, uninitiated
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applicants
. If rationality is even an ideal which agencies seek to imi-
tat6
’ " PraCtlCe thSy d° S ° approximately, m fact, the more know-
ledgeable practitioners of the art would argue that in practice, ration-
ality in funding is reached not through formal sets of procedures but
rather by what we designate the reputation approach.
The Reputation Approach
The essence of the reputation approach is caught in the often
heard axiom that "people fund people." This view is shared by some of
the closer observers of higher education. Describing the awards of grants
and contracts from the federal government, Jencks and Reisman (1968)
write: "Federal grants are made largely on the basis of individual pro-
fessional reputation and competence [with] only minimal consideration to
an institution’s location, sectarian ties, racial composition, and the
like [p. 14]. Kerr (1963), viewing the same scene a few years earlier,
recorded much the same picture: "Projects have been supported for rela-
tively short terms and specific purposes; and support has been awarded,
usually on the advice of qualified experts, on the basis of prospective
performance [p. 55]." The use of professional reputation as a criteria
for funding, and as the main criteria according to these observers, takes
us in a very different direction that the previous discussion of close
review and unweighted competition. The evidence being considered now in-
cludes the applicant’s previous performance as known to his peers. More-
over, this performance record includes not only research experience but
academic training and institutional affiliations. The individual is
ranked in part by his surroundings, which are more easily known and under-
stood than might be his personal research capabilities. The judgments of
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others In hiring hit, for faculty positions or other employment and in
selecting his work for publication are taken as seriously as the proposal
at hand. "It is most helpful and reassuring," according to one founda-
tion executive (Weaver, 1967):
* *
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appllcant has not been able to obtain andl a good job And under present-day circumstances, the chanceis exceedingly slim that a really able person would not be associ-
ated with some sort of reputable institution [p. 140].
Prior contact between applicant and agency under these circumstances may
serve primarily as a means of establishing the credibility of the appli-
cant and only secondarily as a means of clarifying the meaning of specific
guidelines. If the applicant is himself unknown, the recommendations of
reputable persons in his field will act as a surrogate reputation. Mem-
bership in a highly respected institution will serve this purpose also by
implying that the applicant could seek the assistance of his reputed col-
leagues during the course of a project and that the applicant’s abilities
have already received the high compliment of employment, an assumed form
of quality control.
The effects of quality control and reputation may be moderated
in some cases by the desire of funding agencies to scatter their resources
geographically. Geographic preferences, placing institutional restric-
tions on the individual proposal, may have been applied in part to over-
come the effects of reputation tending to keep grants within a relative-
ly closed circle of known applicants (Arnold, 1968). But then, within
geographic areas, the basic criteria are reasserted.
The general effect of reputation, both personal and institution-
al, is to undermine the central role assigned to the proposal in the
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rational approach to funding. The nmnnci .8 Proposal under reputation conditions
takes on a new waning. From being "a formal document detailing need"
the proposal becomes the formal recognition of a set of expectations ex-
isting between an applicant and a funding agency. P art of that expecta-
tion may be that the quality of the proposal as a document should be at
least equivalent to competitive proposals. But this is not always the
case, especially if the commitment to funding has been reached verbally
in advance.
dean of the School of Education, for example, asserted that
there were two entirely different types of proposals (Allen, interview,
March, 19 72). The first type, the proposal "to get money," is submitted
by someone who has an idea and wants to get the idea funded. This per-
son must use the document to sell the idea to the agency, directing the
entire content of the document to that purpose. On the other hand, the
proposal "to spend money," sometimes known as a "wired" proposal, "is
written to build in maximum flexibility because you know you have it."
Building flexibility means putting into the project design, and the pro-
ject budget, as many related needs as can be justified to make the pro-
ject comprehensive and successful. Including these related needs assures
the researcher of both the opportunity to meet unplanned contingencies in
the course of a project and of the ability to use the project as a base
from which to launch other activities, discover new opportunities. "This
is the heartland of grantsmanship , " said the dean.
Recognizing the realities of reputation and grantsmanship, many
colleges and universities hire full-time representatives or part-time
consultants to keep the institutions in touch with funding agencies
(Willingham, 1971). The responsibilities of these representatives
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include »akin g contacts
,
aiding negotiations, advising applicants as to
new programs and the agency personnel in charge o£ them, and lobbying
for the creation of new programs or legislation particularly beneficial
to the organizations they represent. Maintaining direct, personal con-
tact is the basic link to successful applications for funding. One level
of personal contact is simple face to face meetings on the principle that
familiarity makes a difference, a positive difference. More crucially,
however, is the placement of faculty or alumni on agency review panels
and in agency administrative positions. These institutional networks
result in flows of information and easily established credibility for new
names and new projects.
Four Configurations of Reputation
The new School of Education lacked alumni, lacked representation
within funding agencies, lacked full-time lobbyists, and, as an institu-
tion, lacked a record of past performance. What it had was a new dean,
a largely new faculty and graduate student body, new ambitions, and a
new mandate from a growing if not yet prestigious state university. By
1971, as we saw in an earlier chapter, it also had a reputation among
supporters and detractors in the field of education. Those at the School
proposed for themselves and communicated to others high expectations of
future accomplishments. The intention was to use resources granted and
contracted by outside funding agencies for the purposes of educational
reform. But getting resources was more a matter of reputation than of
filling out forms, writing proposals, and following standard operating
procedures. In the following pages, we will use four patterns, or con-
figurations, of the concept of reputation in order to analyze the
66 .
fund raising experiences of the School's active f j ,s funded projects of 1971-
19 72. In the process, we will detail -U . .ome of the behaviors associated
with resource recruitment and define characteristic problems which con-
front an organization trying to establish productive relationships with
its envi ronment
.
The four configurations cover a range of possible applicant-agency
relationships. At one end of this range, the initiative for funding comes
from outside the organization, without prior contact, and is based only on
the reputed capabilities of individuals within the organization. The mem-
bers who eventually will direct the project are, at this initial step,
passive beneficiaries of their own reputations. This first configuration
we will define as £ure reputation, referring to a generalized awareness of
a person or organization, an awareness built on a set of beliefs and ex-
pectations but not yet established through the direct experience of the
observer. Although this definition will be compromised to some degree,
we will also include in this category all unsolicited funding contacts,
even though some prior contact may have existed. We assume here that
the initiative of the potential grantor is based on a predisposition, a
preference, to seek a particular relationship and that the predisposition
is itself based upon the grantee's reputation in the mind of the grantor.
A second configuration, that of established reputation, also as-
sumes a prior awareness of a person or organization on the part of the
potential funding agent. But here the awareness is clearly built on a
history of interaction between the two. These well-established, and
respected, linkages between the two parties are the basis for confidence
in the mutual benefits of continuing that relationship. The source of
specific project initiative lies more in the fact of this on-going
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interaction than xn the clear, one-sided activity of either party. Ide
grow out of conversations or out of the lessons learned from preceding
projects. Expectations regarding funding fnr& m r n o projects are arrived at
prior to the session of a proposal, or the proposal is viewed as a
tentative planning document en route to agreement on funding. This con-
figuration was typical of the vast majority of project funding arrange-
ments at the School of Education.
There are times when an applicant for funding, lacking any direct
connection with potential sources of support, may want to establish his
or her credibility by means of an introduction or recommendation from
someone already well-known to the funding agency in question. This in-
troduction may be volunteered by the intermediary. In either instance,
the initiative for funding comes from the prospective project with its
virtues already endorsed by some connection with an established reputa-
tion. Uses of contacts to gain credibility we will identify as a third
configuration of reputation, that of surrogate reputation.
Finally, at the opposite end of possible applicant-agency rela-
tionships from the pure reputation, is a configuration of behaviors iden-
tified by the behavioral fact of the applicant's directly unassisted ini-
tiative. Because we assume that the agency has no prior awareness of the
applicant
,
no prior knowledge to stimulate its interest, we will refer
to this configuration as that of cold reputation. This pattern of be-
havior fits closely the previously described rational approach to project
financing as the applicant tends to follow official sources of informa-
tion and submits a proposal "cold." The quality of a project proposal
plays a more crucial role in this last case, where it represents most if
not all of what the agency knows about an applicant’s ability to perform.
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In discussing these four configurations of reputation, „e will
see that each individual funding effort, regardless of which configuration
it most closely resembles, nust deal with three characteristic problem.
tteSe arS the Pr°blemS ° f est
-ablishing credibility, discovering tutual
interests, and creating a rationale to justify support.
A few words about these characteristic problems will be appropri-
ate. The basic problem any fund-raiser faces is that of establishing his
or her credibility with the officers of a potential funding agency. This
can be done in almost infinite specific ways, advance professional repu-
tation and impressive proposal writing being but two already mentioned.
Other ways will be apparent in the examples which follow. The second
problem is that of finding circumstances where the interests of the pro-
posed project coincide or overlap with the interests of the funding agen-
cy, and, equally important, with the interests of the appropriate officials
within the agency. This requirement may be met simply by submitting a
proposal which clearly fits the program guidelines distributed by the
agency. But other, more complex, situations can arise, as will be seen
in the cases at hand. The third problem is to create a rationale which
convincingly links those mutual interests to the proposed project activi-
ties. This is often the prime function of a proposal, but the solution
to the problem is not always obvious. Each project will emphasize one
or another of these issues. Without credibility, apparent mutual inter-
ests and an impressive rationale are useless. Without appropriate cir-
cumstances of mutual interest, a rationale will look hollow and credibility
is best preserved for another day. Without a rationale, a problem state-
ment that allows interested parties to identify their roles in the proposed
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solution and ? Tduv int'n -if 11 j_u -b y to it, the opportunity created by credibility and
apparent shared interests will be lost.
Pure Reputation
Thu effects of £ure reputation were noticed most readily when
initiative for supplying resources to the School came from some outside
agent or agency. Ihe most obvious examples would be the many students at
at all degree levels who had heard about the School and sought admission
to it, seeing their voluntary participation in the organization as an ef-
ficient path to personal goals, this rationale was also responsible for
the funding of several School projects, both large and small.
The School's participation in the largest of these projects, one
which would continue for several years at high levels of funding, began
when a person with no previous contact with the School or its dean came
to the dean's office mid-way in the 1968-1969 "planning year" (Bergstrom,
interview, November, 1972). Would the School be interested in becoming
a site for a federally funded regional training program? the dean was
asked. Federal agency officials had their own reasons for preferring to
locate the program outside New England’s dominant university community
while still relying on a university base to design and implement the pro-
gram. The program would require administrative flexibility as well as
risk-taking in admissions and program content. The School, by reputa-
tion, was seen as sympathetic to these intentions. Moreover, if this
mutuality of interests was genuine, the agency also saw an opportunity
to assist the School in developing organizational expertise in the crea-
tion of non-traditional training and degree programs. This initial
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conversation led to farther discussions
„hich in tarn resnited in the in-
volvement of both faculty and students in the preparation of a major pro-
posal. Three years later, the project was stillF J on campus, accounting
for over five hundred thousand dollars in ^ •n ii m funding during that period and
resulting in the University's recognition among communities throughout
New England. The project, both in its substance and its year by year
administration, also created on-goine rel ati rmov.4 ug g l onships between the School
and the federal agency in Washington.
Similar circumstances were reported (Wyman, interview. May, 1972)
in the instance of the School’s Northeast Regional Media Center for the
Deaf (NRMCD), although this project was begun in 1966 during the Purvis
deanship when it was one of the School’s few sponsored projects. Accord-
ing to the project director, someone in the Media Services and Captioned
Films branch of the Office of Education called to request an appointment
to visit the School’s media facilities, of which good things had been
heard. The visit resulted in a discussion of the uses of media in the
education of the deaf, a subject about which the project director-to-be
admitted he knew nothing. The Office of Education, on the other hand,
had many people knowledgeable about education of the deaf and few with
media experience. A merger of interests was what OE wanted in establish-
ing regional media centers. Agreed to that day, the project has enjoyed
sustained and substantial annual funding in the years since 1966.
Pure reputation implies the creation of interest prior to any
direct contact. There were also less clear-cut cases of unsolicited out-
side funding coming from sources whose previous experience with the
School encouraged more contact. For example, one small project, in-
volving less than ten thousand dollars used almost entirely to support
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these graduate stipends, owed its presence at the i _F llce c School to a recent doc-
toral alumnus. Now administering a multi-district public education project,
he needed competent part-time assistance and saw the School's student body
as a resource for his work (Eiseman, interview, April, 1972).
Another modest and unsolicited project was an outgrowth of an
earlier and much larger project whose results had brought favorable nation-
al recognition to the School (Reed, interview, May, 1972). The director
of the earlier project, having shared in the general recognition, was soon
hired by another university with substantial promotions in position and
salary. The second project, budgeted for only fifteen thousand dollars,
was offered by the agency program officer directly to the former project
director shortly before he left the School. The School would be only one
of twenty institutions being funded to explore the potential of a current
concept in teacher training related to the earlier project. Because of
its favorable past experience with the School, the agency was guarantee-
ing funding, assuming an appropriate proposal was submitted. Once the
dean had been consulted on the appointment of a new project director,
the proposal was written, submitted and quickly funded. In this instance,
the problems of credibility and identification of interests were of no
consequence and the only task needing a solution was that of creating an
appropriate rationale.
Established Reputation
These last two examples, although unsolicited by persons at the
School, must be considered borderline cases of the effects of pure repu-
tation because of the previous intimate contact with funding agencies. The
72 .
other side of that border is a category of projects whose funding strate-
gies made active use of well-established linkages between the School and
outside agencies
.
The present discussion of established reputation will distinguish
two separate patterns of behavior, both sharing the defining characteris-
tic of deriving funded projects from an on-going, active relationship.
In projects of the first sub-category, which we will identify as wired
projects, the reputation of the applicant has been established some time
before the project is even conceived as an idea. Here the project arises
out of the prior relationship. The second sub-category will include de-
-
el °ped Proi ects . which used a potential project idea as a means of gain-
xng access to an agency’s interest and, in the course of discussing the
basic idea, established the credibility of the applicants. In essence,
this is a distinction between funding based on the use of reputation to
gain a hearing for an idea and funding based on the use of an idea in
order to establish a reputation. In both patterns of behavior, we shall
see that by the time project plans reached the proposal or contract
stage, all expectations were solidified and the two parties well-known
to each other.
Wired projects
One of the more clear-cut examples of a wired proposal was Gerald
Weinstein's request to the Ford Foundation for a three-year grant of
$182,000 for the purpose of developing a Center for Humanistic Education
(Weinstein, interview, April, 1972). Weinstein had worked at the founda-
tion for several years, doing the research and conceptualization which
the grant was intended to implement. With George Brown, who joined the
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University of California at Santa Barbara to estahHaS , „ablish a similar center,
Weinstein was one of the fodders of the humanistic education movement.
The Ford Foundation wanted to fund any proposals Weinstein and Brown
submitted, with the single concern that the centers be located within
institutions which would allow the new discipline to grow and develop
(Meade, interview, October, 1972). Having published books on the basis
of their work at Ford, Weinstein and Brown then decided to apply for
grants. They decided what they wanted to do, found congenial locations
for themselves and submitted their proposals. Ford's concerns about in-
stitutional support were answered by a UMass commitment to hire Weinstein
on "hard" state monies, and by Dean Allen's personal enthusiasm. The
project was funded for the amount Weinstein requested (Weinstein, inter-
view, April, 1972).
Proposals can become "wired" for any number of reasons. In the
case just cited, funding was assured because Ford's priorities had iden-
tified humanistic education as an important concern and because the founda-
tion saw Weinstein and Brown as the persons best qualified to develop the
field. Different factors made the School's relationship to divisions of
the Massachusetts State Department of Education equally predictable.
Here, because both the University and the Department were units of a
single state government's executive branch, the issue of mutuality of
interests was resolved prior to dealing with the problem of specific pro-
ject and personnel credibility. The formal institutional relationship
between School and State, combined with a State policy of supporting the
development of the state university, created a situation where it would
be in the State's best interests to use project funding as a mechanism
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for raising the professional capabilities, and thereby the professional
and public credibility, of selected educational program at the School.
Most of the School's projects which received funds from the State
of Massachusetts were administered through the School's Center for Occu-
pational Education (Ertel, interview, May, 1972). All of the center's
six active projects were funded through the State Department of Education
five of these by the Department's division of occupational education.
Taken as a group, these projects accounted for about $400,000 in "soft,"
outside support during the 1971-1972 fiscal year. In the opinion of the
center's director, it was the "desperate" need for a qualified state teach
er training agency in the field of occupational education which explained
the continued and strong funding from the State. The School was simply
a logical place to spend money earmarked for teacher training. The School
for its part, had welcomed and sought occupational education projects, es-
pecially since the arrival of Dean Allen. Despite an initial period of
programmatic weakness and administrative confusion within projects based
at the center, the State still wanted to spend substantial amounts of
money at the School. Continued administrative confusion would endanger
even such a logical' relationship. The problem faced by the center dur-
ing 1971-1972 was, in the director's view, not that of attracting funds
but rather that of giving order and competent performance to a relation-
ship that the School would be foolish to undermine. Hired with the ini-
tial responsibility of salvaging several uncompleted projects in occupa-
tional education, the director within a semester's time was able to report
the solution of the most urgent problems and to report successful new
funding initiatives (Ertel, memorandum, 1972).
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A project director within the cent-Pr , , , ,6 te acknowledged that the State’s
funding of adult basic education (ABE) projects at the School was intended
to give the university time to develop a professional area to which it had
not had any commitment previously ,• *.f u bi (.Kossman, interview, May, 1972). By
making the project a bridge between the State and the University, he thought,
the state was able to share in the reputation of the School as an action-
oriented institution. The School, with its broad focus on national edu-
cational problems, could cite the project when countering criticisms that
the School was not serving the needs of Massachusetts. In this instance,
mutual interests and the rationale for developing those interests were
sufficiently strong to overcome a wide gap in the credibilities of
the nascent adult basic education program at the School and the nation-
ally prominent ABE program at Boston University, a private institution
which had also sought State funding.
Projects within the Center for Occupational Education received
support not simply because of coinciding interests but also because fed-
legislation had provided money and designated programs for^the ex-
penditure of that money with the Massachusetts Department of Education
being one of the conduits of congressional initiative. One route to the
establishment of an individual's reputation at the national level was
through participation in the design of new federal legislation.
It is not much of an exaggeration to say that the "new" School
of Education's initial survival as an experimental organization was due
to Dwight Allen's strategic participation as co-chairman of a 1967 Office
of Education task force planning the implementation of the Education
Professions Development Act (EPDA) of 1967. Allen owed this opportunity
to the somewhat specialized visibility he had achieved at Stanford
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University where he directed several afunded projects in differentiated
staffing and flexible scheduling (Allen iru-o • ~g .Alie , interview, October, 1972). The
task force Itself p rovlded m opportw.ity to make his views, personality
and skills felt by a national audience, an audience looking for qualities
of leadership within the education profession. It was also an opportun-
ity for Allen to see how ideas were incorporated into official policy and
procedures. In this way, the task force was also an important learning
experience for Allen, who had just been appointed dean of the School and
was to take up his new post in January, 1968.
In September of 1968, Allen (quoted in Tippo, 1972) told his
faculty and student "planners" what he had learned:
rg8 red that US °E S ° t0 ConS ress get the package fundedrather than go with a piecemeal approach by getting line items in-dividualiy funded by Congress which was the usual procedure. We
asked why not try it. The USOE bureaucrats had always done it the
other way.
. . . We got the act totally funded.
. . . With myEPDA experience, I got the tremendous insight that change can be
accomplished by using the old bureaucratic system.
My experience at USOE with writing and implementing the proposal
gave me faith that at UMass
,
we did not have to play the tradition-
al game to get the job done.
.
. . When I arrived as dean in
January, 1968, I was committed to the idea of a planning year-
discontinuing all courses and programs. I also wanted to tap into
the EPDA to get soft money for ourselves. This would free us up to
operate in a freer fashion as a school. We couldn't be constrained
in a negative way by University and state budgets. Thus, I and a
few others came up with METEP (Model Elementary Teacher Education
Program) as a funding proposal to tap into the new EPDA. . . . The
actual METEP proposal was written and developed at Stanford by pros-
pective faculty and myself. ... It was submitted to USOE two days
before I officially became Dean at UMass.
. . . This raised a big
storm; the faculty at UMass felt I had gone ahead and made a commit-
ment that they had no say or input. But I didn't want to lose this
funding opportunity. ... I didn't want to lose out by default.
If I had waited, the opportunity may have been lost if I had taken
it to a faculty committee at UMass [p. 14].
Convinced on the one hand that the School could by-pass the "traditional
game" of squeezing institutional budgets and equally convinced on the
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other hand that the Washington bureaucracy could be an alternative
of resources, Allen looked to METEP as a test of his strategy for
zation building. The project became the first of a eurs succession of
projects funded by the Office ofy nic x education under the EPDA.
source
org ani-
maj or
In Washington, Allen worked closely with Don Davies. Davies,
then an official with the National Education Association, was a member
of the National Advisory Council on Education Professions Development.
The Council was created by the EPDA legislation as an on-going body to
oversee the report on the implementation of the act. Davies soon resigned
from both the NEA and the Council to head the new Bureau of Educational
Personnel Development (BEPD) as an associate commissioner of education.
By 1971-1972, Davies had been promoted to deputy commissioner for devel-
opment, administering one of OE's three major program branches, including
the BEPD. Throughout this period, the School successfully "tapped into"
BEPD programs for project support. The scale of funding grew from about
$440,000 for two projects in 1969-1970 to about $1,300,000 for seven pro-
jects during 1971-1972 (estimates drawn from School annual reports).
More basic factors than friendship or collegiality entered into the par-
allel advances made by Davies and the School. Central to an appreciation
of this history is an awareness of how both parties recognized the oppor-
tunities provided by the EPDA and turned them to their advantage. A cen-
tral figure in the design of the BEPD, Allen was well-known to its chief
administrators, his commitment to the Bureau's objectives certified in
advance of any specific proposals. Within the Office of Education hier-
archy, Allen's performance with the task force established his personal
credibility, created a community of interests, and offered a general
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rationale for his interest in nil ^Programs offered under the EPDA. Merit
and relationships reinforced each other.
"Alot of what „e were trying to do in the BEPD had a high risk
quality.
" Davies recalled in interview (June 1972) Allv xy I* • en, as we saw
in the previous chapter, sought to characterise himself and his "new"
School as risk-takers, initiating projects which would place him on the
cutting edge of educational reform Davipc ves acknowledged that Allen was
perceived as a controversial figure, one with the imagination to look at
educational problem, and devise appropriate solutions. This quality was,
he said, "a strong plus as far as investing money in an institution is
concerned But while acknowledging his respect for Allen's personal
abilities and his achievements at UMass, Davies stressed that "my inter-
est is not in Dwight Allen as a person. His interests are in the centers
at the School of Education. Some of those happen to coincide with inter-
ests here at the Office of Education."
In the course of seeing those interests coincide over a period of
several years, the School and Dwight Allen had developed a "track record"
which, from the perspective of Washington and in comparison with the pro-
ject performance histories of other schools of education, was a good one.
What factors were included in this track record? Davies noted five which
impressed him. First was the ability to attract a faculty of more di-
verse backgrounds than could be found in most schools of education, many
of which were "highly isolated" from the world at large. Diversity of
this sort was itself a major advantage in effectiveness of project manage-
ment. Second, Allen had successfully attracted a wide range of graduate
students, a resource which Davies thought was directly related to the op-
eration of projects. Creating this kind of diversity brought with it the
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turmoil and debate attached to new means of credentials a „eaentialmg and to new pro-
grams. "Office of Education objectives " d^h*J ur , Davies emphasized, "are greatly
enhanced by that sort of thing." Third was Allen's proven imagination
for devising new solutions to persistent major problems. A fourth factor
was Allen's ability to produce in new areas demanding creative responses,
the early METEP project having been one of the two best reports from the
ten funded projects. Finally, Davies considered Allen "a man of personal
integrity, imaginative but not a distorter of money."
Allen's work on the EPDA task force was also observed by people
outside the government, or about to leave it. Harold Howe, the Commis-
sioner of Education who had appointed Allen to the planning task force,
was soon to leave that post for the Ford Foundation, where, in 1971-1972,
he would be a vice president in charge of the division of education and
research. Directly under him as officer in charge of the public educa-
tion section of the division was Edward J. Meade, Jr. In 1967, Meade
had been with Ford and its Fund for Educational Advancement for several
years. He had helped Allen find Ford money for the Stanford Flexible
Scheduling Project. It was this project, which progressed from a $23,000
first Ford grant through federal funding eventually totalling almost one
million dollars, that gave Allen his initial entree into Washington
(Allen, interview, October, 1972). But, Meade recalled, at Stanford,
Allen had been a junior faculty member with a reputation for his involve-
ment in educational technology, "tinkering" with change, rather than in
leadership issues (Meade, interview, October, 1972). From the Founda-
tion’s point of view, the EPDA task force was "the first chance for us
to find out how he felt about personnel and leadership." Ford was inter-
ested in EPDA because "despite lots of legislation to improve schools
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• • . it was apparent to us that leadershin ,•lp was important, that the lack
of it can stand in the way of change."
Thus, Allen's performance on the 1967 con iyo task force was also impor-
tant xn making his broad, as opposed to specially •
-
lu ecialized, interests and talents
known at a national level at precisely t-hp uhe time he was taking on his new
responsibilities as Dean at the University of uux t Massachusetts. There were
many unknowns at that time about what Dwight Allen would do at UMass. But
his now-proven concern for people and leadership issues, his dramatic move
from Stanford to create at Amherst a "school to serve the nation," and the
opportunity to implement new programs in a school lacking "an embedded
tradition with a background of 'success'" were all factors which made
Ford interested in supporting the new dean. This interest, reinforced by
Weinstein’s selection of the School as the site for his Center for Human-
istic Education, materialized during 1969-1970 into a $50,000 planning
grant to develop an innovative leadership training program for education-
al administrators. The following year the School received a first-year
grant of $198,000 from Ford as one of seven universities participating
in the program. With a second group of doctoral candidates entering on
fellowships in 1971-1972, the project's funding was increased to $287,750.
The intent of this discussion of Dwight Allen's participation in
the design of the Education Professions Development Act was to provide
insight into some of the complexities underlying the established approach
to project funding. The reader should not be left with the impression
that personal relationships guaranteed success for all proposals, or
even any single proposal, forwarded to the BEPD. Each project would
still have to stand on its own ability to establish credibility, shared
interests, and a viable rationale. Each would still be subject to the
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professional expectations of the agencies concerned and the whimsy of
national and bureaucratic politics. The National Alternative Schools
Project would be funded in 1971-1972 instead of a year earlier because
the Office of Education, with its nationwide clientele, could not find
a rationale to justify supporting two large-scale sole-source projects
at the School simultaneously, whatever the perceived merit of the pro-
posed project (Allen, interview, October, 1972). Before granting fund-
ing for the administrative leadership project, Ford program officers
would require a complete reconceptualization of the project proposal to
include an infusion of the liberal arts (Flight, interview. May, 1972).
The School remained one among many applying for federal and foundation
support and its dean one among many voices wanting to be heard. The ad-
vantage lay in knowing that voices from the School would be heard because,
for the time being, students and faculty could share in Allen’s reputation
for leadership in education.
Developed projects
The configuration of events leading up to a developed funding
effort are similar to, but significantly different from, those typical
of the wired proposal. When successful, both efforts may have the same
end result in a proposal which confirms prior discussions, revisions
and mutual assurances. But the route of the developed proposal is more
difficult. The parties to a wired project, as we have defined that sub-
category, have already achieved mutual credibility before project fund-
ing even arises as an idea. The participants in a developed project, on
the other hand, must overcome at one time the three basic obstacles of
achieving credibility, defining mutual interests, and creating an appro-
priate rationale.
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where reputation and credibility are uncertain, but where appar-
ent mutual interests and a strong rationale are present, the officer of
a funding agency may develop a single project by successive stages. The
risks of funding are absorbed in small steps while a record of past per-
formance and professional credibility is created. Such, at least, was
the experience of the School’s Center for International Education (CIE)
as it slowly negotiated its way into a $11? ^ -< <-y proposal for its Ecuador
project in non-formal education (Evans, interview, June, 1972).
When a faculty member and graduate student from the Center trav-
eled to Columbia on a short-term consulting contract in October of 1970,
Allen asked them to visit a friend of his who was the principal of a pri-
vate secondary school in Quito, Ecuador. Allen knew the principal wanted
to experiment with the curriculum there and perhaps an arrangement could
be made to set up an internship program between the private school and the
School of Education. Coincidentally, the visiting graduate student knew
that a friend of his from Peace Corps days was living in Quito and working
with the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). The visiting
pair arranged to stay at his home, a choice which set events in motion.
It turned out that the AID friend was a member of the Cotopaxi
board of directors and eager to hear about current educational innova-
tions. Conversations at his home turned to the interests of the faculty
and students at CIE and the Center's major focus on non-formal education.
This led to an invitation for the visitors to meet other members of the
AID staff to outline what CIE was doing with non-formal education. Their
ideas enthusiastically received, the UMass pair discovered that the AID
mission in Ecuador had been looking for new directions for the past two
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years and that the independent thinking of the Cente a& i cn r seemed to fit very
closely. The visit closed with promises to "do something."
Six months later, a four-man feasibility team from the Center
hired by AID as consultants to visit Quito and d« i^ develop a proposal for
further activities. Out of this two week controlK tract came a feasibility
survey of education in Ecuador and several sketrhv „ ti c y proposals with rough
budgets. AID remained interested, agreeing after a "period of waffling"
to fund an extended field stay during the summer of 1971. A CIE doctoral
candidate went to Quito to coordinate the AID-UMass relationship and to
develop a more detailed proposal. Essentially, the Center found itself
In the unusual position of being funded to write a sole-source proposal.
But by now, both through the presentation of their ideas and their demon-
strated ability to work effectively with Ecuadorians, the Center's pro-
ject personnel had gained the respect and confidence of officials in the
AID mission. The doctoral student's grant was extended as ideas were
developed in conjunction with the Ecuadorian ministry of education. The
arrival of a new AID mission director created another period of "waffl-
ing and uncertainty, as did the temporary refusal of Congress to approve
a new AID authorization.
But the basic intentions of the project were clear, the AID mis-
sion was kept well informed, and the education section of the mission was
now working to keep the project alive. A series of questions and indi-
rect answers gave the CIE staff a "ball park" idea of the scale of fund-
ing they could aim for in their proposal. Technically, this information
should not have been available. But once a suggested budget was rejected
by AID, the actual working boundaries were readily apparent. By December
of 1971, the CIE coordinator was back in the United States traveling
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between Washington and Averse white naiii„g down the detalls of prQ.
Posai negotiating the project's regents with the School and University
administration. Towards the end of this funding saga, the graduate coor-
dinator and a CIE faculty member sat down with an AIR desk officer in
Washington who knew nothing about the project and helped him write the
contractual description. What had begun as * oh.u a chance meeting ended, after
several demonstrations of competence, as an established proposal.
Surrogate Reputation
Reputation can be pure, or untouched by direct personal relation-
ships. It can become established, or based upon a history of direct re-
lationships. Reputation can also be borrowed. Within the category of
surrogate reputation are included projects whose initial credibility with
a funding agency was based upon the recommendation of a third person.
In February of 1971, the School Council, the representative leg-
islative body at the School of Education at the time, voted to commit
the School to a "completely modular curriculum":
... to a full conversion for September of 1972, if appropriate
administrative support systems are developed, evaluation procedures
spelled out, faculty and student commitment is determined, under-
graduate advisory and counseling procedures are operable, and im-
plementation procedures are clearly defined.
.
.
[in Christensen,
19 71]
.
The completely modular curriculum (CMC) was one of Allen's prime person-
al interests at the School, a reform of organizational structure which,
he thought
,
would encourage innovative thinking by creating new rela-
tionships and opportunities for members of the organization. He had
found internal School funds to nurture the project during its initial
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stages. Now timing was important if thecn project was to meet its dead-
line. There was no expectation of suggestion that the University should
use its funds to finance the sizable developmental and start-up costs
still remaining.
About this time, a friend of the dean, a person sympathetic to
the success of the School, inquired if any worthwhile projects at the
School needed support (Allen, interview, July, 1972 ). If so, perhaps
an introduction to the Carnegie Foundation would help set events in mo-
tion and permit a careful hearing there All Pn •6 -uer . ie used this opportunity to
present the CMC proposal to Cameeie Rut- . .p p LU u g . B t the meeting was not success-
ful, perhaps in part because the ramifications of the CMC concept were
not communicated adequately, perhaps because the styles of the people
involved did not mesh. In any case, the initiative at Carnegie seemed
lost
.
Shortly thereafter, the Foundation again appeared as a possibil-
ity. The president of the University, Robert Wood, inquired if there
was some way in which he could help the School. CMC was still the pri-
ority issue on the dean's funding agenda. Now it was Wood's turn to
reveal that he had a contact at Carnegie, this time at a higher level
than that at which the previous discussions had been held. With this
assistance, Allen was again presenting the CMC proposal to Carnegie and
this time the response was clearly more favorable. The Foundation’s
only serious concern centered on the degree of University support
—
gen-
uine continuing support— for the CMC, both at the campus and University
levels. By his willingness to guarantee total support, Wood insured the
Carnegie grant. On June 15, 1971, the Foundation’s executive committee
voted to grant the project $87,800 to cover two years, with a first
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installment for the preparation year being $5 3,000 and a conditional
second installment for the implementation year of the remaining $34,800
(Anderson, letter, June, 1971).
Why were these two different "qnrmnotooM . , , .j- i surrogates willing to offer their
help? The first contact with Carnegie came from a "friend of the School,"
a person with no apparent advantage to gain who respected the School’s
efforts at educational reform. The second contact must be seen from the
point of view of the office of the president of the University of
Massachusetts. As explained by Peter Edelman (interview, November, 1972),
the assistant to Wood, the expectation was that "by operating in good
faith to maximize University resources, we will get the university into
activities this office views as useful. In this sense, the rewards are
intrinsic." There was also the possibility that successful or at least
sincere, forceful effort by the president's office would lay the ground-
work for good relations with the affected University staff and organiza-
tional units. Presumably, in times of unpopular University decisions,
these good relations would make discussions of these decisions more rea-
sonable and less influenced by unwarranted fears that the president's
office was "out to get someone."
In a School of Education where the dean was himself the princi-
pal developer of and magnet for outside funding, one would expect that
other persons in the School would look to him as a possible surrogate
credibility factor. This, of course, was the case. As in any such situ-
ation, the degrees of his support could range from a lack of negative in-
volvement in a venture with which he basically disagreed to a willingness
to assume all responsibility for the funding effort. Inbetween were
stages including letters of support, personal telephone calls to
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appropriate agencies, and personal visits m f a-f b i to funding agencies or visits
to potential project sites to encourage field participation. For example,
much of the groundwork to establish field relationships for the Career
Opportunities Program (COP) in Brooklyn, Hew York, was laid by the direc-
tor of the School's Center for Urban Education. But when questions of the
University's commitment to the program were asked, the ability of the di-
rector to have the dean appear "on command" gave the project credibility
(Allen, interview, October, 1972).
At another time when the director of the School’s Center for the
Study of Human Potential found in 1969 that his hopes for major federal
funding had been cut at the last minute by a Presidential freeze on all
new programs, even after telephone confirmation of a three-year grant, he
sought help from the dean (Jordan, interview, May, 1972). Support was
needed to develop and pilot test a teacher training program based on a
comprehensive analysis of research on the learning potential of young
children. Allen was one of four Massachusetts members of the board of
directors of the New England Program in Teacher Education (NEPTE)
,
es-
tablished in May, 1970, by the New England Regional Commission. In the
first round of proposals submitted to NEPTE, several were received from
the School of Education, among them one from the Center for the Study of
Human Potential.
Later, Allen recalled that the NEPTE board's review of School
proposals operated under two major considerations (Allen, interview,
October, 1972). On the one hand, the program was a multi-state venture
and the available funds were meant to be distributed in a balanced fash-
ion. On the other hand, the board was impressed by the quality of the
UMass proposals and had in fact encouraged their submission. Two School
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faculty members
,
for example, had been hired earlier, when the board was
first appointed, as consultants to suggest areas of concern NEPTE should
address In the region and possible strategies to address those problems.
Disqualifying himself from participating in the decision to fund
any of the School's proposals, Allen did make the formal presentations
for two of them, including the Human Potential project. His argument
that both projects should be funded if other potential projects were not
of equivalent or better quality won the day. The projects were only two
among twenty-eight funded by NEPTE through June, 1972, but they were among
the very largest. Human Potential received $175,121 for its eighteen-
month project. The Integrated Day Program at the School, which had ini-
tially submitted a proposal for first year funding of $172,000, received
a sunmer teacher-training grant (Rudman, interview. May, 1972). Together
with a second grant at the end of the summer, the project was granted
$95,000 from NEPTE for its first year. A third School project, actually
a spin-off alternative high school program for dropouts in Springfield,
Massachusetts, was funded for $88,650 (NEPTE, 1972). This last project,
run by School graduate students, had no official connection with the
University.
Clearly, the use of surrogate reputation, borrowed credibility,
was a complex issue subject to the nuances of all political relationships.
In matters calling for human judgment and decisions based on conflicting
pressures, the use of another person's reputation can add more room for
uncertainty as easily as it can add the extra measure of assurance. But
the examples cited demonstrate that at times, it could be the only way
to be heard with authority.
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Cold Reputation
Finally we come to the cateeorv of i jg y the cold project proposal.
TMs category tits the tergal outline ot project funding. The assumptlon>
or chance taken, with a cold proposal is that the quality of the document
Itself Will prevail
. This staple model of grants.anship was ataost no-
found at the School of Education during 1971-1972. To all
appearances, however, one project did quality.
reported by the project's principal investigator (Urch, inter-
view, May, 1922), a written request for guidelines and the proposal itself
constituted the only contact between the applicant and the agency. The
applicant, an assistant professor in the School's Center for International
Education, was a member of the Comparative Education Society, in whose
bulletin he saw a brief article describing a National Endowment for the
Humanities program in cross-cultural education. Guidelines in hand, he
presented his ideas to the Center's weekly meeting, asking if anyone was
interested in these concerns and willing to help write the proposal. With
the aid of two doctoral students, he wrote and submitted the proposal
"blind" for $75,000. Several months later with no interim contact be-
tween agency and applicant, a letter notified the principal investigator
that the project had been approved and awarded $40,000 for a one-year
period. The letter requested a response detailing the plan of action.
After several weeks of proposal revision to accommodate the project to
the reduced budget and agency suggestions, the project was under way.
This model example of a cold strategy for outside funding is
compromised only by some unknown factors which the present study was
unable to explore. At the lowest level, it is possible that the history
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of the funding effort was misrepresented to the ,• „ .f ‘tea interviewer. This is
possibiiity in all the examples given. A second possibility would
^ that some hind of personal intervention was made unbeknown to the appli-
cant himself, such intervention could include a direct comment or inguiry
to agency officials by someone within the School or University administra-
perhaps an agency official or review board member, knowing a
reliable personal source within the University sought additional infor-
mation about the applicant and his capabilities. Finally, even if the
applicant was himself totally unknown to the agency, the reputation of
his department, his school, his university could have enhanced or detract-
ed from the confidence with which a proposal reviewer received his ideas.
This is simply to say that at some level and to some degree, varying in-
evitably from case to case, no funding effort can escape the effects of
reputation.
Summary
Finding and recruiting financial support from government and pri-
vate funding agencies is largely a matter of reputation. It is also much
more than that. Throughout the examples found in our four categories of
funding strategies—pure, established, surrogate, and cold—we have seen
how each project had to deal with three characteristic problems, reputa-
tion or credibility being only the first of those problems. The others,
discovering mutual interests and creating a rationale to justify support,
could be equally important, equally decisive, under some circumstances.
Before a project was successful in finding support, however, all three
problems had to be solved.
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was
an in-
We have seen also how reputatinno became established through per-
formance visible to important observers. This personal reputation in
turn provided the opening through which project proposals, could be sub-
mitted with reasonable chance of being respected and accepted. The next
step, one which will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter,
the extension of project funding won by individual reputation into
stitutional reputation. For even though agencies funded specific projects
for specific purposes, the presence of projects and their funds indirectly
benefited the organization to which they were attached. With faculty po-
sitions, attractive graduate stipends, increased visibility for an organ-
isation's activities, and financial overhead paid to the university, pro-
jects intensified the flow of resources throughout the School organization.
This more intensive flow of resources also created more opportunities to
develop new ideas and attract still more resources. Assuming the continued
availability of outside support, a critical assumption, the key to this
strategy of organization-building lay in the ability of the School admin-
istration to keep individual projects feeding into the mainstream of the
organization’s life, to keep the pieces from self-isolation. As we have
seen, one way of attempting to meet this challenge was to combine in a
single person the formal authority of the School’s dean with the informal
magnetism of the School's most successful fund-raiser.
But we should also be reminded that these organizational challenges
had to be solved within an environmental context. In the case of the
School of Education that environment had two major shaping forces. One
was the presence of funding agencies whose assets and priorities permitted
them to subsidize projects in areas of the School’s competence and inter-
est. The other was the presence of a university administration which
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established both
dures to monitor
criteria o£ appropriate project involvements and proce
those involvements. The environment created by avail-
able resources has been discussed in this and earlier chapters. It is
to that second environment of the university context
third chapter, to which we now turn.
introduced in the
CHAPTER IV
FUNDED PROJECTS AND UNIVERSITY REVIEW
Before discussing how the School of Education itself operated
as a base for outside funded projects, before analysing the administra-
tion of what the second chapter identified as an innovative higher edu-
cation organization, and before attempting to understand why Dwight Allen
(interview, March, 1972) would say that there was "no way we could have
made it without soft money," we should look at those procedures and prac-
tices of the University of Massachusetts which were directly concerned
with the approval of sponsored research. As a legal sub-unit of the
University, the School had to maintain its policies compatible with those
of the University as a whole. A description of School procedures must be
incorporated within a description of the University's.
This review of the "rules" will identify the formal organization-
al structure through which applicants for outside funding moved in order
to secure their objectives. Once the formal structure has been described,
it will be appropriate to account for the actual experiences of various
School projects with that structure. In this way, we will define with
greater specificity some of the boundary lines separating acceptable
from unacceptable activities, as those boundaries were established by
the University during the period of this study.
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Project Approval Sfr„o riirP at the University Level
Work undertaken by faculty staff a ay i , , and students of institutions
8 education m the United States is commonly denoted as "spon-
sored" when it is financially subsidized by non-university sources yet
officially recognized by the particular university or college as a direct
and legitimate responsibility. The basic policy of the University of
Massachusetts on sponsored activities was first approved by the Board of
Trustees in 1963 and subsequently amended in 1968 and 1970 (Camarino,
1972). The Board determined that sponsored projects would be permitted
subject to certain stipulations regarding appropriateness, official ap-
proval and financial compensation. The preface to the policy includes
the following assumptions:
WHEREAS it is the policy of the University of Massachusetts to Pypect each member of the faculty to \ 0 ex~
Other cphninriw a teach, engage m research and/or
and for the n -
and
.
creatlf work ’ and t0 Perform a service role to
.
. f
diversity including the academic advisement and coun-seling of students, and
WHEREAS it is also the policy of
sponsored and paid for by grants
federal government, foundations,
the University, and
the University to undertake research
or contracts from agencies of the
business, or other sources outside
WHEREAS such sponsored research is of great economic advantage tothe Commonwealth in that it both supports research that might other-
wise require state appropriations and provides new processes for de-
velopment by Massachusetts industrial and agricultural interests,
THEREFORE, it is the policy of the University of Massachusetts to
permit compensation for certain additional professional services
within the following policies [p. 2].
Among the policies itemized is one requiring that research proposals
"shall bear the approval of the principal investigator, the department
head, the academic dean. . . and the Dean of the Graduate School and
Coordinator of Research before being submitted to the Treasurer of the
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University for execution/' The treasurer became the "authorized univer-
sity official" whose signature officially approved of the proposal's
transmittal to a non-university destination in search of support.
But if the University had an official policy regarding sponsored
research after 1963, it did not have uniform procedures to implement that
policy in the years that followed. Changes in practice were responses to
the growth of the University and its involvements with sponsored research.
When the University's first Manua^Je^sor^^ (Camarino, „ 72)
was finally published in late 1972, the dean of the Graduate School intro-
duced it by writing that:
The extraordinary growth of activity in the Graduate Office in the
tions hive" rebL'd f ^ °VerKhelmed «• Graduate applica-ex a t le , degrees granted have doubled research andgram support requests have more than doubled.
.
.’ and so fonJ.
'
The growth in size and quality have
not yet had time to provide a level
the needs of the expanded community
occurred so quickly that we have
of support services adequate to
[pp. ii-iii]
.
Publication of the Manual was intended to help remedy this situation by
consolidating information from many sources and points in time into a
single document.
Centralization of information concerning sponsored projects fol-
lowed from the centralization of responsibility for University review of
proposals in the office of the associate graduate dean for research.
This decision in September, 1971, by the vice-chancellor for academic
affairs (Gluckstern, memorandum, 1971a) consolidated the review of "all
proposals requesting outside support involving any academic aspect of
the University at any level." Previously, a distinction had been made
between "research proposals" and "training grants," the former being
reviewed by the Graduate School and the latter by the Provost's office.
96 .
The controller continue, to sign tor the treasurer's o«ice as ’Wbor-
iced University official" until July, 1972, when that authority was als<
transferred to the associate graduate dean for research where project
grants were concerned. The treasurer’s Gained the official signature
for contracts (Gluckstern, memorandum, 1972). These changes in
responsibilities were symptoms of a persistent flux in University prac-
tices as administrators sought to accommodate the pressures created by
growth. School of Education proiectt;P 1 c s, of course, operated within this
changing environment.
Project Approval St ructure at the School Level
In the School of Education, the problem of deciding how to rou-
tinize both information dissemination and proposal processing for spon-
sored research was shared by the two offices of special programs and
administration, each with its own assistant or associate dean of educa-
tion. The office for special programs was generally responsible for
assisting in the development and funding of School projects and for the
coordination of information about existing projects. This office with
its deanship had not existed before 1968 and its creation signified the
importance Allen gave to sponsored projects. Assisting a given proposal
or contract through the University’s approval channels was a responsi-
bility not of the special programs office, but rather of the dean for
administration, whose office was also responsible for all financial
monitoring and record-keeping within the School. Because the staff of
this second office had closer contact with the mass of proposals and
contracts than did the special programs staff, and because this office
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was also more closely in touch with t-h*W! the various offices in the University's
approval chain, these people also became a principle res ,ource for the
prospective proposal writer or budget-maker uk • u *. Which of these offices was
actually sought out for advice was more a matter nfo where the prospective
grantsman felt more comfortable than of any define! area of responsibility.
until March, 1971
, information about School and University poli-
cies and procedures concerning sponsored research was communicated mostly
by word-of-mouth within the School. The less experienced grantsmen talked
to the more experienced. At one point or another, however, all project
directors came in contact with the special assistant to the dean for ad-
ministration. Very quickly after his appointment in the Fall of 1970
,
the special assistant discovered that he was constantly re-explaining in-
ternal University procedures for processing proposals and contracts. The
obvious solution was a memorandum in March, 1971 (Bender, memorandum,
1971a). This was revised in January, 1972
,
to include subsequent changes
in policy "cross campus" (Bender, memorandum, 1972 ). It was the expressed
intent of both these documents:
* t0 °utline the steps which we must follow in order to comply
with University regulations and time schedules as they apply toproposals and contracts in order to make life easier for prospec-tive principal investigators and those who will be affected finan-
cially or otherwise by proposals which are accepted by a funding
agency [ 1971
,
p. 1 ].
6
In other words, the memorandum was a lesson plan on how to test the ac
ceptability of project goals and means to University officials.
Projects in which no funds were involved needed only internal
School of Education review. Four copies of a rough draft proposal of
two or three pages describing the research or project were to be
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submitted to the assistant dean for administration who would then dis-
tribute them to the other deans for review.
Proposals for Grants
posals for project grants faced a more complicated sequence
of informa! and formal review. According to University policy, only the
signature of the dean of the School of Education was required prior to
University review. The School's own procedure, however, first requested
that persons seeking outside financial support submit a short rough
draft "of all relevant ideas" to the dean for administration for distri-
bution to the other deans. A tentative budget could be attached. The
guide stressed that this step be taken prior to contacting funding agen-
cies in order to avoid situations where proposals from the School competed
for the same agency funds in ignorance of each other. This had happened
once during the first burgeoning of funded projects in 1968 with the
consequent loss of both efforts. At that time, the agency had decided
that if the School administration was not aware of the two proposals,
then it could not be trusted to monitor and support them once funded
(Bender, interview, February, 1972).
Review by the deans at this initial stage was intended to alert
them to potential problems and opportunities inherent in particular pro-
posals and to permit questioning and strategizing between project staffs
and deans. In other words, this was a time for the School administration
to make initial commitments to projects or to express reservations and
suggest revisions.
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Following initial approval, a fonnal proposal with a finalized
budget was to be submitted to the dean for administration for internal
processing. The University's internal processing for. was attached at
this point, to be signed by the dean of education. There being no de-
partments within the School, the need for a department head's signature
did not arise. With a cover sheet added which would also serve as the
transmittal sheet carrying the signature of the "authorized University
official," the proposal and its internal processing form had to be xer-
oxed so that the School’s administrative staff assistant would have the
six copies needed for internal processing. Only at this point was a
proposal considered ready to leave the School for university review.
Actually, some projects required an additional step. Proposals asking
for funding of $200,000 or more, or anticipating an eventual escalation
of funding to those heights, required the approval of the School Council.
Both an elective School Council and its powers of review were authorized
in a constitution of the School of Education (University of Massachusetts,
School of Education, 1971c).
Persons submitting proposals were warned to allow "at least a
week for running the proposals through university channels. One morn-
ing or less would be sufficient if all administrators were in their
no questions were asked. But this was not always the case.
There were three stops in the approval voyage within the University ad-
ministration, all to be made in proper sequence. Over in the Whitmore
Administration Building, the university accountant was first to check
the budget and approve it by initialing the internal processing form on
the line reserved for the treasurer's office. Of the six copies, he re-
tained two, one copy being sent to the Commissioner of Administration
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and Finance in Boston for the formal approval of the State Executive
Office. Next to the accountant's initials the university controller
would sign his name, approving the budget for the University. The con-
troller would also sign the transmittal sheet, officially activating the
proposal under University policy. During the year prior to September,
1971, the "authorized" signature was given before the proposal had been
reviewed for programmatic content by either the provost's or graduate
dean's offices. This inconsistency with Trustee policy was corrected
that September when programmatic review was made the first step in the
process. But the sequence was revised again in June, 1972, when the
"authorized" signature was assigned to the associate graduate dean for
research, thereby locating both final university approval and program-
matic approval in a single office.
^>r:*'or *"° September, 1971, the distinction noted earlier between
proposals for research and training grants was operative. The former
were carried to the Graduate School for signing by the research coordin-
ator, an assistant or associate graduate dean delegated this responsi-
bility by the dean of the Graduate School. Training grants were taken
to the Provost s office within Whitmore for review by an associate pro-
vost. Whichever of these two offices was involved would retain a copy
for its files.
A fourth copy would be filed with the School of Education's
dean for administration. The two remaining copies were returned to
the principal investigator for forwarding to the funding agency. If
After January, 1972, the School's dean for special programs
also received a copy.
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accepted, these proposals would be signed bv thpy e agency, with one copy
returned to the principal investigator.
Contracts
"Contracts for service" were another matter entirely. Here it
was assumed that the f'mifr'nnHnr, ,contracting member of the School had already reached
an understanding about a particular project with some potential funding
agency. The contract constituted a more stringent demand than a research
grant for it held the University financially liable for completed perform-
ance. Moreover, where a grant proposal would be reviewed and authorized
by the University prior to submission to the funding agency, a contract
would not be signed until the funding agency had itself signed the con-
tract and provided legally binding proof that the agreed funding had been
encumbered by the agency payable to the University and that the agency
person signing the contract was authorized to do so.
When planning a project involving a contract, the prospective
university researcher or consultant was asked (Bender, memorandum, 1971a)
to address a memorandum to the School’s five deans "stating the benefit
to the University of entering into the project [p. 4]." A letter to the
funding agency would be prepared informing it of the University’s re-
quirements and asking to have three signed copies of the contract for-
warded to the School’s dean for administration. A contract would be
developed, typically by the agency but in accordance with University
format. The contract together with supporting requests for documentary
proof noted above would be hand carried by the administrative staff
assistant to the University’s attorney for approval. Only then were
102
.
these documents submitted to the agency for rh.-i •s y t t e r signatures. Finally,
with supporting evidence and signed contracts on hand, the University
treasurer would execute the contract. During 1971_ 1972> thl, flnal <lg_
nature was given only after prior review and approval by the vice-chan-
cellor for administration.
The reader should be conscious by now of the presence of a bureau-
cratic structure at work. The crucial characteristics of coordination of
efforts, achieving some common goals or purpose, specialization and sub-
sequent division of labor, and a hierarchy of authority can be found in
abundance throughout this chapter (Schein, 1965). As simple and clear-
cut as were the few steps involved in proposal and contract approval,
closer inquiry will discover that both administrators and project staffs
had many tales to tell about their experiences in pursuing this bare rou-
tine. This was not an unexpected phenomenon. Routines exist for purposes
which are not inevitably congruent with the individual purposes of all
members. Routines are institutionalized solutions to complex problems
(Simon, 1960). The problems, defined in terms of the organization's
ability to function impersonally, aim at a degree of conformity. But
not all situations confronting individual members happen to conform to
the boundaries of legitimacy so defined. Given the range of possible
funding sources, the range of project purposes sought by individuals,
and the idiosyncracies of events and personalities governing the rela-
tionships between many parties to a funded project, a routine initially
designed to clarify paths of expected behavior and to enforce institu-
tional conformity could restrict professional activity in some instances
and expedite that activity in others.
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StrurM.ro.
"Talking about it the process sounds simple," recalled one pro-
ject director (Harris, interview, May, 1972) who had been through the
contract procedure, "but it’s very time-consuming when you’re walking
through it." He had planned on three days as enough time to secure sig-
natures in the University. In fact, he was at the job for three weeks
and found it very frustrating. The frustration, he recognized, was part-
ly his own responsibility and partly inevitable. He had made some mis-
takes in the final copy, mistakes which meant time spent getting seven
copies retyped as well as making and attending two or three apointments
with officials in the Graduate School and the University administration.
These final steps followed a previous series of appointments and work-
sessions while getting assistance within the University for the prepara-
tion of the contract. He understood the University's concerns about in-
stitutional liability and could, therefore, accept the necessity of review
procedures. The review had had no programmatic effects on the project,
but it had taken time. Not sure whether or not the amount of time was
justified under the circumstances, the director only knew in retrospect
that negotiating the review structure had been a "hassle."
The simple amount of time required for the School and University
processing of proposals and contracts was one of several issues raised
during interviews with project directors and principal investigators.
It was apparent during these interviews that the project approval struc-
ture was regarded as a standard operating procedure, a formality, per-
ceived with varying degrees of awareness, understanding and sympathy for
both the structure itself and the policy rationale underlying that
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structure. Understandably, the main concerns of these people were with
the projects themselves whereas project processing within the University
was seen as an unavoidable appendage to the more serious business of
finding resources. When ashed to describe the steps their proposals or
contracts took through the School and University hierarchies, many pro-
ject directors' responses would be simply "the usual" or "the normal
ones." For such people, the approval structure was neither help nor
hindrance but just part of a necessary task. Other responses emphasized
either helpfulness or obstacles. Still others emphasized both. From
the project perspective, the review structure was never an end in itself
in the way that outside funding was a goal while being sought yet a means
to other ends when being spent. Getting funding could be a worthy public
achievement in itself, deserving of praise. Internal organizational ap-
proval did not merit that kind of goal-related attention.
But although School and University approval channels were regarded
as only incidentally related to main project concerns, some project level
personnel showed a keen sensitivity to the consequences these channels
were having or could have on their projects specifically and on the stra-
tegy of outside project funding generally. The issue of the amount of
time required for processing—for example—had implications which ranged
from perceived nuisance value to more profound disadvantages. We are
not talking here about tactical administrative delay, probably the most
widely used technique to confuse and harass unwanted initiatives in any
organization. Rather, we are considering time as a function of the tasks
included in the routine procedure of project approval.
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Structure as Nuisance and Assistance
Within the School itself, one source nf ,’ o delay was the procedure
of having all proposals reviewed by all the deans. One project director
(Eachus, interview, May, 1972) saw this system as a "mess" because of
the time involved. He stressed that the School and University were com-
pletely supportive of his projects, that there were no conflicts at all
with University or funding agency regulations, and that the complications
were purely procedural. The complications themselves involved the fail-
ure of some offices to sign off on a proposal quickly. Similarly, another
project director (Rossman, interview, May, 19 72) found that his contract
had been held in a dean's office for "a couple of weeks." The project
director had not been contacted and his contract had been side-tracked
while the particular dean was out of town. A third project director
(Evans, memorandum, n.d.), having just completed a particularly diffi-
cult processing experience in early 1972, felt strongly enough about the
subject to draft a detailed memorandum on the subject. The heart of his
concern read:
Despite great effort and considerable good will on the part of all
the various offices concerned, the net effect often has seriously
disheartening effects on individuals trying to submit proposals to
meet deadlines. The cumulative experience on the proposal submitter
is a series of three to six offices through which he must pass in
sequence. Getting through an office means (and none of this is un-
reasonable on the part of any of the individual offices):
1. Making an appointment—often for a time five to ten working days
in the future since each of these offices is overworked and in
some cases travel and vacations further extend the time needed
to get an appointment.
2. Explaining the project in some detail since frequently the
mountain of paperwork on the individual's desk has prevented
his making any but the most cursory glance at the project.
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or additional supporting
t the sequence is all in
as not prevented all the
are rightly felt to be unfair, for early
r deadlines. The
This study was not designed nor intended to assess how wide-spread these
concerns were among all members of the School. Rather, the question of
the project approval structure’s functioning as an aid or obstacle to
funding efforts should be a subject of periodic review by the School’s
administration itself. More pertinent to the objectives of this study
was the finding that the approval structure could have and was having,
in at least a few cases, an unintended detrimental effect on the School’s
overall policy of encouraging the development of funded projects. The
memorandum stated the situation explicitly:
If the School needs to derive support from these various contracts,
it must generate feasible and realistic techniques which proposal
writers and project officers can legitimately use to channel some
resources to the School [p. 2],
Organizational structure needed both to embody a management strategy and
to do so in ways which educated individuals about the value and legiti-
macy of the requirements they were asked to fulfill.
Many of the project participants interviewed felt they had bene-
fited from the required review, despite having criticisms of individual
aspects of the process. Most faculty and students wrote proposals only
occasionally. The deans’ offices on the other hand reviewed all propos-
als and were held accountable by the University administration for
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insuring concurrence with University policy. Thus the administrators
frequently had valuable expertise and insight regarding University or
agency procedures.
Responsibility for budget review within the School lay in the
office of the dean for administration, where a staff assistant handled
the day-to-day work of proposal review. Part of this job was simply
catching errors in budget format and computation, errors which could
turn the final sign-off routine across campus from a mere formality in-
to time-consuming obstacle at deadline time (Jordan, interview, May,
1972). More importantly, the job was one of knowing what financial con-
cerns would arise at all points in the review process, within the School,
within the University, and occasionally within the agency, and convincing
the proposal writer to make appropriate changes. This, at times, involved
offering advice on how to best apply funds remaining from one year to a
continued project’s grant proposal (Oliver, interview, May, 1972). It
involved warning a project director of University restrictions on signing
contracts until agency funds had been encumbered and then thinking
through a solution if the agency could not spend funds until services
had been performed (Peck, interview, May, 1972). It meant educating
the project director to the importance of including health insurance
in his request for direct costs (Evans, interview, June, 1972). And it
meant checking to see if the project was asking for sufficient telephone,
reproduction, and equipment expenses so as not to cripple the project
once in operation (Hinckley, interview, July, 1972). The School's own
interest in this preparatory review, usually done before the proposal
was submitted to the dean for administration for sign-off, was in assur-
ing consistency with university policies, including those related to
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overhead costs, and in assuring to whatever extent possible that the
project would carry its own financial weight and not be a burden on re-
sources from the School’s other sources of support (Bender, interview,
January
,
1972) .
In other cases, the various deans themselves contributed to
planning a proposal writing strategy (Nichols, interview, April, 1972).
Advice on personnel issues included informing the prospective project
director of university personnel categories which would permit him to
hire staff at the salary levels he thought appropriate, or finding some
professional position for an individual who lacked the usual credentials,
or to prepare an argument in anticipation of University reluctance to
hire a recent graduate to fill a soft-money faculty position (Durant &
Hammar
,
interview, May, 19 72). Time spent in this kind of review or pre-
liminary counselling was rarely categorized as an obstacle or complaint.
"Helpful" review was not seen as a waste of time.
University review also was seen as a cause of delay. One project
director, for example, found the University's handling of contracts "a
disaster" because there was only one lawyer to review all contracts (Gorth,
interview, April, 1972). As a consequence, one of the director’s con-
tracts had waited three weeks for approval. This basic bottleneck was
complicated by a long chain of command requiring several signatures that
were formalities once legal and financial review were completed but still
necessitating separate appointments.
Structure as Obstacle
The amount of time needed to get a proposal approved by both
School and University, and the anticipation of delay en route , could be
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a nuisance and an annoyance, as we have seen. It also discriminated
against proposals written with very short notice of funding opportuni-
ties. Educational research grants were the type of funding most af-
fected by time span considerations.
One project director recognized within the School as an accom-
plished grantsman contended that School and University procedures were
not geared to seeking money for educational research grants from the
Office of Education (OE) in Washington, the principal source of such
grants (Fortune, interview, June, 1972). He contrasted the numerous,
time-consuming stops along the University's approval route with the ten
to twelve day limit when a researcher was preparing and submitting a
proposal. Normally, this gap between funding necessity and institu-
tional reality was enough to discourage researchers at the School from
submitting proposals for this kind of research. But the director, a
full professor, said that on one occasion when he knew he was about
ninety percent assured of getting a grant for over $100,000 he called
the then chancellor of the University asking him to clear the review
channels of all delays and minor objections. The proposal was written
and processed within four days and was successful. The University re-
ceived its share of indirect costs. The director saw the RFP route as
a major unexploited source of funding at the School, especially useful
for researchers using testing and computer data analysis. The School,
he thought, had "to get more systematic, more like a business if we're
to compete on RFPs .
"
We noted earlier that several changes in the project approval
structure were made during this time. The purpose of those changes was
to coordinate information about the University's prospective alliances
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with outside funding agencies. This information would allow the University
to gain perspective on its internal planning. The intention was not to
stymie, but rather to encourage, the flow of outside funds. But, as is
evident, some of the procedures designed to achieve one institutional
goal, that of coordinating information, interfered with another, that of
encouraging sponsored research. The problem faced by University admin-
istrators was that of devising a system which would facilitate both goals
at a minimal cost to either. Improvements, as they were seen, were made
step by step, sometimes resulting in a frequency of changed procedures
which confused project applicants. Placing more responsibility for this
*
needed coordination with the associate graduate dean for research was
one of several University responses to this problem. Meanwhile, during
19 71-19 72
,
the School of Education sought to improve its handling of pro-
posals by creating a new position responsible for recording all proposals
coming through the office of the assistant dean for administration and
shepherding them through the official processing steps within the School
and the University. In other words, the description contained in these
pages is only one time slice in the life of a changing organization.
The reader’s attention should be directed to the general features of the
description, most significantly, to the inevitable and on-going tensions
created by conflicting goals within and across the various levels of
University authority.
Project Experience: Review Criteria and Concerns
In the following pages
,
as in the preceding ones
,
we are not in-
terested in documenting every instance of interaction between funded
projects at the School of Education and the administrative structure of
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the University. Rather, the aim is to show how the negotiation of out-
side funding generates patterns of organizational behavior, many of which
would not otherwise exist. Without the initial availability of outside
resources to induce these behaviors, the organization we are describing
would be very different. These, therefore, are examples of how funding
is transformed into "inside" behavior, some of it innovative or poten-
tially so.
The University's official policy towards sponsored research, its
broadly stated criteria determining the appropriateness of specific re-
search projects, and its limitations upon the use of research funds can
be found in the policy on compensation adopted by the Board of Trustees
in 1963 (Camarino, 1972). In addition to acknowledging the University's
responsibility "to promote and encourage the search for new truth and
knowledge for the benefit of mankind," the policy states that:
University participation in tests and investigations shall be limited
to activities which lead to the extension of knowledge or to in-
creased effectiveness in teaching. Routine tasks of commonplace
type will not be undertaken except where it is shown conclusively
to the appropriate University officials that satisfactory facilities
for such services do not exist elsewhere [p. 3].
Later, in May, 1972, the Board followed the 1970 example of the Amherst
campus' Graduate Council by adopting a policy allowing "only those re-
search projects in which the purpose, scope, methods, and results can be
fully and freely disclosed [p. 12]."
Speaking more informally, the University's provost and vice-
chancellor for academic affairs explained (Gluckstern, interview, July,
1972) that "our basic attitude is supportive of grants" for two basic
reasons: the activities were themselves good for the University, and
the money received by the University for overhead costs helped to support
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important organizational services. Given this supportive attitude, he
continued, "we tend not to stand in a bureaucratic way" regarding the
case-by-case definition of acceptable projects and practices. Flexibil-
ity was appropriate because projects were temporary creations, not im-
plying any long-range commitments. But, he emphasized, there was no
easy connection between policy flexibility and outside funding. Requests
were judged on their merits. The School, for example, had had requests
and privileges granted it even before the successes of its staff in pro-
ject funding. In part, this had been done because the University wanted
to support the programs advocated by a new dean.
The provost s principal concerns with projects were fiscal and
political. Fiscal concerns meant that a project proposal or contract
should not commit State resources without the approval of responsible
authorities, that the University's share of overhead costs should be in-
cluded in the project budget when permitted by the sponsoring agency, and
that the project’s administrative practices should not violate the rules
of the University of Massachusetts. Politically, some projects had the
potential to become highly visible to the public, making the University
vulnerable to political pressures.
The University just has to be sensitive. But in education, that's
where the action is and the University and the School of Education
can't buck those issues. The point is that the criteria applied
should be educational criteria, not political.
He pointed to the School's involvement in New York City's 1968 Oceanhill-
Brownsville school crisis as an example of how a group entering as
neutral observers could be perceived as biased by other groups. The
University should be aware of and prepared to support responsible pro-
jects touching potentially sensitive areas. While not directly in
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contact with the proposal review process, the provost might get involved
if notified by a dean. Depending on the issue, it might be discussed
with the chancellor and the University president.
Authority to review proposals and contracts was delegated by the
provost to the associate graduate dean for research. He, also, insisted
(Camarino, interview, July, 1972) that a principal investigator or di-
rector had a great degree of latitude in developing a project. A person
should have that latitude, "within minimal organizational restraints, be-
cause the individual is innovative, not the organization." Aside from
the official policies cited above, the research dean relied on his own
learned sensitivity to four institutional criteria which might find a
proposal or contract unacceptable.
First, it was essential that a project "should not contravene
the University’s unwritten educational philosophy." The philosophy was
not easily defined and he added that he had never rejected a proposal on
this ground, nor ever had the issue raised, during his eighteen months on
the job. A second concern involved "issues raised in a parapolitical
way." This would apply to projects of a potentially controversial con-
tent or involving persons with high public visibility. As one could al-
ways expect someone to say that the project was not appropriate for a
university, the reviewer’s responsibility was to ascertain if the pro-
ject was properly planned with all involved persons having been consulted
in advance. Where in doubt he would check with the provost’s office.
Hidden university involvements constituted a third area of con-
cern. This might mean commitments to build new buildings, accept new
graduate students or hire new faculty beyond the quota allowed for a
sub-unit of the University, use campus facilities for special purposes,
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adopt new curricular policies, or enter relationships with other organi-
zations. Any challenge to existing policy and procedures which would be
promised as a condition of receiving outside funding could be defined as
a "hidden" involvement. A final area of concern covered the adequacy of
support requested for the project, including both overhead for the Uni-
versity and direct support for the project objectives. This last concern
however, was the chief responsibility of the University controller and
accountant
.
The four screens of philosophy, political sensitivity, hidden in-
volvements, and adequate resources were meant to filter out unwanted in-
fluences which might approach the University wrapped in outside funds.
These criteria protected the integrity of the organization’s policies
and the authority of the individuals who apply those policies. They were
used not only when a proposal was being forwarded to a funding agency,
but also later, when a project was being implemented. Thus, when ex-
amining the substantive issues raised by School projects within the
University
,
we will not necessarily distinguish between issues raised
during or after proposal approval. Proposals are often generally stated
whereas the operation of a project demands specific personnel appoint-
ments, specific curricular decisions, specific financial arrangements,
all requiring official approval. Typically, however, the expectations
and understandings shaping these requests and decisions were worked out
prior to funding.
When the associate graduate dean for research spotted a poten-
tial problem area during his reading of a proposal, he would contact
the principal investigator or director directly. Or he would talk with
the department head or, as in the case of the School of Education, with
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one of the School’s deans. He could call one of the associate provosts.
If the proposal was hand carried by its author or someone from the
School's administration office, the matter often could be raised and
resolved on the spot. More likely, the dean had advance warning since,
in his experience, "people have been good, giving me drafts for comment,
trying to avoid confrontation."
Quite probably
,
any exemption from University academic policy
had already been cleared through the provost's office. Or if the point
in question was of a contractual or purely financial nature, it may have
been discussed with the University attorney or perhaps with the vice-
chancellor for administrative affairs. At the School of Education, the
responsibility for catching variances in academic and financial matters
rested with the respective deans for academic affairs and for adminis-
tration, and ultimately with the dean of the School.
At the School, the associate dean for academic affairs stated
(Seidman, interview, January, 19 73):
We know what the University position is and we try to adhere to it.
Talk of testing the limits of acceptable involvements is ninety
percent rhetoric. Fuzziness develops because the University s
own sense of purpose is changing.
When there was a question of the School involving the University in
some new direction, he said, the matter was taken immediately to the
provost. "Rather than 'testing the limits,' I'd say we were a quarter
step ahead. We've been on the vibration edge, a little ahead of the
University." He noted that the School's involvements with off-campus
projects had preceded other departments by just a few years. The
University's guidelines, he thought, were "not very fuzzy." The
to do research, training and to be of serviceUniversity's mission was
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to Massachusetts. The School's mission was to train teachers. Projects
were judged case by case and written guidelines were not needed.
Another point of view came from the associate provost responsible
for all professional personnel appointments and curricular matters. Com-
paring the School to the other academic administrative units, he observed
(Bischoff, interview, November, 1972) that it was "enormously dissimilar"
in that:
By its very nature, it has tested the limits of the University's
acceptance for change. Most other units work within historically
developed procedures. But the School of Education feels to be
effective it can't work within those restraints.
Specifically, he pointed out that when the rest of the University was
using an eight-point grading scale, the School had sought and won per-
mission to use a pass-fail and pass-no record system. He described ad-
missions procedures at the School as "quite extraordinary" in the cri-
teria of qualifications used for both graduate and undergraduate students.
The School's project to implement a completely modular curriculum cutting
across all University procedures for times, scheduling and course crea-
tion was a third example of what he saw as "severe differences with
University policy at the time each was made." He noted that each request
had been granted with some constraints and that each request had been
brought to his attention "in the normal way." One of these "severe"
restructurings of University procedures, the modular curriculum, had
required special funding to prepare new administrative systems for regis-
tering students, scheduling classes and accounting for credits earned.
When funding was not available from the University budget, a private
foundation was found willing to sponsor the "innovation."
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Sensitivity to Personnel Issues
How did the administrative roles, perceptions, and procedures
just described impinge on or assist sponsored research activities at
the School? How did they affect the design and implementation of pro-
jects? In analyzing this interrelationship of projects and University
rules, we will use reported areas of disagreement as indicators of sen-
sitivity zones; that is, zones where the organization's integrity was
thought to be in question, where administrators felt they had to exer-
cise authority if there was to be any meaningful identity of interests
between the units of the organization and the organization as a whole.
The point of reviewing proposals and contracts, after all, was to en-
sure that funded projects were accepted as sub-units and did not use
their independent sources of support to form identities independent of
the University's "parental" policies. Although we will be focusing on
areas of disagreement and sensitivity, the reader should bear in mind
that the absence of conflict is also an important consideration. Thus,
eventually, we will have to speculate on the relative seriousness of
the conflicts found as compared to the range of obstacles which could
have confounded the acceptance and operation of funded projects at the
University. In point of fact, the two areas, or "zones," in which the
projects studies most frequently touched University "nerves" were those
of personnel and finance.
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Hiring Graduates
More than a few project staffs discovered that the University of
Massachusetts was sensitive to the intertwined questions of who could be
hired for project positions and at what levels of responsibility and
status. One ground-rule held that doctoral students should not be hired
for faculty positions upon receiving their degrees. The rationale usually
offered was that such hiring amounted to inbreeding, or hiring through
sympathy and friendship or similarity of point-of-view, a tendency con-
sidered unhealthy for any university dedicated to diversity of inquiry.
Another argument held that the hiring of recent graduates would give the
impression that the School was keeping the best products for itself and
leaving its less qualified graduates for others, an impression unhealthy
for graduates looking for jobs. The rule, while useful as a guide to
initial reactions from administrative authorities, was not unbending.
Recent graduates could be found on the faculty list in both State-sup-
ported and soft positions. The transition from student to faculty was
not always without difficulties even for those who eventually succeeded.
One project director (Rossman, interview, May, 1972), having completed
his degree while working on two predecessor projects, applied for a
faculty appointment to a "soft" position being funded by the same agency,
now sponsoring a third project. Even with the support of the School's
dean for academic affairs
,
the director was unsuccessful in appealing
his case to the associate provost. His recourse at this time was to
take his problem to the dean. This level of intercession and explana-
tion of the situation made a difference and the faculty appointment was
approved
.
DU
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Another and this time unsuccessful case (Fortune, interview,
August, 1972; Rios, interview, May, 1972) was made more complicated by
the fact that the funding agency’s research coordinating director had
enrolled as a doctoral candidate. Completing his degree work and want-
ing to have direct responsibility for what was to be a major project
breaking new ground in state-wide educational evaluation, he sought a
soft-money faculty appointment. The appointment was intended to cement
a working relationship between School and agency. But although vigor-
ously supported by the involved School faculty, it was denied, as was
the second choice of another recent graduate who had collaborated on
the project’s preliminary work at the School. A third nominee had to
be found for the directorship.
Release Time
Yet the hiring of recent graduates, especially for "soft" posi-
tions, made especial good sense to some faculty frequently involved with
funded projects. Part of this good sense was tied to another University
ground-rule, actually an established policy, which effectively prohibited
the "release time" practice so common among American universities.
"Release time" means that the salary of a faculty member employed
by a university is actually paid out of the "soft" monies of a project
budget. The faculty member is released from his normal university respon-
sibilities in proportion to the amount of his salary contributed by the
project. The released portion of the salary then becomes discretionary
capital for the university. Unless the individual has been hired for a
specific project, the typical understanding in such cases is that the
university will pick up its full share of his salary whenever the project
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is completed and the "soft" support disappears. With a continuous flow
of funded projects, a university can establish a revolving salary fund
in the expectation that an estimated number of faculty—whether tenured
or non-tenured-will be carried on released time during a given academic
year.
The policy adopted by the Trustees in 1963 and amended in 1968
stated (in Camarino, 1972 ) that:
Members of the faculty on calendar year appointment are permitted
to participate in sponsored research but may not receive addition-
al compensation in addition to the budgeted salary [p. 4].
This policy removed the incentive enjoyed by faculty in some universities
of negotiating above-average salaries from funding agencies while working
on projects. Summer salaries in addition to annual academic year income
was authorized by the Trustees to a maximum of twenty-five percent.
^hile the original Trustee policy permitted deans and department heads
to authorize faculty release time from other duties, later administrative
policy (University of Massachusetts, University Business Manager, memor-
andum, 1971) ruled that "not more than twenty-five percent of faculty
academic year time should be devoted to all sponsored research. " As
this percentage equalled a faculty member's normal research responsibil-
ity, release time was in effect an inoperative concept. And although
the University continued to acknowledge the right of a dean or chairman
to negotiate faculty time informally, the practice in preparing project
budgets was to include the dollar value of faculty time and effort as a
University contribution to the project (Camarino, interview, December,
1972; Gulko, interview, January, 1973 ; University of Massachusetts,
University Business Manager, memorandum, 1971 ).
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The intent of this policy was to make the State of Massachusetts
the primary support of its state university (Camarino, interview, December
1972). The University administration was also aware of the traumas ex-
perienced by many research-oriented universities in the United States
as federal research funding was withdrawn in the late 1960's. UMass would
not imitate M.I.T. and the University of Michigan by using "soft" money
to finance hard' positions (Gluckstern, interview, July, 1972).
At the project level, the chief effect of this policy was to
limit the incentives for faculty involvement. There were no direct fi-
nancial incentives for academic year project work. Nor were faculty re-
lieved of academic responsibilities should they assume the administrative
burdens of a project director. The problem was that the School depended
on projects to do the things it wanted to do off-campus and to provide
student stipends and supportive services on campus. Of course, the "plan-
ning year" itself had been built on the assumption that the School's true
"faculty" consisted of both official faculty and graduate students. Thus,
first by staff desire and then by necessity of University policy the key
role of administering the School's many projects was delegated to stu-
dents. It followed, too, that hiring recent graduates already on campus
to fill "soft" project positions often appeared more efficient than try-
ing to find someone to move to Amherst for a short-term, insecure oppor-
tunity
.
Students as Project Directors
The practice of having graduate students, almost always but not
invariably doctoral students, act as directors of projects was widespread
at the School. But within the University it was unusual to permit a
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student to assume this level of responsibility (Camarino, interview, July,
1972). In other departments and schools, students were graduate assis-
tants and never directors. Stipends for graduate assistants as for
teaching assistants in the University were normally set at $3,200 per
academic year. At the School of Education, $3,200 was the standard sti-
pend, but many graduate students received more. Over thirty doctoral
candidates in an administrative leadership project, for example, received
fellowships ranging from $4,00 to $8,000 (University of Massachusetts,
School of Education, 1971d). With the added responsibilities of project
directorships or assistant directorships, students could qualify for
"soft" funded professional appointments as staff assistants, staff asso-
ciates, or lecturers with salaries up to $15,000 (Roop, memorandum, 1970a)
In Fall, 1971, the School reported 293 graduate assistantships
and 117 graduate fellowships being held by its students, respectively
about twenty and thirty percent of University totals. The average School
stipend was slightly below the University average of $2,685 as a result
of many small stipends. But the average School fellowship of $3,955
tilted the University average up to $3,025. Moreover, staff positions
would not be included in these figures (University of Massachusetts,
Graduate School, 1971).
To justify the discrepancy between these levels of graduate
support and those found elsewhere on campus, the School pointed to the
unique backgrounds and abilities of its students, many of whom were
older and more experienced in their field that were graduate students
in other fields. The associate graduate dean for research accepted
(Camarino, interview, July, 1972) this argument after a series of dis-
cussions with the provost's office. He no longer questioned higher
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than normal stipends when included in School proposals, but noted that
he would question higher stipends or salaries if included in proposals
from elsewhere in the University. The provost himself admitted (Gluckstern,
interview, July, 1972) that he had "been upset about the high salaries
for School of Education graduate students because they are so out of line
with normal University stipend support." But, he added, "I have been
persuaded by the School that its students are experienced, older, deserv-
ing, and that the School wouldn't have gotten projects without them."
He emphasized, nevertheless, that this was a "clear case of adjustment
because of the availability of money."
The dispute over student support was resolved before 1971-1972,
but one project director recalled (Flight, interview, May, 1972a) how
his project had caught lots of flack" in 1970 when it sought to offer
academic year stipends averaging about $5,000. The University accepted
the pay scale after the School developed an "elaborate" justification
built on four basic points. First, the proposal already approved and
submitted by the University included a budget itemizing a total sum for
a given number of students. Secondly, the sponsoring foundation insisted
on large stipends to insure that high quality students would be attracted
to the program not only at the University of Massachusetts, but also to
programs at six other participating universities. Third was the unusual
talents and backgrounds of the people being recruited. Fourth was the
classification of the payments as fellowships rather than as stipends,
thus indicating that they were given for a special purpose and were not
comparable to normal stipends.
Appointing graduate students to professional positions when
responsibilities were judged appropriate and money allowed was a standard
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operating procedure at the School during 1971-1972. The associate pro-
vost responsible for approving appointments concluded (Bischoff, inter-
view, November, 1972) that the School, "having more money, has used
titles more often, not more flexibly. Any unit within the University
has the right to pay within reasonable limits. What a graduate student
does in addition to his program is of no concern to this office, if the
person has appropriate qualifications. Disagreements arise over matters
such as qualifications and eligibility."
But even admitting that the respective graduate students were
qualified for their appointments, it is clear that the University's will-
t
in8ness to grant that status was conditioned less by the match of task
and person than by the availability of funds. Without funded projects,
students would be paid as students regardless of abilities or responsi-
bilities. Higher and differentiated student salaries, the provost noted
(Gluckstern, interview, July, 1972), had not been given much thought as
a University—wide practice because the idea was "too closely tied to
availability of funds" to be practicable. Beyond this objection, though,
more than just accessible money was at issue. Any unit of the University
had the right to spend its resources within reasonable limits. And its
freedom to define those limits may have increased if the resources being
spent did not come from the University budget. But from the perspective
of the provost, expectations of balance impressed themselves from all
sides:
Most of the University feels the School of Education has gone too
far, that the University has been too supportive. ... We try
not to favor or penalize units because they secure outside fund-
ing, but I don't think all would see it that way.
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"what gives me a different perspective," explained the associate
provost (Bischoff, interview, November, 1972), "is my view of the whole
University." The final authority to approve appointments rested in his
office and not in the School itself "because we have people in these
positions all over the campus with responsibilities and salaries within
known limits.
. . . Expectations are the same at all levels" for people
receiving equivalent salaries. The implication is that without its pro-
jects, the School's treatment of graduate students would parallel that
given students elsewhere on campus.
Even within the School, there were at least two points of view
on the distribution of responsibilities and rewards to students. Some
argued that students at the School, as students everywhere, were essen-
tially exploited laborers when the rewards they received were not commen-
surate with those given faculty for comparable effort. By this argument,
the inequity was compounded when project work, said to be a rewarding
experience in itself, proved to be merely routine administration rather
than a learning experience, or when such work existed as an accommodation
to the fact that the School had the highest student-faculty ratio on the
campus. From this point of view, the School's interest in improved stu-
dent status was more rhetorical than real.
The other, and dominant, perspective, held a higher opinion of
what had been accomplished. When asked if the School had used its out-
side funding differently than other higher education organizations, the
associate dean for academic affairs answered (Seidman, interview, March,
1972)
,
"I think we use it better because we deal with doctoral students
as equals. Other schools are tight, only using graduate students as
as project
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research assistants. We give them responsibilities.
. ."a
directors and lecturers.
As we have now seen, through its review procedures the University
could establish a semblance of uniformity not only between the School and
the University as a whole, but also among the administrative practices of
the many funded projects which had garnered their financial resources in
so many individual, serendipitous ways. Policies and practices affecting
graduate hiring, release time, salaries and stipends would be just three
of many ways in which the University created comparability among its
units, although these three were of particular importance for funded
proj ects
.
There were many other aspects of administration which brought
projects into contact with the University* s academic governance. For
one, even if a student conceived and developed and negotiated a project,
the University still required that a faculty member have final accounta-
bility for it. The consequence was pro forma faculty oversight (Dye,
interview, July, 1972). The same would be true where faculty grantsmen
would develop projects and then leave the implementation responsibility
to others. This latter practice, moreso than the former, was vulnerable
to gaps of accountability because in such cases the project staff might
lack personal ties to either the funding agency or the University (Ertel,
interview, May, 1972).
Securing those ties was supposed to be the purpose of reviewing
personnel appointments. In some cases, the University's desire to secure
loyalty could overcome other hesitancies, such as the instance of one
project whose director was given a professional staff appointment even
though he lacked a college degree (Durant & Hammar, interview, May, 1972).
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At other times, professional status was a scruple which could keep pro-
jects at a distance. One director whose project required specialized,
but non-academic staff to meet the demands of its urban poverty setting,
described as "rhetorical policy" a University contention that qualifica-
tions, not degrees, were the essential criteria of professional appoint-
ments (Conway, interview, May, 1972). He complained of having to use
devious evasions" and non-professional appointments at lower than de-
sired salary levels just to get his project off the ground, temporarily
by-passing the time-consuming processing of professional appointments.
Sensitivity to Finance Issues
In addition to personnel matters, a second zone of organizational
sensitivity was that of finance. The University served as the financial
legitimizer of projects, keeping their accounts and monitoring the proper
use of budget categories. In his review of proposals and contracts, the
University controller (Maus
,
interview, July, 1972) looked for "compli-
ance with University of Massachusetts policy." Components of this policy
included limiting additional faculty compensation to summer salaries,
keeping salary levels for all project positions comparable to equivalent
University positions, keeping travel reimbursement consistent with
University practice, ascertaining that the method of payment stipulated
correct prepayment, checking the project budget for accuracy and con-
sistency with the University’s indirect cost (overhead) rate. The vice
chancellor for administrative services emphasized (Campion, interview,
August, 1972) his concern with the payment schedules for contracts as
the University had tried to limit reimbursements on all its projects to
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$200,000. If the reimbursement period was too long, the University's
fund would soon be overdrawn, cutting receipts of interest on its trust
fund and restricting the ability of the University to accept new pro-
jects. Thus, the University sought to require prepayment, and, where
that was impossible, to limit reimbursement to the shortest period pos-
sible.
Project Management Concerns
As with the processing of proposals, so with its financial ac-
counting the University’s performance was found wanting by some projects
and serviceable by others. Some complaints were restricted to the handl-
ing of purchase orders, often felt to be a nuisance, but an outright ob-
stacle where time was of the essence. Other projects found the rules
dealing with travel restrictive. Vouchers for proposed travel had to be
submitted one week in advance, not conducive to emergency or short-term
planning. Unlike faculty, graduate students—even project directors
—
were unable to get travel advances, meaning that substantial amounts of
limited student cash could become tied to project responsibilities. One
director said University accountants had advised his staff to take out
student loans from the University at three percent interest to cover
travel costs prior to reimbursement. Faculty also discovered that the
University's advance travel fund was frequently empty. The most serious
criticism of support for operating projects was the alleged inadequacy
of accounting manpower and of financial information reported to project
directors. This was despite the fact that in the seven years from 1965
to 1972, the University’s accounting staff handling grants and contracts
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had grown from three to seventeen persons. The School also provided
accounting services to the University, paid out of "soft" projects.
Others noted that many problems of project fiscal management had been
relieved over a period of several years as the University and its "new"
School of Education learned how to adapt to each other’s needs and capa-
bilities. (This paragraph drawn from interviews with: Bender, January,
1972; Conway, May, 1972; D. George, March, 1972; Jordan, May, 1972;
Lopez, April, 1972; Roeder, August, 1972; Tutman, May, 1972; Wilson,
May, 19 72).
More significant than this commentary on project maintenance ac-
tivities were the University's limitations of financial involvements.
The requirement that funding agencies encumber funds before the University
would sign a contract was accepted as reasonable, but complicating when
dealing with other organizations—often school systems—which required
services performed prior to payment. The project director was usually
responsible for communicating the different sets of expectations to the
two organizations, again a time-consuming process. Where the services
were desired, solutions were found. But the complexity and slowness of
the process seemed to catch projects by surprise (Interviews with: Evans,
June, 19 72; Peck, May, 19 72; Rossman, May, 19 72).
The same University policy which prohibited faculty from being
paid by funded projects during the academic years, conversely prohibited
projects from offering to pay faculty as consultants to other University
projects. Thus, it was easier for one project to get help with its eval-
uation needs from the University of Georgia than from the Amherst campus
(Beattie, interview, May, 1972). Others noted with irony the difficulty
of involving faculty in funded School projects for a few days with only
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travel and experience as incentives at the same time that the same facul-
ty were busy with independent consulting (Interviews with: Bierwirth,
May, 1972, R. Clark, April, 1972; Fortune, June, 1972).
At one level, what this melange of complaints and criticism tells
us is that whatever improvements had been made in the University’s role
as fiscal agent for funded projects, there was room for more improvement.
This was an area where periodic evaluations should have been sought from
the users of the services, the project staffs, to assist the University
in identifying problem areas and designing solutions to make the linkages
between projects and University administration more effective.
At another level, these incidents were indicative of the costs
and benefits which projects accrued by being housed within a larger, more
permanent organization. Without the University, its services, its facil-
ities, its social recognition, almost all the projects we are discussing
simply would not have existed. But the certifying and credentialling
functions performed by the University while shaping projects to internal
requirements and legitimizing them to the external world imply a degree
of frustration to people at the project level who were understandably
concerned with what they felt were their projects.
Overhead Contributions
The University’s interest in project finance extended beyond
routine fiscal management. The discretionary funds received as overhead
reimbursement from federally funded projects were crucial resources for
the University administration. Overhead, or indirect cost, was an audited
estimate of the expense to the University of housing and supporting a
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project, and was included as a budget item in proposals and contracts
for federal agencies. Where the funding agency expected its investment
to be paired with a University contribution, overhead along with faculty
time would be the basic contribution (University of Massachusetts,
University Business Manager, memorandum, 1971). The University’s rate
for on-campus projects was set annually by a federal audit of the
University accounting department's computations of the previous fiscal
year expenses involved in operating the institution (Roeder, interview,
August, 1972). During 1971-1972, this rate at the University of
Massachusetts was forty-six percent of research project salaries and
wages, up one percent from 1970-1971. Training contracts with the fed-
eral Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) were treated
differently. These educational service agreements, as they were identi-
fied, typically had high levels of personnel expenses in their budgets,
much of it not directly associated with University support. Universities
were required to establish a second indirect cost rate for educational
service agreements. But here individual government agencies set their
own maximum rates of a project's total direct costs which would be paid
as overhead. When the institution's own rate on project salaries and
wages resulted in a larger dollar figure, the agency rate was used.
School contracts with HEW, consequently, used that agency's eight per-
cent rate on direct costs as the standard method of determining allowable
overhead. A third University rate, this one for off-campus projects
funded by the National Science Foundation and the Agency for Internation-
al Development was set in yet another manner of computation according to
agency guidelines.
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During the nine-month period ending March 31, 1972, covering
project operations during most of fiscal year 1972, the University re-
ceived notices of awards from federal sources totalling just under seven
million dollars. The figure for foundation and industrial gifts and
grants was almost 3.5 million dollars awarded for a total of about 10.5
million dollars. During all of fiscal 1971, the University had been
awarded over 10.2 million dollars in grants and contracts from all sources
The operating budget for fiscal 1973, however, modestly anticipated only
8.4 million dollars in grants and contracts. During those first nine
months of fiscal 1972, School of Education projects accounted for one-
third of the University's federal awards and over one-half of the non-
federal awards. In anticipating fiscal 1973, the University saw the
School contributing about one-third of all contract and grants receipts,
leading eleven other academic divisions on campus. Another one— third was
anticipated from the natural sciences and mathematics, viewing those de-
partments as a single group (University of Massachusetts, Office of the
Treasurer, 1971, 1972; University of Massachusetts, 1972).
How much of this money went into overhead and where did that
money go? By 1968 State of Massachusetts law (Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 1968), overhead costs from grants, other than grants for
capital improvements, received from the federal government had to be
spent
:
. . . for the support of a computer or computers, of another re-
search grant, or of publishing programs under the exclusive con-
trol of such institution, or for faculty research or research and
scholarly work. . . [p. 399].
The State legislature, realizing that the University was getting State
funds for general support but was then receiving federal funds for the
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same purpose, intended to direct overhead receipts to the specific areas
named, rather than leaving them as totally discretionary funds in the
hands of the University administration (Myers, interview, July, 1972).
The overhead funds themselves belonged to the University, not
to the projects, or schools, or departments which brought in funding.
Within the limits established by law, the University administration was
free to allocate overhead as it saw fit. Spending "in support of" re-
search and scholarly work, however, was a broad mandate, almost as broad
as the general purposes of the University. In point of fact, only five
operating units directly received funds from the "research trust fund,"
the accounting title for overhead from federal sources. In the budget
fiscal 1973, for example, the Graduate School was to receive seventy-
five percent of the fund's 1.6 million dollars (University of Massachusetts,
1972). Of this 1.2 million dollars, $772,960 was allocated to the "com-
puter trust, providing three-fourths of the operating expenses for the
University Computer Center. Other overhead funds given to the Graduate
School supported a variety of programs including the University Press,
general support of Graduate School operations, a marine station, faculty
research grants, a polymer research institute, a year-abroad program.
The School of Education itself was the next largest recipient of
research trust funds, being allocated $160,458. Another $60,000 went to
the provost's office for special academic projects. Physical plant was
to get $16,000 for facilities improvement, and administrative services
$30,000. Over $138,500 was to be held in reserve. Overhead from all
sources in the University was a substantial administrative resource. If
it amounted to less than two percent of the total budget, it included
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funding for some crucially basic and prestigious activities and supplied
precious discretionary capital.
The School’s role in supplying overhead to the University was a
major one. But it does not explain why research trust monies were re-
turned to the School, for it was University policy to deny such claims
on indirect costs. The origins of the unusual arrangement lay in the
special needs of the ’’new" School as it developed under its new dean
after 1967. The enthusiasms of its first year had left the School
$260,000 over obligated with debts and promised future commitments (Allen,
interview, May, 1972). The dean argued that the School was demonstrating
an ability to attract both talent and resources, that the limited State
budget had failed to provide the increased support services necessary,
but that if the overhead gained by the University from School projects
were returned to the School, then services could be performed and future
funding efforts would be enhanced. The then president of the University
agreed to a sum of $100,000 as a one-time-only allocation. But the fol-
lowing year State support was still not available and the allocation was
increased to $150,000 (Allen, memorandum, 1970). For fiscal year 1971,
the University agreed to return a formula portion of overhead from cur-
rent and newly funded projects, a portion which amounted to $162,000
(Allen, interview, May, 1972; Gluckstern, memorandum, 1970). In 1971-
1972, the School received $192,000 by this arrangement. Return of over-
head was scheduled to decrease in 1972-1973 as the University sought to
provide the required services and eliminate the School’s special claim
on trust funds (University of Massachusetts, 1972).
"It is important to understand," Dwight Allen noted (interview.
May, 1972), "that the difference between success and failure of the
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School of Education was not in the standard categories of the budget,
but in the atypical categories we've been able to negotiate one by one."
Although accepting the School’s need for special treatment. University
administrators were not happy with it. The provost (Gluckstern, inter-
view, July, 1972) thought the use of trust funds "basically an unhealthy
relationship. Overhead was paying for the Computer Center, the Graduate
School and general research support. Overhead, he thought, "should be
used as seed money” for research which, once initiated, could eam its
own recognition and support from non-University sources. But the fail-
ure of State funds to cover all instructional and support services de-
layed the time when the University, with its own fund of "seed money,"
could act as its own project sponsor in a major way.
Sensitivity to political issues
In addition to personnel and finance, a third zone of sensitivity
between projects and University should be mentioned before closing this
chapter. This zone of political issues required unique decisions at the
University level.
Some funded projects, by virtue of their potential impact on the
whole University or by the special requirements of the sponsoring agency
or by their potential compromise of basic organizational assumptions,
received special attention from University administrators sensitive to
possible public reaction and to precedents for later institutional in-
volvements .
In one instance, the proposed name of a project caught the at-
tention of the University treasurer (Johnson, interview, July, 1972).
Proposing to create a clearinghouse for information about "revolutionary"
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change in education, the project raised unintended visions of violence
without specifying what it had in mind as "revolutionary." Rewritten
to omit illegal implications, the proposal was approved and eventually
funded
.
Another proposal, this one finally rejected by the University
after being raised step by step to the president, sought to have faculty
and graduate students from the School’s Center for Higher Education take
over the management of a small, private, and bankrupt college (F. T.
Clark, interview, November, 1972). The college’s trustees were con-
vinced that their only hope of survival was by becoming a non-traditional
alternative institution. The proposal was to use the college as an ex-
perimental extension of the School of Education. Eight weeks of inten-
sive planning while trying to persuade the college's creditors to allow
it to keep operating brought the project staff into discussions with
the provost, chancellor, the campus attorney, the president and his
office s attorney. The question which finally stopped the project at
the last minute involved the ability and desirability of the University
adopting a new campus and, in essence, rescuing a private college
(Gluckstem, interview, July, 19 72). The precedent of a tax-supported
university forming such a liaison was determined to be more a legal and
political liability than an educational opportunity.
The University’s responsibilities as a state, tax-supported in-
stitution could imply special obligations. The University administra-
tion would make major administrative adjustments when requested by one
of the State’s senators to take over the administration of a state-wide
summer camp program using federal facilities and coordinated at the
local urban level by community anti-poverty agencies (McCoy, interview,
137 .
May, 1972). The University's major programmatic interest was in creat-
ing an educational component which would justify its participation.
Uncertainty of funding levels and the inadequacy of time for program
planning for the first year indicated, however, political rather than
educational considerations created the University's willingness to ac-
cept the program. More than just accept the program, the University
offered to make available $150,000 of credit in case all the expected
support from a variety of federal and non-government sources failed to
materialize (Gluckstern, memorandum, 1971b). In fact, the credit never
proved to be needed, but the gesture was unprecedented. The following
year, precaution was taken to ensure a flow of capital in advance from
the agencies. Once the project was in operation, the University also
provided special accounting and payroll assistance (Campion, interview,
August, 19 72; McCoy, interview, May, 19 72).
Presumably, all projects dealing with off-campus populations
had the potential to raise political issues simply by involving the
University in public affairs where one man's problem-solving is another
man’s outside agitation. The determination to be an active force in
the field of education inevitably would involve the School in sensitive
issues. This involvement was encouraged by the University administration
in innumerable large and small decisions supportive of off-campus pro-
jects within the State of Massachusetts and outside it. Some of these
decisions could be made in normal approval channels, once the general
University disposition was established. Others such as special student
admissions, tuition waivers for paraprofessional and teacher trainees,
unusual project directorship appointments often had to be made at higher
levels
.
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On-campus projects warranted special attention when they prom-
ised to attract widespread attention. A youth advocacy program designed
to bring juvenile offenders to live with graduate students while the
students counselled the juveniles was planned to arouse publicity for
alternatives to institutional treatment of youths (Dye, interview, July,
1972). The proposal was reviewed at every level of the University, a
process which took one month. Again, a struggle over the control of a
major funded project led to a crisis involving accusations of racism
within an on-campus teacher-training program. Campus administrators
were forced to mediate a settlement when tensions originating in the
project closed the School, threatened violence, and attracted national
news coverage (Daily Collegian , 1972; Gillmor, 1972). Both these pro-
jects embodied the University's desire to extend its impact into impor-
tant social issues. Both, having passed through the structures of
University approval, had been recognized as the appropriate ways for
the University to do what it said it wanted to do. In the process,
University administrators accepted responsibility for the unforeseen
consequences of project activities.
Projects which aimed to change the relationships between facul-
ty and students in higher education, both by structural reform of the
traditional schedule and by conceptual reform of student and faculty
roles, touched the core of University administration. Implementing the
modular curriculum required top-level endorsement not only at the time
the project was proposed to a funding agency, but later as well when
the School required nearly complete revision of University notions about
scheduling and accrediting of learning experiences (Allen, interview,
1972; Bischoff, interview, November, 1972). The University's decision
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to adopt a "university without walls" project was made with the encour-
agement and knowledge that the project was being watched with interest
by the State government (Harris, interview. May, 1972). The project
had proven itself in part by gaining the support and participation of
important faculty members throughout the campus, for University absorp-
tion of an academic program meant that the approval of the Faculty Senate
was necessary. The university without walls project, admitted the asso-
ciate provost (Bischoff, interview, November, 1972) responsible for mon-
itoring its passage from project to University status, "forced us to
address the issue, but I don’t think the University would have responded
differently without the grant. What the grant did provide was a sense
of urgency on the part of the faculty involved."
Summary
Acknowledging that he paid especially close attention to proposals
coming from the School, the associate graduate dean for research (the
authorized University official") explained (Camarino, interview, July,
1972 ):
I’m not suspicious, but I feel I have to be informed so I can answer.
Partly it is because of the School's reputation within the University.
. . . Perhaps the School of Education has adapted. I don't find any-
body pulling fast ones. But my impression that the School has set-
tled down comes only from hearing of the way things used to be. I've
had no problems. . . . But my point is, if proposals are routine,
why bother to look at them? But the question is, would these things
still continue to be routine?
The thesis of this dissertation is identical to Hefferlin's (1969)
conclusion that:
The flow of resources—their extent, direction, and limitation—in-
evitably is the prime determinant of academic change. The material
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and attitudinal resources that are made available
universities
,
or that they can made available todetermine their programs [p. 34],
to colleges and
themselves
,
will
The purposes of this chapter, as a partial analysis of the flow of re-
sources within an organization in American higher education, have been
two. First, we have tried to describe the formal organizational struc-
ture designed to approve or disapprove of proposed projects financially
sponsored by agencies outside the University’s own administration. Next,
we have tried to describe the ways in which this formal structuring of
authority relationships was used in practice to direct and limit the
uses of outside resources, redefining an external as an internal resource,
creating procedures which legitimize sponsored activities as activities
of the whole organization.
Part of the findings show that the University at many points and
in many ways struggled with the resources set before it. The University
had policies to which it preferred that projects conform. But the pro-
ject staffs, when it suited their needs and their abilities to strate-
gize, found that they were in positions of negotiation. Consequently,
the University found itself compromising in numerous specific ways at
almost every point of its being, sometimes in ways it would just have
soon moved if only pushed, othertimes in ways it could accept only re-
luctantly.
The other side of this picture reveals a scene of complex and
pervasive institutional socialization. Some complained of "painful,
halting, trial and error training for each successive submitter of a
proposal [Evans, memorandum, 1972, p. 2]." But broadly seen, the par-
ticipants were in substantial agreement on how they should proceed and
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what were allowable purposes. ’’Over time,” summarized the School’s dean
(Allen, interview, May, 1972), relationships have been excellent. Dif-
ferences have been superficial. ... The issues that persist—quality
control and matters of academic tradition-have been at most irritants.”
Challenges to the institution were of a gradualist nature, a reasonable
finding when examining the behavior of persons already admitted to or-
ganizational membership. The social network connecting external funding
agencies to internal policy was a pattern built on broad understandings
and expectations of the role of the University. More specifically, how-
ever, the organizational member—whether student or faculty—whose inter-
ests were directed at an external audience was also being induced by that
audience to reshape the policies of the University to facilitate external
purposes. In this process, the University as a whole was socialized to
the purposes and operating style of both funding agencies and the popula-
tions served by projects. In the process, moreover, the project staffs
found themselves placed in multiple interactions with the University,
some with a feeling of restriction and limitation, others with a sense
of independence and personal control over events.
There is nothing in this dual socialization that makes reform,
innovation, or any specific kind of change inevitable. Outside funding
could be used, has been used, simply to reinforce one pattern or another
in American education. Colleges and universities seeking to become the
"Harvard of. . .” their peculiar regions are as likely, moreso, to be
found applying for and spending outside resources as are persons com-
mitted to even marginally unorthodox change. The difference lies in
the individuals who use resources. Earlier chapters have attempted to
show that there was some justification for seeing at the School of
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Education a group of "innovative" individuals trying to make what they
thought were needed changes in American education. The previous chapt,
demonstrated that there was a market of resources willing to sponsor
some of these proposed changes. The workings of the market encouraged
an individualistic, entrepreneurial style of operation based on the nur-
turing of an identifiable reputation, whether individual or institutional
The present chapter has tried to place the resources won by one School's
entrepreneurship into the University context within which they had to
operate. Individual and group energies and resources were seen domesti-
cated in part and resisting domesticity in other part. External funds
were budgeted, categorized, used to purchase University approved services
The funds were also used to achieve project objectives and to win needed
organizational concessions, to place pressure on organizational linkages
designed to bring the projects into conformity with the University. In-
stead, the linkages worked both ways.
The objective of any organizational structure," some students of
organizational behavior have observed (Chappie & Sayles, 1969), "is to
minimize the incidence of deviations from the established interaction
patterns of the work process [p. 314]." From the point of view of a
university trying to absorb the impact of outside funds being used to
sponsor a specific project, we would have to add to this generalization
the notion that when an organization is placed in a sensitive, changing
relationship to the surrounding world, the objective of organizational
structure is not only to minimize deviations, so defined, but also to
help it select the deviations it will tolerate and perhaps consider as
new types of standard operating procedures.
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The ambivalence at the University of Massachusetts is revealed
in two views of the School's activities seen from the University perspec-
tive. Most of what the School of Education is doing now is still viewed
as temporary by most people on the faculty," said an associate provost
(Bischoff, interview, November, 1972), indicating that the School's de-
viations were granted on a renewable license. "If the question is, would
the University like to see more departments and schools be more aggres-
sive in seeking funds, the answer is yes," remarked the provost (Gluckstern,
interview, July, 1972), indicating that the University was appreciative
of the opportunity to encounter deviations and anoint selected ones with
the pure waters of legitimacy.
This chapter has also served an intermediary purpose, establish-
ing the general organizational limitations within which the financial re-
sources gathered in so many unique and personal ways could be applied to
higher education projects. While the chapter has shown how these resources
were shaped to the requirements of the University, it has not dealt with
our ultimate concern of how outside funded projects could be fused into
a strategy of organizational innovation. The School of Education and
its dean had their own uses for funded projects. It is to those uses
that we now turn.
CHAPTER V
PROJECT RESOURCES IN A SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
Introduction
How was outside money transformed into human behavior both at
the project level and at the level of the School as a whole? This ques-
tion brings us to a third and final phase of our examination of project
resource flow. The first phase involved the recruitment of funds from
outside agencies. The discussion at that point focused on characteris-
tics of the personal and institutional reputations associated with spe-
cific projects and the roles those reputations played in the agency-level
decision to approve funding. The second phase involved the securing of
University approval in order to legitimize each project's objectives
and proposed course of implementation. The advantages of University
approval were gained in return for some loss of project authority over
personnel, financial and policy decisions and some loss in the timeli-
ness of project responses to funding agency requirements and deadlines.
Approval at these two stages, the agency and the University, cleared the
way for the implementation of project proposals and the distribution of
what had become project resources. The preceding two chapters, con-
cerned respectively with each of these two types of approval, described
some of the activities of project and other School members as they
sought to make resources available for the broadly stated purpose of
"producing a maximum positive impact upon educational thinking, train-
ing, and practice [Allen, 1970, p. 1]."
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Funds granted or contracted by outside agencies and accepted by
the official approval of School and University authorities entered a
third phase, that of direct use within the School itself. The crucial
structural fact of this phase of resource flow was the required approval
of a project director, principal investigator, or other legal authority
for all expenditures of funds. But as we have found it necessary to
place the School's overall strategy of institution-building within a
University context, so we must place the project director’s use of re-
sources within the context of the School of Education. From the perspec-
tive of a particular project, the basic task would be to organize avail-
able resources in order to obtain the staff participation and the use of
other forms of assistance essential to the accomplishment of project
goals. But from the perspective of a more broad-based strategy to build
an organization which relied on continued outside funding to keep its
members in contact with and alert to their professional environment,
the basic task would be to integrate the benefits of project activities
as closely as possible into the life of the School. The members of every
organization, of course, must find their own proper balance, the proper
sets of procedures and norms, to govern the relationships between the
parts which, when administered from some central perspective, form a
whole. In this chapter, we will attempt to describe and analyze how
project resources were used to institutionalize these relationships
within a reputedly innovative organization in American higher education.
The Problem of Outside Funding and Authority
Speaking of a history of federal support for the sciences fol-
lowing the Second World War, one university president (Babbidge, 1968)
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observed that: "College presidents have long chafed under the project-
grant system of the scientific agencies of government, which tends to
establish direct working relationships between the agency and the indi-
vidual scientist [p. 324]." Nevertheless, the advantages of the system,
with its payments for salaries, equipment, stipends, buildings, and ad-
ministrative overhead, proved irresistable to most administrators search-
ing for research support. Moreover, the refusal to approve a contract
negotiated by a faculty member would only result in accusations of in-
fringed academic freedom and probably the loss of both faculty member and
his or her project monies to some other institution.
But outside funding did more than just exacerbate what many saw
as a "natural tension" (Lewis, 1971) between expectations of institution-
al loyalty and professional expertise. Others observed (Kerr, 1963;
Orlans
,
1962) that in addition to making grant-supported faculty less
dependent upon a particular organizational setting for their rewards,
outside funding also created obvious disparities of professional rewards.
Individual faculty members proved more successful than others in getting
projects funded. Individual disciplines and academic departments were
more affluent than others. Individual universities and research centers
dominated others by their preeminence with funding agencies. The effects
were as much divisive of an idealized collegiality as they were of in-
stitutional authority. Burton Clark (1971) noted that:
... a direct relation of faculty members to external sources of
support affects the distribution of influence within the campus,
redistributing influence from those who do not have contacts to
those who do, and moving power from the faculty as a whole and as
smaller collectivities to individual professors [p. 246],
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Jencks and Reisman (1968)
,
reviewing the rise of the modern American
university, also acknowledge that the project funding system had en-
hanced the status of the individual academician through his role as
fund-raiser, diminishing the traditional authority of trustees and ad-
ministrators
.
These shifts in organizational balance in favor of the faculty
grantsman, and in favor of the academic disciplines receiving the great-
est proportions of support, sometimes were seen as disruptive when the
welfare of whole institutions was taken into account. These outside
pressures made difficult the search for a balance between the faculty
goals of professional autonomy and academic freedom and the administra-
tion goals of efficiency, accountability, and control. The modern cam-
pus, warned Clark (1971):
. . . is, or is becoming, too large and complicated for collegial
or professional arrangements to provide the overall coordination,
and coordination is performed by bureaucratic arrangements.
. . .
The weakness of collegiality or professionalism in the large or-
ganization.
. . is that it cannot handle the problem of order, it
cannot provide sufficient integration [p. 248].
Increasing complexity posed a dilemma to higher education administrators.
On the one hand, the authority of the administrator was being undermined.
On the other hand, the faculty as a group lacked the interest and profes-
sional ideology needed to fill the vacuum of authority that their activi-
ties had created. Remedies were suggested, of course. One school of
thought would have balanced the independent financial status of the
faculty researcher with sufficient institutional aid to permit higher
education administrators to become themselves independent of the pres-
sures of the project system (Orlans, 1962; Price, 1968).
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Another, and complementary, perspective suggested that the vacuum
of authority and responsibility had been created less because resources,
and thereby influence, had been diverted from centralized control by out-
side forces than that administrators themselves had failed to respond
imaginatively to the new environment. The chief spokesman for this view
in the 1960's was Clark Kerr, who wrote (1963):
The external origin of most changes raises grave problems.
. . .
These obligations to select the good and reject the bad, to pace
the rate of change, and to discover the methods of change that
will do least damage to traditional processes fall primarily on
the reluctant shoulders of the administrator [p. 107].
This argument went beyond saying that the administrator had an opportunity
to exert authority if only he knew how. It called for skill and under-
standing. Litchfield (1971), for example, held that creative coordina-
tion and leadership was the heart of the administrator's task and not
merely an added responsibility:
If there is anything approaching unity within an institution, it is
essential, in my judgment, that the administration be vigorous, aca-
demically creative, well-trained, and well-organized. Its role
should be affirmative, not merely neutral. The administration should
be the source of new developments as well as the coordinator of ex-
isting programs [p. 150].
The administrator's goal, said Litchfield, was to realize the organiza-
tion's objectives. The basic decisions involved those related to ob-
taining and allocating resources of people, money, materials, time,
and authority.
As we shall see, the distribution of resources within the School
of Education reflected the relative roles played by administrators and
project staffs in making the organization a stable operating base for
funded projects. In other words, the internal balance among the parts
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of the organization-referring here to the relative prominence of the
dean and other administrators as compared with project directors and
their staffs—was a function not only of the attitudes and interests
of the School’s members regarding governance, but also of their abili-
ties to deal with the School’s external environment. Furthermore, this
ability entailed more than the successful recruitment of project funds,
although that aspect was not unimportant. Equally significant was the
ability to design and implement an administrative system within the
School which supported the activities of members involved in existing,
developing, and potential funded projects. The strategy of using out-
side resources as incentives for participation in innovative projects
and as the building blocks of the School's growing reputation became
defined as a series of administrative tasks.
In the following pages, we will describe the implementation of
this strategy within the School from essentially two perspectives. Look-
ing first at the personal incentives for project participation, we will
try to understand why individual faculty and students chose to partici-
pate in funded projects. This is essentially a matter of finding the
linkages between project resources and individual goals. Similarly,
the second perspective will examine the linkages between project re-
sources and organizational goals, asking how these linkages were created
and what benefits resulted from them.
Personal Incentives for Project Participation
When in 1967 Dwight Allen asked prospective faculty and students
if they would "like to join a revolution [Nathan, 1971, p. 52]," he was
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trying to recruit people who shared his sense of the need for thorough-
going change in American education. He wanted a School of Education
which would escape from the restricting, time consuming, and frustrating
checks and balances by which, as he saw the situation uc ^J-cuati , most members of
higher education organizations were governed (Allen, interview. May,
1972). In essence, to replace structural means of control, he sought
people with shared basic attitudes who could govern themselves by self-
defined normative controls.
Thus, the underlying incentives by which the new dean attracted
members were the values of basic social change, a belief in applying
ideas to "real world" education experimentation, and the opportunity to
participate in the building of a new organization from which ideas and
projects could emanate. "My philosophy," Allen said later (interview,
May, 1972):
is one of people, not programs. My thinking is that if I have the
rlg t people there, I should support the projects they want.
.
If it doesn't work, the School of Education falls apart instantly
and totally. It's reflected in everything.
Allen wanted people at the School who had some personal vision of the
future of education, who were willing to take initiative, risk and tol-
erate the ambiguities inherent in experimental process, people not "hung
up on prerogatives and status, "hustlers in the constructive sense" of
willing to pursue their objectives aggressively. Beyond these qualities
of individuals, the faculty and student bodies as groups ought to be di-
verse in interests, experiences, and backgrounds.
For people who shared these basic attitudes and exhibited the
energetic qualities just mentioned, additional incentives were available.
It was beyond the scope of this study to examine the personal motivations
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of the many individuals who joined the School and participated in funded
projects there. Presumably, these individual motivations were amalgams
of personal interests, living in semi-rural western Massachusetts, oppor-
tunities for contributing to social change, comparative university pay
scales, teaching loads, consulting opportunities and so forth. For grad-
uate students, the anticipation of continued financial support could
weigh as immediately upon a decision as the long-range prospect of chal-
lenging project involvements and eventual career preparation. The ab-
sence of academic titles and the presence of students on all governance
committees including those making personnel decisions would attract a
faculty not jealous of their professional privileges. The absence of
doctoral course requirements and the need to design one's own degree
program would attract students looking for alternatives to specialized,
narrowly defined courses of study.
Students and Stipends
All these factors acted as incentives or disincentives for dif-
ferent people. But on the whole, it was the School’s emphasis on pro-
ject involvements which distinguished it from other schools and depart-
ments of education. Allen (interview, May, 1972) thought this a crucial
distinction:
We can get really bright, able students because we have the market
to ourselves for project orientation. If we have to compete with
others for students and programs, then the other theories of our
success might not hold up because so much depends upon the really
extraordinary talent of the students we have.
As we have already seen in a previous chapter, School administrators
succeeded in convincing University policy-makers that the project
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responsibilities being offered to qualified graduate students justified
the payments of stipends and fellowships well above those paid to stu-
dents elsewhere on the Amherst campus. Of
receive these higher stipends and the gross
and student salaries remained for the most
fact that many stipends were viewed by all
course, most students did not
^ f fcrent ials between faculty
part. Equally true was the
parties as work in exchange
for support with little or no pretense of being important learning ex-
periences. But the incentives of professional-level responsibilities
and above-normal financial support were important contributions of funded
projects to the operation and style of the School.
The commitment to support graduate students, both financially and
experient tally, was probably the most immediate and pressing inducement
for seeking project funds. One faculty member (Evans, interview, June,
1972) said:
From the start this center has held itself responsible for support-
ln8 graduate students and finding field experiences. You can’t do
that without money. In fact, finding experiences, sites, and money
is part of the curriculum, defining curriculum as experiences for
learning.
The same center's four funded projects could not support all full-time
students and additional stipends and fellowships were gathered from
State-supported programs within the School, University fellowships, ex-
ternally funded fellowships, consulting arrangements and one position
funded by another center.
Students, faculty, and their centers could rely on State funds
to some degree, but not heavily. The core of support supplied by the
State budget amounted to over one hundred stipends during 1971-1972,
the majority of these being used for undergraduate teaching and student
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teacher supervision, the remainder being allocated throughout the School
teaching and service assistantships
. But the $350,000 in State sti-
pends that year accounted for only slightly more than one-third of the
total support reported. This two-to-one proportion of "soft" to "hard"
money served to keep deans, faculty, and students alert to new outlets
for their interests (School of Education, 1971c).
This did not mean that everyone at the School was a "grantsman,"
talking with agencies and writing proposals. But outside observers, as
we noted earlier, did report an atmosphere charged with interest in fund-
ing opportunities, an atmosphere for which the project system had to take
much credit. By 1971, even the internal Teacher Preparation Program
Council (TPPC) was allocating its State supervisory stipends on the basis
on yearly proposals received from centers, groups, and individuals within
the School for "innovative programs and program components [TPPC, memor-
andum, n.d. ] . In effect, TPPC required faculty and graduate students
who wanted to be involved with on-campus and off-campus undergraduate
teacher training to employ the strategies of funded projects in order to
receive resources allocated from the University budget.
Parlaying Resources into Flexibility
Student assistance in research, teaching, and administration was
simply one of several ways in which projects extended the reach, and
grasp, of principal investigators and project directors. Each category
of a project budget meant additional categories of resources put at a
project’s disposal, and thereby at the disposal of project participants.
These extensions of individual capacities included secretarial assistance,
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equipment rental, technical services such as audio-visual aides or com-
puter programmers, more specialized and short-term consultant help, com-
munication costs, project housing-whatever was co^atible with agency
and University approval.
Summer salaries permitted research to continue beyond the aca-
demic year, supplementing faculty and student salaries, permitting time
for report and article writing without the normal academic year respon-
sibilities of teaching and committee work. Money for secretaries meant
articles and letters could be dictated, books ordered, files maintained,
saving many hours of professional staff time, enabling contacts with
more people in a field of study than any single person could sustain
working alone. "For me," one project director (Fortune, interview, June,
1972) had decided, "the secretary was the incentive. I can be three
times more productive with a good secretary."
When the University’s limited travel allocation to the School was
empty, project travel budgets remained liquid. The University's State-
imposed restriction on out-of-state travel did not apply to most funded
projects. Depending upon agency- imposed limitations, travel might be
authorized not only to project sites but also to conferences and other
professional meetings where individuals could exchange research reports,
social contacts, reputations, leads for improved employment or recruit—
and so forth. The carefully planned project was aimed not only at
its specific funded goals
,
but also at the use of those goals as a means
of improving the likelihood of future rewards. For such ambitions, the
apparently simple advantages of a competent secretary, ample xerox ex-
penses, and the unrestricted use of a long-distance telephone were not
to be discounted, and travel, consultant, or assistantship support still
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less so (R. Clark, Interview, March, 1972; Eve, Interview, April, 1972;
Gorth, interview, April, 1972).
The exemplar of this outlook at the School was the dean himself
(Allen, interview, March, 1972). T* e University would not and could not
provide the type and scale of money needed by projects. "Therefore,"
he reasoned, "so long as we are hemmed in by institutional dollars, sub-
ject to institutional definitions of goals, we must look elsewhere for
funds." He used his personal experience as a case in point:
I learned this at Stanford. In my last year there, my absolutedollar budget was larger than the dean’s. For example, the dean
would even come and ask me to do things. And I was a very junior
associate professor. The effect of soft money is that it upsets
the power hierarchy. At Stanford, I had more power as an assis-
tant professor than most full professors. This was a leverage
thing to parlay. They couldn't control me.
The official reward system at Stanford, as throughout standard American
academia, Allen continued, was built on publications and research. But:
Once I had my own resources: secretaries to type my papers, re-
search assistants to do my gut work, equipment, computer time,
consultants, travel, hire other professors, good students. . . .
The list could be extended indefinitely. All these were sources
of leverage. All helped me succeed by Stanford's own reward sys-
tem in addition to my own. I accomplished more research for the
institutional goals and had more time for my own goals.
Part of Allen's accomplishment was the achievement of the professional
visibility which brought him into contact with individuals and organi-
zations at a national level.
"Parlaying" project resources into the whole range of specific,
timely needs of projects and their staffs was a skill. Especially with
many projects operating simultaneously, each competing for the time and
attention of faculty and students, participation on the basis of intel-
lectual interest alone could not be expected or taken for granted. The
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most common way to involve students in projects was to offer financial
support in return for specific tasks or responsibilities. But other in-
ducements were available as well. A faculty member could accept the
chairmanship of a student's guidance or dissertation committee if the
student would participate in areas of interest to the prospective chair-
person. Students desperate for dissertation topics might assist in a
project with research opportunities even though the project's substance was
peripheral to their ultimate career goals (Eve, interview, April, 1972).
Faculty participation might be won by direct hiring for a pro-
ject-financed "soft" position, by offering up to the allowable twenty-
five percent of academic year salaries for summer work, or up to ten
percent for instruction offered through the University's continuing ed-
ucation program. University policy prohibited the use of project funds
for direct payments to State-salaried faculty during the academic year.
This policy created a market for "in kind" payments ranging from travel
to supplies and secretarial services to student support. Informal ar-
rangements providing assistantships to students selected by other faculty
members, or sharing the time of a project secretary were two principal
means of gaining faculty participation. In these ways, the ability to
find ratios of acceptable exchange provided flexibility in the form of
opportunities to incur future obligations and created personal discre-
tionary power for project directors (R. Clark, interview, March, 1972;
Eve, interview, April, 1972; Hambleton, interview, April, 1972).
But the other side of this exchange process was the creation of
a feeling that services should not be volunteered to funded projects
without some quid pro quo . Even a large project of substantial scope
potentially appealing to many professional interests could find itself
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unable to attract specialized short term manpower from within the School.
One project with a cross-country site offered transportation, food, and
lodging, "that and the chance to do their own thing in a field environ-
ment," in return for assistance from in-School consultants. Yet the pro-
ject encountered widespread "unwillingness" when non-project individuals
and groups were asked to get involved. "The deans," said the director
(Nichols, interview, April, 1972), "feel strongly that people should
offer services for free as long as it doesn’t cost them anything. But
It’s difficult. Some people are very mercenary."
Two Assumptions
The perpetuation of the project system at the School was built
upon two assumptions. One was that individual members saw the system as
a means to personally determined needs. The other was that once indi-
viduals recognized the potential benefits of the system, they also judged
that the system was operating satisfactorily within their immediate or-
ganizational setting. The very number, scope, and continuity of project
activity at the School would indicate that these assumptions were widely
accepted, that members did recognize potential benefits and that the sys-
tem was administered in a way which made those benefits realizable.
However, not all persons shared these assumptions, and therefore
not all persons participated in the project system with equal vigor.
One faculty member recruited by the dean in 1968, for example, questioned
whether outside funded projects were appropriate paths toward his profes-
sional goals (Ivey, interview, May, 1972). Having directed projects at
his previous university with grants totalling over one million dollars,
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he had found that "the grant was running me around.- The money had gone
largely into institutional academe salaries, the impact on education
had been questionable, yet the agencies were pleased and increased fund-
ing. Why apply for more money just to keep a project staff together?
he wondered. Lacking any research objectives which would require sub-
stantial and sustained financial support, he had removed himself from
grant-seeking activity. On the other hand, he recognised that should
his interests again identify a concrete purpose justifying his own con-
centrated, long-term attention, a grant would be useful. "To my mind,"
he said, "funding is for muscle and clout to act on a commitment. I see
grants as power rather than as flexibility."
Flexibility" to this faculty member defined an ability to change
interests "every few months":
I m not locked into two and three year terms. ... I need gooddoctoral students and would like to help them if I could. But I
can work on a shoestring and with students, it’s a mutuality ofinterest rather than the commitments of grants.
As for the secondary benefits that others saw in projects, this person
did without summer pay, did much of his own typing and was "delighted"
with the School’s secretarial pool when he had used it, rarely attended
conferences, rejected distant consulting offers, and found the xerox
and computer resources of the University more than ample for his own
needs. Working in local schools and hospitals with occasional consult-
ing elsewhere in New England provided a basis for his articles, teaching,
and research.
Some people, as the example just cited, found that the project
system did not contribute directly to their self-perceived needs. Still
others thought that their goals could be attained only if the system was
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redesigned, only if its administration became a more efficient route to
those goals. Criticisms mentioned in the previous chapter regarding the
effects of the time-consuming project approval process upon some research
proposals submitted to the federal Office of Education reflected this
point of view. But in some instances, objections were raised to the
School’s treatment of operating funded projects and the rewards those
projects held for their staffs.
The most outspoken critic of the School’s administration of
funded projects during the time of this study was a highly successful
and respected grantsman on the faculty. The problem with the organi-
zation’s support for projects, he argued (Fortune, interview, June, 1972),
was that basic services which should have been supplied by the University
as a matter of course were denied to faculty and students successful in
finding outside resources. "Once you have a grant," he complained, "you
are no longer part of the University services." In a memorandum to the
School Council, he asserted that because of School policy:
. .
. (1) project directors must pay for all xeroxing, including
copying not project-related; (2) project directors must pay all
travel expenses for themselves and their staffs, including travel
not project-oriented; (3) total secretarial support must be paid
from project funds; (4) project directors must pay for all tele-
phone service; and (5) all graduate student assistantships must
be paid from project funds [Fortune, memorandum, 1972].
This was not to say that the director found himself absolutely worse off
for having sought and received outside funds. The project did buy grad-
uate assistants, a competent secretary, telephone needs and other sup-
portive services. On the other hand, despite his responsibilities for
a large project, he had not been allocated additional space and was
forced to house the project s iff and records in his own office.
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Together, the limitations turned project workF u c from an opportunity into a
burden. "It would not buy professional growth if han, t becomes just produc-
tion," he said
.
Outside funds, thought this project director, should have been
used to challenge existing programs, "to do things ordinary programs
don’t dare to and bring them into comparison." Competition of this sort
was healthy. Instead, he saw his colleagues competing unproductively
for central School and University support. In his view, the benefits
of better students, equipment, supplies, "soft" positions, national
reputation, research opportunities, and overhead warranted a policy of
positive reinforcement for those faculty who obtained grants. Such a
policy would have given project staffs access to "hard" resources equal
to that enjoyed by faculty and students who lacked outside support.
An objection to this argument was raised from the perspective
of the School’s administration. "Resources are always scarce," observed
the dean (Allen, interview, May, 1972). "People with resources want to
husband their own. They don't stop and think that the University helped
to identify resources and provided other assistance." Citing the many
advantages which projects supplied, the dean took pride in the fact that
substantial "soft" funding took pressure off of a limited "hard" budget,
permitting the School's resources from the University budget to be di-
vided "among far fewer people with the result that those without projects
have alot of the benefits of projects."
Participation and Personnel Decisions
The search for organizational balance and integration was also
asserted by the School’s faculty-student personnel committee, which
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recommended decisions on promotions, tenure, and merit pay. During 1971-
1972, the committee (memorandum, n.d.) advised that its decisions would
be made "in light of the total contribution of an individual to the
School of Education in terms of its stated commitments." Attracting
funds and involvement in projects were only two of the twenty criteria
listed by the committee. A belief "in the variety and diversity of
strengths and styles of individuals" was placed above narrow "minimum
criteria such as number of publications or amount of dollars raised
through grants. In other words, the committee's decisions were meant
to serve less as incentives for project activism than as a means of en-
couraging the direction of that activism toward organizational rather
than personal objectives. The weight of personnel decisions was added
to the School’s underlying normative influences.
Expectations of Project Commitments to the School
By focusing on the rewards which individual members of the School
could find in funded projects, we have begun to perceive and understand
the balances of incentives and disincentives affecting faculty and stu-
dent participation in projects and fund-raising activities. Still to
be explored is the question of how the School administration was able
to integrate project benefits and create an institutional identity as
an innovative organization.
To do this we will look at some of the administrative expecta-
tions which helped to govern the behavior of project personnel. These
expectations were initiated by the School’s administrators and were de-
signed to insure that the School as a whole would benefit from project
resources
.
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As described in the preceding chapter, the first step in the
University's review of proposals for sponsored research coming from the
School occurred when a prospective project director or principal inves-
tigator brought a draft proposal to the office of the School's assistant
dean for administration. At that time, two basic criteria were applied.
First, did the project and its budget comply with University policy?
Second, were there any ''hidden commitments' 1 of either a political or
financial nature? At almost every stage of subsequent review, the focus
of the process was seen to be on these two basic questions.
Proposal review, however, was more than an opportunity to pro-
tect the University from the effects of poor project planning. It was
also an opportunity to impress upon project directors the extent of the
benefits they received from, and the expectation of their commitment to,
the School of Education. The message, simple and direct, was usually
given by the assistant to the dean for administration, the person norm-
ally handling initial budget review (Bender, interview, January, 1972).
The University, it would be argued, had never paid for the true overhead
expenses of the "new" School. The services which the School had managed
to make available to its members ranging from funding ideas and assis-
tance to logistic services such as travel, telephones, secretaries, xer—
oxing had always been subsidized by projects because, in fact, these
services were designed specifically to assist project staffs in forming
their proposals and meeting their objectives.
A case could be asserted that the true debt owed by a project to
the University would reflect the actual cost of recollecting and organiz-
ing from ground zero all the resources of buildings, staff, reputation
and good will which contributed to the initial ability of a project
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Proposal to find funding and to the final ability of the proj ect to meet
Its objectives. Computed this way, no project could possibly meet the
consequent institutional obligation. On the other hand, the supporting
University organization was forced for long-range purposes other than
those temporarily being performed by the project, whose presence would
be attributable to the abilities of faculty and students already on cam-
pus and whose additional cost to the University would be only a marginal
increment of the normal costs of supporting those individuals and their
activities. By common practice, the argument about overhead costs has
been a matter for resolution by universities and the agencies sponsoring
funded projects. In the School of Education, however, overhead became a
subject of negotiation between project staffs and the School administra-
tion
.
Project directors were told that but for the general reputation
of the School, much less any direct assistance by deans, colleagues, or
students, their chances of receiving funds would be diminished. Beyond
the effects of any indirect surrogate reputation was the fact that many
project staffs had sought and received advice and assistance from one or
another of the deans while planning a funding strategy, conceptualizing
a proposal, or anticipating reactions within the University. Further
evidence was the fact that, as during 1970-1971 for example, only four
of eighteen staff positions in the various deans' offices were paid out
of the State budget. "Soft" funds paid for the remaining fourteen.
Nonetheless, all these positions—secretaries
,
staff assistants, account-
ants—served the interests of the School as a whole (University of
Massachusetts, School of Education, 1971d).
This system of direct and indirect support was designed to facil-
itate not only the recruiting and maintenance of funded projects, but
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also the continuity of resources during periods when individuals were
''between" projects. What the administration wanted in return for pro-
viding these services was a commitment to the techniques by which the
School was administered, and thereby to its broad organizational goals.
The specific forms of such commitments varied from project to project
and time to time depending upon both the needs of the School and the
flexibility of project resources. Commitments of resources, broadly con-
ceived, included the availability of project sites for training and re-
search opportunities, the sharing and intermingling of project experi-
ences, the teaching of project-related courses open to all students, the
participation of project personnel in governance and other non-funded
activities as well as financial commitments.
A main theme of this study, if we need to remind the reader, has
been that an organization's vitality is directly linked to the effect-
iveness of the ways it recruits and transforms resources into goal-
directed behavior. In the following pages, we will describe three com-
mon patterns
,
three levels of organizational expectations which governed
the fiscal integration of projects into the management of the School.
The first level includes direct but limited contributions and exchanges
for specific needs such as travel, secretarial salaries, telephone and
xerox deficits, and general supplies. A second level of expectation
would create resources for the School by the responsibilities of center
operations to projects, removing the affected centers from many routine
claims on the School's administrative budget. Finally, at a third level,
a project could be defined as a School-wide commitment with the inten-
tion of intertwining the mutual objectives of project and larger organ-
ization so that each could be used vigorously as a resource for the other.
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Expectat ions of Direct Contributions
Besides assuring that project budgets accounted for all direct
and indirect costs, proposal reviewers in the office of the assistant
dean for administration typically urged project directors to "build in-
extra money, especially for telephone, xerox, and travel
.
1
In part,
this request reflected a concern that projects might find themselves
underfinanced and their success jeopardized once operational. In part,
the request reflected an expectation that the School would have some
claim on these funds at a later date. If the point was not raised at
the time of proposal submission, it could be raised at some later date
when the administrative staff, observing unspent categories in a pro-
ject's budget, could request that some portion of the balance be placed
at the School's disposal.
Cooperation
One project director, for instance, reported he had entered "a
private relationship" whereby the salary of a secretary in the School's
secretarial pool was paid by his project. The arrangement was made
after the project was funded when the director received a call from the
then administrative dean. Reaching an agreement, the director said,
"was very easy. I understood this was the way things were done here."
While the sponsoring foundation had not been informed, the director
Because of the sensitive nature of some of the information con-
tained in the remaining sections of this chapter, project directors will
not be identified even when quoted directly. The names of all persons
interviewed and the dates on which they were interviewed may be found
in the essay on sources following the text of the dissertation.
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emphasized that nothing had been done "undercover." He recognized that
being at the School had helped clear the way for funding and that the
agency "had good feelings" about the dean. These considerations, and
the additional understanding that "foundation money is the most flexible
money you can get," justified the School’s request in the director’s
mind.
A smaller project acknowledged requests for travel and telephone
assistance. As reported by the director, "They say, ’we have a problem,
what can you contribute?'
. . . It's done case by case, just that I have
money in the categories they need." Yet another director explained,
"Their case is that the University gives you free computer time and in-
kind contributions as well as permitting comfortable salaries and sti-
pends for project staff. It would also be argued that projects used
more xerox and telephone resources during non-funded developmental stages.
This director had objected to the idea of building up his xerox and tele-
phone budgets. A center director as well, he operated the center out of
his grant and thought that the support of students and staff was suffi-
cient advantage to the School. None the less, he added that he had
signed some small bills not associated with the project when these were
sent to him by the School.
When the School wanted to purchase a keypunch machine it had been
renting, several projects using the machine were approached for contri-
butions of one hundred dollars each. As each project had an interest
in retaining the machine, the contributions were made. At least two of
the project directors, however, later agreed to the use of their contri-
butions for smaller, unrelated School purchases when the administration
office found an alternative means of funding the keypunch purchase.
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As a final example of this widespread practice, one director re-
ported that his project supported a secretary in the School's teacher
training office. In part, this was done because the project, a small
one, needed little space and only part-time secretarial assistance and
in part because the project objectives were related to undergraduate
teacher training. In addition, the project bought more supplies than it
actually needed.
Resistance
Not all directors regarded the administration’s requests with
equal willingness. When preparing his proposal budget, one director re-
called, he had listened to the "standard" suggestion to build extra money
into the xerox and telephone budget. He agreed to increase "a couple of
categories, but I didn't agree to use the money for purposes other than
those in the proposal." Furthermore, he and the co-director of this par-
ticular project both reported that they had consistently rejected School
requests for budgetary contributions and had adopted a policy of provid-
ing ass is tantships only in exchange for actual project services.
Noting that in two instances he had picked up part of an assis-
tantship without receiving any service in return, one director felt
misused. "That means dissipating my energies to support things that
should be a direct concern of the School," he said, blaming his own
"naivete" as a new director for having concurred with the request.
The director and staff member of one large project felt that
they had received minimal support from the School and determinedly re-
jected possible encroachments on their budgets. Because the project’s
substantial funding had been received routinely for a period preceding
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the arrival of the new dean in 1968, its support was described as "very
hard soft money. " That security, along with an actual physical separa-
tion from the rest of the School, contributed to the independent position
taken by the director. "The School of Education knows they [sic] can’t
get their hands on the money," said one staff member, "and it drove
Dwight up the wall for awhile." The project handled all its own account-
ing and processing of travel and purchase orders, using the School only
as the official channel for its funding proposals.
Yet another project director reported several requests from the
School administration. One rejected request would have committed the
project to use about one-sixth of its budget in support of a secretary
for one of the assistant deans. Again, a faculty member responsible for
the project had been urged to drop some teaching responsibilities in or-
der to concentrate on project work. The suggestion was declined, but
School administrators still argued that as faculty time on the project
was not included in the project budget, some contribution of resources
to the School was reasonable. Because the project's funding had developed
out of the School's membership in a higher education consortium, the dean
suggested that project funds might be used to pay the annual institution-
al membership dues. The project staff, while willing to pay half the
dues, declined to contribute the total sum. Meanwhile, the project did
supply a phone for the faculty member's office, as the academic center
in which the project was located lacked any logistic budget of its own.
These examples are meant to be indicative of a widespread ex-
pectation, one implemented with mixed success, that funded projects
would be used to aid the School's short-term needs. Support of this
kind was one way a project director could acknowledge the benefits his
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or her project had received from the larger organization. The benefits
themselves could be either direct as by use of the counsel of the deans,
support of other administrative personnel, and the availability of other
services, or indirect as from the effect of the School’s reputation on
project funding.
Exchanging Resources
Project directors were frequently asked to exchange resources,
both budgetary and non-budget ary
,
with School projects, programs, and
centers. What made these exchanges so mutually advantageous was the
fact that projects varied in the flexibility of their own resources.
One project, for example, found itself unable to purchase a
secretarial typewriter because of restrictions in the grant agreement.
With the help of the School administration, a "swap” was arranged. The
School s own budget lacked adequate funds for secretarial supplies and
honoraria for bringing visitors to the campus, categories in which the
project had ample funds. By paying School bills up to the purchase price
of the typewriter, which was ordered through School channels, project and
administration both gained. The same project was able to find other
equipment it needed by exchanging some of its out-of-state travel funds
for equipment monies held by other projects.
The agency funding the above project had been asked to approve
the internal transactions. The agency sent restrictive formal guidelines,
but, project staff reported, "on the side said, 'don’t tell us."' More-
over, the director asked and received permission from the agency to make
line item changes in the project budget when individual categories ran
out. In effect, the budget was left to the staff's discretion, although
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still under the accounting auspices of the University. The project staff,
in tum, relied on the School’s central administration to arrange ex-
changes and find ways to by-pass any obstacles of University procedures:
Our administrative office here has made alot of effort. If they
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y SO ' T1'ey ' 11 8° t0 bat -oss campus !the Sc ool of Education, you can lay it out straight. Theydon t play games with us. They know how to use the ropes and do
This clearing of administrative paths and brokerage of project resources
were services which earned the loyalty and cooperation of project parti-
cipants
.
Personnel could also be involved in resource exchanges. At one
level, this could amount to simple cooperation among the people associ-
ated with two or more projects. Or a project might offer the use of a
stipend or summer salary to students associated with another center in
return for specialized project work. In one case, several projects con-
tributed funds for a guest lecturer at the School where none could have
done so alone. The contributions were defined as either repayments for
earlier favors or purchases of portion’s of the guest's time for special
seminars. In another instance, a faculty member on "soft" money was
transferred to a State position while still working full-time on the
project. In return, the project paid salaries for some School secre-
taries up to the amount of funds still encumbered by the original posi-
tion .
Some projects, those dealing with, or potentially dealing with,
undergraduate teacher training, were in positions to benefit from ex-
changes with the Teacher Preparation Program Council. TPPC wanted in-
teresting off-campus sites for its undergraduate student teachers and
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hoped that some funded projects would find ways to build even small
scale pre-service opportunities into their operations. In exchange
for such cooperation, TPPC could provide State-funded stipends for stu-
dent teacher supervisors, thereby building project manpower. During
1971-1972, the TPPC chairperson considered his efforts to "tie in" with
funded projects "largely unsuccessful." His problem, as he defined it,
was to show project staffs that student teachers also could be resources
for project programs if effort was made to create new options for under-
graduates rather than seeing them only as "added burdens." This kind of
reconceptualization fit his own definition of "soft" money as "any form
of creating resources that don't cost us anything and provide benefits."
Expectations of Coinnii
1
111011ts to Centre its
The second level of expectation structuring the fiscal commitments
of projects to the School organization was basically an extension of the
dean s axiom that the lack of calling on resources is itself a resource
[Allen, interview, April, 1972]." This expectation called for "soft" pro-
jects to supply support services to the centers in which the projects
were based. By so doing, a project released the institutional resources
which it could ordinarily claim, leaving these for redistribution to
other purposes selected by the dean.
"The center is the grant and the grant is the center," asserted
one faculty member who combined the roles of project and center directors,
"In my mind, it was a grant to build the Center." From the point of view
of resource flexibility, this was almost an ideal relationship. The di-
rector and his secretary received their salaries from the University's
"hard" budget. But the remaining needs of the center, ranging from
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PP rt to off campus training and curriculum development to
secretarial and other logistic retirements, were all supported by a
three-year grant. Moreover, expenditures were not tied to narrow oh-
jectives and line-item budgets. The proiect h a kP j ad been funded for the
broad purpose of establishing a new area ofg
^search and teaching in the
field of education, which meant by implicaM nr, m •y cation the institutionalization
of the academic content within an organizational structure. The direc-
tor^ also believed that funded had been intended to subsidize the cen-
ter's participation in helping the "new" School of Education "get off
the ground.' All these factors combined were enabling the director to
"pursue my interests with a greater degree of power, flexibility, and
resources .
" The only weakness to the arrangement was the likelihood
of a decline in flexibility when the grant expired, by which time only
some of the project's costs would be taken over by the University.
Another project director noted that "our contribution to the
School of Education was in terms of the contribution to the center.
This was something that came out of the center's interests." The pro-
ject, a small one of under $20,000, was the only funded involvement of
this center, although several students associated with the center helped
staff University programs not associated with the School. This particu-
lar project supported three graduate students, an administrative assis-
tant for the center director, and basic center travel and telephone ex-
penses. Because five of its "top-level people" were students in the
project, the sponsoring agency was closely involved with the center.
The agency, reported the project director, was "receptive" to the ad-
ministrative meshing of project and center resources. "I think," she
stated, "this is because of the experimentation with a new form of
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administrative training, because they realize that the smoother the cen-
tral program functions, the better the ancillary programs function." In
essence, this was the same argument used at the School level to justify
the expectation of project contributions to the "parent" organization.
Just as projects were encouraged to absorb center administrative
costs, so were they encouraged to absorb the developmental costs of other
prospective projects. This expectation could mean no more than that stu-
dents and faculty associated with a particular project would plan propos-
als and funding strategies in addition to the project responsibilities.
In other cases, projects acted as funding agents for prototype projects
related to the goals of the parent activity. Or mutual arrangements
could be developed where projects subsidized their centers in expecta-
tion of later support for staff members during lapses in funding.
The staff of one of the School's larger projects was able to or-
ganize as a working team prior to funding because the students involved
were already at the School, supported on stipends which allowed them the
time to research and plan the proposal. Planning included the prepara-
tion of undergraduate courses, workshops, and contacts with other cen-
ters as well as proposal writing. This planning process gave the group
enough solidity to be recognized by the School Council as an official
program, one step short of center status. Without project funding, it
was likely that some of this energy would have become diffused during
the following year. But with funding, the group was able to consolidate
its gains and became another base for the conceptualization of future
proj ects
.
A grant made for the explicit purpose of helping a center design
alternative methods of graduate education fitted itself exactly to this
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style of operation. The funding, spread oyer several years, was meant
primarily to support graduate students who would help create the School's
program in administrative leadership. Resources of this kind almost by
definition encouraged the development of ideas which could lead to fund-
able projects because they brought people and logistic support together
without aribtrary preconditions. A single center memorandum, for example,
brought three potential off-campus collaborative involvements to the
attention of center members (Center for Leadership and Administration,
memorandum, 1971). Another memorandum (CLA, 1972) reported a meeting of
the center at which the dean:
. •
. urged CLA to involve itself in School-wide activities.
Dwight identified six existing project sites which offered signif-
icant opportunity for CLA involvement, as examples of the kind of
entrepreneurial ventures which would win his admiration.
In this instance, project development was considered the very substance
of the basic grant.
One project director had searched for outside funding for several
years before finally receiving an unusually large planning grant. During
the year before the project was funded, the director was able to create a
new School center in part with the help of a relatively small project.
This second project provided most of the administrative support—tele-
phone, secretary, duplicating—which made center status meaningful. As
the smaller project closed its books and the larger one became a reality,
the favor was returned. The new project now subsidized the center, in-
cluding the activities of the doctoral candidate who had organized the
earlier project and was now preparing new proposals.
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Expectations of Multiple Use
Defining a project as a School-wide commitment and creating with-
in its staff the expectation that the project’s resources would have wide
application within the institution was a third, and more broadly conceived
level of the integration of "soft" funding. Such projects did more than
respond to limited requests for the support of School overhead. They al-
so did more than equip individual centers with the ability to pay their
own ways. Such projects made the types of contributions already discussed
while fulfilling a more important function of providing semi-discretionary
resources to the dean, and through his approval to other members of the
School. Typically, as in the examples to be cited, the dean himself had
taken the leading role in arranging funding for these projects. Some of
them, reflecting this initiative, held no affiliation with any of the
School’s centers.
As seen in earlier chapters, the School’s reputation as an inno-
vative higher education organization was based on a policy of internal
and external experimentation. Loosening institutional restraints was
intended to encourage reformist involvements off-campus, first by at-
tracting capable, active people and then by attracting additional re-
sources to provide project opportunities for those people. The School’s
national reputation belonged not to any single project, but to the com-
plex interactions of internal restructuring and external involvements,
which together embodied "the School." One of the aims of the adminis-
tration was to make this reputation an institutional reality by broaden-
ing the manpower base of important projects to include sections of the
"community" beyond the immediate project staff.
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Integrating Center Resources
One of the more noteworthy examples of this aim must be draKn
a project which began in 1970 and was still active at the time of
this study. In addition to providing instruction « tg , supplies, and travel
to the off-campus site, the nrniect-'c • .
,
n p oject s administration and curriculum de-
velopment needs became the core interest of one of the centers and its
budget the primary source of center support. Thus, like some other
projects, this one created institutional resources by not calling on
them.
Beyond this not unusual contribution, however, the project sup-
plied the School administration with over $40,000 in semi-discretionary
funds during 1970-1971. The funds amoved to two-thirds of the "admin-
istrative fees" Charged the contracting school system, itself the recip-
ient of a federal grant. The other third of the fees were assigned to
University s Department of Continuing Education to cover the costs
of maintaining records for project students enrolled at the University,
and to permit payments to faculty teaching in the project. Payments to
faculty of up to ten percent of academic year salaries, it will be re-
called, were permitted by the University for courses taught under the
auspices of Continuing Education. The project involved faculty from
other academic units of the Amherst campus and these payments were the
only incentives the School could offer other than the experience of
teaching adults in an inner city environment (Bender, memorandum, 1971a;
F r i- ar
> memorandum, 1971; Suzuki, memorandum, 1972).
Within the School, the administration sought to focus the at-
tention and talent of the entire "education community" upon the project
}
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attempting to use it as a means of putting the range of individual and
group interests to work at a common task. In a joint memorandum, the
center director and the then assistant dean for special programs (Gentry
& R. Woodbury, memorandum, 1970) told "the community":
This is a program that can have a major impact on the School as
well as the School have a major impact on one of the crucial areas
of American education.
We are interested in drawing on the broad resources of the School
to make this program succeed and also encourage cooperation among
centers to strengthen the impact the School can make.
Each center was offered the use of $3,000 with another $3,000 for divi-
sion among non-center groups. A total of $27,000 was made available in
this way for the "general support, travel, and/or project development of
each center. Center’s were asked to "assess and negotiate" the contri-
butions they would make to the project in return for this support. The
purpose of the gesture was emphasized as an organizational lesson which
other projects could imitate to the extent that their own resources per-
mitted: "This program, like almost any program in the School, is finally
dependent upon the School as a whole. We want to underline this fact in
a financial way and not just a rhetorical one." Later memorandums from
the assistant dean for administration reminded centers of their oppor-
tunity and informed them of actual availability when payments were re-
ceived from the funding agency (Bender, memorandum, 1971b); Roop , memor-
andum, 1970)
.
Monies offered to centers for their cooperation with the present
project were used for almost every possible programmatic purpose. Par-
tial assistantships were given in some centers , honoraria were paid to
consultants and persons attending conferences on campus, travel was
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authorized for faculty and students, luncheons were paid, xerox costs
covered, office supplies purchased, faculty recruited, films rented,
conventions attended, brochures printed, and visits made to agencies
in search of future funding. The specific expenditures were selected
at the discretion of the various center groups. The distribution of
funds to the centers was itself a discretionary act, essentially a de-
cision within the School administration to make some of the dean’s dis-
cretionary authority available to School members, even if inevitably
diluted by the number of people invited to participate.
Uses of the Service Fund
Discretionary resources from the project were made available to
the entire School in this instance through the School of Education Ser-
vice Fund. The fund was a University-authorized trust fund established
in 1963 as an accounting mechanism for monies received by the School:
in connection with your program of research and studies including
those arising out of your cooperative relationships with the school
systems of the cities and towns of the State [Treasurer, University
of Massachusetts, memorandum, 1963].
In practice, the fund’s use had been expanded to include all sorts of
institutional income, as from the sale of catalogs, payments for School
workshops, gifts and endowments, and short-term contracts with payment
schedules not normally handled by the University accounting office.
Nor in practice was the fund limited to receiving monies only from
within Massachusetts (Suzuki, memorandum, 1972).
In the present case, the "administrative fees" paid to the pro-
ject were transferred with University approval from the project account
to the School’s Service Fund. One-third of the fees were again
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transferred from the Service Fund to the account of the Department of
Continuing Education (Clay, memorandum, 1971; Friar, memorandum, 1971).
Explaining the School’s use of its share of the fees, the assis-
tant dean for administration (Suzuki, memorandum, 1972) told the
University that the money was "used for special and unusual adminis-
trative or programmatic expenses which are directly or indirectly re-
lated to the programs." Two examples given were the transporation of
off-campus project students to the Amherst campus during the School's
semi-annual "Marathon" activities, and the allocation of small grants
to the various centers "for support to develop courses and programs"
for the project. He continued:
While there is considerable flexibility in the use of these funds,
their use is subject to the approval of the principal investiga-
tor, who must judge whether they are being used for purposes which
are directly or indirectly beneficial to the [project] students
[p. 2].
Actually, disbursements from the fund were made "under direct jurisdic-
tion of the dean, according to the view of an earlier administrative
dean at the School. By implication this meant that project monies trans-
ferred to the fund were available for the discretionary use of the dean
in concurrence with the principal investigator, who accepted the proce-
dure in the first place. As the dean had been an instrumental figure in
the development of funding for this project, the congruity of interests
between project director and School administration was understandable
(Allen, interview, September, 1972; Roop, memorandum, 1970).
Monies remaining in the Service Fund after the allocations to
the centers mentioned above, together with the general accounts in the
fund, remained for the use of the dean, and were one of the major sources
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of discretionary capital for the School during 1970-1971. Service Fund
monies paid postage, rented equipment, sponsored School retreats, fi-
nanced artwork for School banners, slides, and lapel buttons, bought
food for student receptions and faculty recruitment, permitted assorted
students to accompany the dean on his public speaking engagements as
"administrative shadows," bought books and films, brought people to
Amherst to discuss possible funding ventures, and sent people from Amherst
to do the same, paid travel expenses for an occasional student to travel
abroad for conferences or study trips, supported the costs of an intern-
al School committee to combat institutional racism, subsidized the
School's nationally known "Marathon," paid consultants, and permitted
the dean to make a grant of his own of $2,000 to a member of the faculty.
Thus, in myriad ways and on innumerable occasions, the School as a whole,
and especially the School's ability to reach out and maintain contact
with the world around it, benefitted from the resources made available
in this way.
Project Integration and the Deans
Other large projects whose funding conditions permitted budgetary
flexibility also were conceived as sets of incentives for the integration
of School activities. The program statement of one of these projects
listed all the School's centers and programs to indicate back-up re-
sources available to assist cooperating school districts in meeting pro-
ject objectives. In actual practice, the project staff found that their
ability to draw on these resources was more limited than they had anti-
cipated. "We wanted alot of center activity," said one of the directors,
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"but actually the main importance for the School was that it paid for
fxve to seven assistantships
,
provided research opportunities for those
research assistants, and we had a task force.
. . of several deans and
centers who met and talked fairly regularly." The project's first em-
phasis had been on involving the deans:
There was a strong effort to.
. . use the program as a unifying
force for the deans, revitalizing the deans' interest in things
other than School of Education administration. ... It was par-
ticularly designed not to go into a center for that reason.
In fact, mid-way through the academic year, the deans assumed direct
control of the project. Within a few months, finding that responsibility
burdensome, they appointed two doctoral candidates as directors, with one
assistant dean remaining principal investigator.
Other School uses of the project came from the dean, who had ar-
ranged the funding and appointed the director, a recent School graduate,
to the soft faculty position. Consequently, it was not unexpected that
the dean would have some authority over the uses of project resources.
One of these uses was the allocation of assistantships to fill commit-
ments made by the dean to a number of graduate students. One of these
stipends, for example, went to the student organizing the Marathon, an
event that was determined to be in keeping with the general project ob-
jectives. Again, by informal agreement between the dean and the funding
agency, $50,000 of the project's budget was separated from the main pro-
ject. Of that sum, $30,000 was used to set up a much smaller project,
also off-campus, in a kind of competition with the larger one. A doctor-
al student who had worked closely with the dean on a number of earlier
projects was selected as director of this smaller project. His staff
was itself largely recruited and recommended to him by the dean. Of
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the remaining $20,000, some was distributed to more stipends and some
Was used as discretionary support for activities tangental to the two
projects such as travel and communications.
The bulk of one project funded for several years, for example,
was used for stipends with the aim of recruiting highly qualified doctor-
al candidates who would conceptualize and organize the graduate program
for one of the centers. But as the director of the center acknowledged
when asked about agency awareness of funds used for School purposes
Sure they knew. It’s very much a case of Dwight being funded and what
Dwight is doing here and not just the substance of the proposal." That
understanding between agency and School permitted the dean to put on the
project budget staff members of the assistant dean for administration,
the people who formed the administrative and accounting core of the
School's support services for all funded projects. Moreover, some of
the project’s stipends were available to the dean for distribution to
students whom he could admit to the School as "wild cards," outside of
the admissions quotas and procedures of individual centers. The School's
written constitution authorized the dean "to admit a certain number of
graduate students at his discretion [University of Massachusetts, School
of Education, 1971e, p. 6]," but it did not indicate how those students
would be supported. As the principal fund-raiser for projects such as
this one, however, the dean was able to make use of his constitutional
leverage. Consequently, this ability to admit students was also an
abllity fond ideas in the persons of degree candidates wanting to
follow particular courses of study.
Again, it was at the dean’s initiative that funding was sought
to assist the School in restructuring its internal academic scheduling
183
.
and accrediting procedures. The very nature of the project gave it
School-wide impact and meant that its resources would assist the School's
overall administration. Project staff worked closely with the staffs of
the academic and administrative deans and turned to the deans for support
when high level discussions were required with University officials. The
director guaranteed funds for the academic office's summer student ad-
visors if money could not be found elsewhere. Also, the project's tele-
phone budget was assigned to the School, although less than a third was
used by the project itself. These commitments were seen as part of the
project’s rationale of making "the School structure flexible, responsive."
Multiple Resource Use and Integration
This chapter s descriptions of some of the relationships joining
funded projects to the overall School organization are by no means defin-
itive. Specific expectations were created on a project-by-project basis
and varied with the needs of the School, a project's own needs, the limi-
tations imposed by agency requirements, and the personal relationships
existing between project and School administrators. As we have seen,
the administration's arguments for support were not always received en-
thusiastically by those who saw such claims as infringements on project
resources. Still others had doubts about the ethics of the practice, as
did one center director who made inquiries concerning the previously
described allocation of a project's funds to the School's centers:
I personally believe the "no strings attached" arrangement to be
a nice one, although scarcely legitimate, so I certainly will not
be "upset" to find that we have been operating on the basis of a
misconception.
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The director's disbelief was unwarranted and this project as others made
its contributions of resources for reallocation from the perspective of
the School’s overall needs. But the changing character of those needs
and of the solutions to meet them makes a definitive description impos-
sible.
On the other hand, the examples given have displayed the types
of expectations of institutional loyalty and support which a project di-
rector could have been asked to accept. We have seen how School members
were educated to their responsibilities regarding the organization’s re-
sources and how operational patterns were established to help them ful-
fill these commitments. Expectations were transformed into obligations
and thence into concrete donations and exchanges, providing the basic re-
sources by which so many of the activities of persons at the School were
sustained. The importance of these expectations for this study is that
they constituted the core mechanism, the administrative engine, of a
broadly conceived strategy of institution building, just as the reform
of American education was the ideological heart of the School. Together,
these two forces, applied with vigor and sophistication, created an or-
ganization of unique character, recognizably different from other schools
of education. This character of the School was described in the third
chapter.
The conceptualization of these expectations and of their role
in integrating funded projects with other organizational programs nec-
essarily prefaced the selection of personnel and the 1968 invitation to
"join a revolution." It underlay the very notion that a "new" School
of Education could be built at the University of Massachusetts without
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the restraints of University and State budgets. Implementing this set
of expectations made possible both the dramatic gestures—retreats
,
Marathons, plentiful stipends, special admissions, venturesome programs—
and the unassuming support services described in this chapter.
Expectations of University Support
The topic of this dissertation has been the interplay of outside
funding and organizational structure in a university school of education.
But it would be misleading to create the impression that non-University
funds were to be preferred invariably over University funds. Rather,
the key preference was for the discretionary use of funds, or of any re-
source, regardless of its source. Speaking to this issue, Allen (inter-
view, March, 1972) asserted, "I’d rather have $100,000 of really flexible
money than one million dollars without flexibility." The problem was
that no single funding source, no single group of agency decision-makers,
whether in government, university or private positions, could or would
provide the range or depth of resources required to operate a national-
level school. But taken together, diverse sources could be used to cap-
italize on the opportunities provided by each other. As a consequence,
while the dean and others at the School sought to develop new projects
and new agency contacts, they also sought to increase the University's
support.
It is not our intention here to describe in. detail the proce-
dures or politics of creating the University's "hard" State budget. We
aim only to show that the School's success in attracting outside resources
was the keystone of its argument for increased institutional resources.
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In some respects, the University could be viewed as another "outside-
agency in the School's environment, an agency to which proposals could
be made and with which bargains could be negotiated, of course, the
School was but one of many sub-units of the University whose administra-
tors were legally responsible for decisions affecting the School's activ
ities. From this perspective, the School was "inside" the University.
Consequently, the requests for support were couched first in terms of
the School's role within the University and only secondly in terms of
particular program objectives.
Establishing Expectations
In the previous chapter, we saw how the School’s dean had suc-
ceeded in securing special allocations of University trust funds. Dur-
ing fiscal 1972, these allocations from trust funds amounted to over
$280,000, some of it ear-marked for special purposes, such as the con-
struction of new facilities, but most of it left to the discretion of
the dean.
the dean argued for the School's special claim on overhead
funds, he also pressed for a broader base of support from the University
I understand the problem of the availability of funds to the total
University," Allen (letter, 1971) wrote University president Wood in
preparation for fiscal 1972, "and the competing priorities for their
allocation. I would hope that the University will demonstrate through
budget support the social need for dramatic change in education." In
the actual budget request for higher levels of support, the School's
success in using outside funding to achieve national prominence became
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an argument for increased State funding. Requests for additional "hard"
staff positions were justified in a variety of ways (University of
Massachusetts, School of Education, 1971d)
:
The rapid and continuing growth, the innovative nature and diversity
o School of Education place unusual demands on its administra-
tion.
. . . The necessity and the desirability to participate in
federal and foundation grants is an additional burden. Staff asso-
ciates are requested.
. . to facilitate both effectiveness of re-
sources and control of programs. These positions are currently
being funded through soft money [n.p.].
and
,
Even though a number of the employees are paid through "soft" money,
it is imperative that we maintain standards of performance. . . .
The request for this position at this time is due to a projected
decrease in soft" money.
. . . This position was created in June,
1969, because of an urgent need to coordinate all of the many ac-
tivities of this rapidly expanding School. The need has been met
and the continuance of this position is critical to the successful
administration of the School of Education [n.p.].
and
At present, the School of Education has close to fifty trust funds
amounting to over 2.25 million dollars. ... It is imperative to
have a bookkeeper at the School.
. . . Failure to receive this
position on state monies (it is currently funded on soft money)
would result in a serious problem of information flow and control
[n.p. ] .
Requests for increases in State travel funds were explained:
The national status and diversity of interests necessitates this
level. Currently, a large portion is being supported by trust
funds. This travel is more correctly a part of minimal support
necessary [n.p. ]
.
The repeated assumption of these requests was that the "new" School's
history under its new dean had proven the value of using outside funding
as a path to prominence and that the time had come for the University as
a whole to provide a measure of security and permanence for that style
of operation; that is, to help institutionalize an administrative system.
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With the direct intention of emphasizing the University's alleged
responsibilities for support of the School’s administrative support sys-
tem, money received by the School of Education special trust fund from
the University's overhead account, the research trust fund, was used
primarily for support of basic services. During fiscal 1972, for example,
over half of the total $192,000 was applied to non-professional salaries
for secretaries to the deans and the Teacher Preparation Program Council.
About $35,000 more was committed to TPPC for materials and administrative
expenses including travel and equipment. Other portions were allocated
to pay membership fees in professional organizations, to assist in faculty
recruitment, to support the semi-annual Marathons, and to cover costs of
distributing the School s catalog. The intent of using University trust
fund monies for these purposes was to "show very clearly that the large
portion.
. . is directly committed to program support, primarily the up-
grading of the undergraduate teacher education program [Allen, memoran-
dum, 1971a]." Trust fund money, neither "soft" nor "hard" because it
shared important characteristics of both, was used primarily for appar-
ently "hard" services so as to create a University responsibility to
eventually absorb those costs into its overall budget. In effect, the
School’s administration used its leverage on "soft" University resources
in order to expand and institutionalize programs and services presumably
qualifying for State support.
Uses of the Special Trust Fund
But if most of these returned overhead funds were used in ways
which the University might have used them had they been allocated as
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categorical rather than as discretionary support, it regained true that
this money served the School's purposes better as trust fund money than
had it come from the State budget. Unlike stat* f a6 i K S e funds, returned overhead
be used for out-of-state travel. This meant that TPPC could super-
vise its programs outside Massachusetts and send representatives around
the nation and to Europe in search of additional sites. Additionally,
these funds could be used to sponsor faculty travel, "administrative
shadows" traveling with the dean, and other administrative travel approved
by the dean. This additional flexibility in turn permitted the kinds of
exchanges with other internal budgetary sources described earlier. Thus,
when using overhead funds to pay for overseas teacher training supervi-
sion, the dean was creating an expectation that the teacher training pro-
gram would "repay" the School from its own funds when an appropriate need
developed.
Soft money," observed Allen (interview, April, 1972), "allows
multiple uses of State funds that were never there before." Continuing,
he stated the principle "of always looking for way to protect the flexi-
bility of funds":
Example. If someone has a purpose "X" and asks, where to charge it,
the answer is always, charge it to the place with the least discre-’
tion. Regardless of which fund has the most money. I never ask
where is the logical place. I always ask, where is the legitimate
place with the least discretion.
The combined resources of projects, returned overhead, and State allo-
cations made possible a complex interweaving of purposes and activities.
Using the School's travel requirements as an example, the dean noted
that during fiscal 1972, the State allocated $11,000 (later increased
to $16,000):
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Normally administrative travel alone would take three to fivethousand dollars per year. But In fact, there have been almost
no administrative charges to the hard-money travel budget. Al-
most all the recruitment for the first three years was done on
soft money by combining it with other purposes.
A trip to a project site could become an opportunity to meet and talk
with other individuals and groups either in the immediate area of the
site or en route to it. For that matter, the need to travel for one
purpose could be the incentive to find a way to justify the trip in
terms of a project’s needs.
More important than the glamor of having far-flung projects was
the fact that by scattering projects around the country, or outside the
country, opportunities were created to piggy-back fund-raising, staff
recruiting, publicity, and general knowledge gathering functions atop
on-going project work. "You see," explained Allen (interview, April,
1972), "if you have enough people around, you build up a network. Take
Chicago. I can easily build up a two-to-one ratio there. For fifty
dollars to one hundred dollars, I can get what would otherwise cost
$250." Finding multiple uses for travel funds was simply an example
of the underlying principle of never letting a resource do only one job
when it could do others as well. This constant searching for maximum
impact was essential to the development of outside funding sources first
by making those contacts physically possible and then by using one set
of resources as the means of finding the replacement resources needed
for organizational continuity. Continuing success, in turn, could be
used to justify the dean’s bargaining for a share of the University's
overhead receipts for yet another year.
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Special Trust Fund as an Insurance Account
But even more important that its availability for specific pur-
poses such as travel or individual salaries was the fact that the School
of Education special trust fund was a discretionary account which left
these choices of allocation up to the dean. True, the fund's uses were
partially inhibited by the arguments used and expectations created dur-
ing annual negotiations between dean and University officials. But this
still meant that particular uses could be created or disbanded on short
notice, that the School's assessments of its needs could be made on very
short notice and that even longer range assessments were not subjected
to the restrictive, drawn out procedures of formal budgeting. On the
other hand, some of the presumed security of "hard" budgeting was lack-
ing.
The fund was allocated to the School as a lump sum, with the op-
portunity to renegotiate its size and uses at later dates. Being avail-
able as a whole rather than as line-item categories meant that the fund
could be employed as an insurance account to the extent that its monies
remained unspent. Commitments to spend special trust monies could be
made with the expectation that the expenditures would be repaid in time
to cover later encumbrances for salaries, travel and program support.
When, in September, 1971
,
the new director of one of the School's
centers discovered that three important contracts were still pending for
approval by their funding agencies, he found that the crisis could be
weathered by transferring the salaries of the people affected to the
special trust fund account. To do this, the dean (Allen, memorandum,
1971b) notified the University's vice-chancellor for academic affairs of:
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In this way, the salaries of four faculty members and the stipends of
seven graduate students were protected and on-camP us work associated with
the projects such as program development and teaching was not interrupted,
m return, once the projects were funded, their resources were made avail-
able to the School up to the amounts previously spent from the trust fund.
An observer could infer, also, that this proof of the School's resource-
fulness would weigh either as gratitude or as an obligation of loyalty
at such times as these project directors were asked to assist the School's
administration with exchanges or contributions of resources.
The value of this kind of insurance was not underestimated by the
dean (Allen, interview, April, 1972):
Special trust is like an insurance account of say $200,000. I’d be
SPOO^nr^
0
^
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ne milllon dollars in opportunities with that$200,000. There s no way that none of it will come through, oreven most of it. Sometimes you may have to eat one or two. Butthat s what insurance is for.
Occasionally, the fund did "eat” its investments, as when a faculty
member hired in anticipation of receiving a grant was continued on the
fund when project negotiations failed. But here too, the fund's dis-
cretionary status enabled the dean to hire and retain the services of
an individual whose abilities he valued and who could become a valuable
resource to the School on other occasions.
In the final analysis, the School’s special trust fund, although
negotiated with and allocated by University administrators, was another
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way in which projects contributed to the nr** •organizational flexibility
whxch not only the dean, but many other School members as well, could
rely on when seeking resources and administrative means to achieve per-
sonal and program objectives. Of course th* aUI C
> e dean, as the person author
ized to approve expenditures, was the principal beneficiary of the fund.
Both his ability to create the fund by negotiation and his ability to
spend from it inevitably supplemented his formal authority as dean. It
made of him a person who both legally and practically could commit re-
sources to specific purposes on the basis of oni u •6 ly his best judgment and
without the need to seek higher approval "TV.no •s . his is a very powerful re-
source for decision-making," he observed (Allen, interview, April, 1972)
"The ability to say okay on the spot is a very cherished power of any
administrator.
"
The special trust fund's role as an insurance account also pro-
vided the dean with a perspective on the use of the School's portion of
the State budget that other campus administrators could not afford to
share. Deans and chairmen of other campus units, lacking outside funds
and depending on State allocations from the University budget to carry
them through the fiscal year, were constrained to leave a "cushion" in
their budgets to pay for any borderline expenses arising toward the end
of the year. Invariably, when all these "cushions" were added up at
the close of the fiscal year, the University was left with a healthy re-
serve fund which reverted to the central administration. At the School,
the situation was different. While State monies, subject to State gov-
ernment procedures, lapsed at the end of a fiscal year, trust fund
monies received as overhead costs did not. This meant that the dean
and his staff could, as he put the case (Allen, interview, April, 1972):
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Having spent hard, and taken some chances, but kept that spending within
the bounds of professional justifiability, the dean would be in a posi-
tion to approach the University administration for relief at the end of
a fiscal year. "The problem," he acknowledged, "is how to be responsibly
broke." Looking "responsibly broke" was really a question of proving
that the expenses incurred held, or at least had held, the possibility of
payoffs beneficial to both School and University. This argument, of
course, was once again the case for providing developmental funds which
enabled good ideas and qualified people to find other means of support.
Spending for telephones, the Marathon, staff recruiting and consultant
honoraria would come under this heading. Or it could be argued that
extra spending had provided the margin of success for important School
programs. Spending for TPPC or additional support staff could have come
under this heading.
A keen attention to the resources on hand and to the connections
which might be created between the School's many pools of resources could
appear confusing to the casual observer. The constant transferring of
payments among accounts, Allen (interview, May, 1972) noted, "makes our
finances hard to understand and convinces people something chicanerous
is going on." But it was just this interaction of resources which made
so many activities possible. Thus, the School's ambitions implied a de-
gree of risk, of operating in a way that others might suspect of impro-
priety. "I think," Allen said, "that that’s one of the biggest services
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I ve provided to the School, the willingness to accept that level of per-
sonal risk. Many administrators won’t."
Summary
Starting from the premise that American education was in need of
dramatic reform, dramatic leadership, the planners of the "new" School
were presented with the problem of how to organize themselves within the
University in order to improve their chances of having the impact they
wanted to have. The availability of outside funds as the means by which
the School could "remain in touch with the realities of societal needs
and the kinds of educational directions dictated by those needs [University
of Massachusetts, School of Education, 1971b, p. 5]" acted as a stimulus
to the implementation of many ideas which, when combined one with another,
were designed to increase the total impact of those resources. Thus, in
an earlier chapter, we saw how the elimination of grades and course re-
quirements at the doctoral level, the informal redefinition of graduate
students as "faculty," the abridgement of status differentials between
faculty and students, the deemphasis on academic departments in favor of
shifting cross-disciplinary, problem-solving alliances, and the recruit-
ment of a diverse group of faculty and students were programmatic changes
all serving to remove organizational obstacles to participation in funded
proj ects
.
But it took actual funding to make possible the projects and the
human participation in them. In still another chapter, we saw that ideas,
initiative, personal skill and resourcefulness, luck and, as people at
the School repeatedly emphasized, "whimsy," were needed to bring outside
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funding to the School in the amounts and frequency with which they did
come. The rewards which projects carried had to be substantial to jus-
tify all this activity. The present chapter has described in detail
some of these rewards, these incentives, as they were applied in the
day-to-day life of the School. We have finally come to see how project
funds were transformed within the School into inducements for individual
behavior-such as administering projects, traveling, attending confer-
ences, writing articles, seeking additional funding and so forth—and
also into "organizational" behaviors—such as decisions on hiring, secre-
tarial help, financial exchanges and contributions and other matters gov-
erning the relationships between individuals, funded projects, and the
School
.
At one point, we raised the question of whether individuals in
fact perceived the project system as a path to personal goals as well
as a path to the goals of their projects. A School-wide survey on this
question was beyond the scope of the study. But evidence gathered from
interviews revealed that funded projects provided an abundance of incen-
tives which could be offered as at least partial resources for the career
aims of many faculty and students. Restricted by the University prohi-
bition on salary supplements during the academic year, project directors
still found they could induce faculty participation by "in kind" payments
of student assistantships
,
secretarial help, travel and telephone privi-
leges as well as by any intrinsic appeal of the activity itself. These
services made professional goals such as publishing, conference attend-
ing, research productivity and personal visibility more easily attain-
able. Graduate students shared these needs, but in their case, finan-
cial support could be provided directly and stipends were often the
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principal requirement for the secure pursuit of an advanced degree. For
students, the intrinsic worth of specific projects was augmented by the
many dissertation topics inherent in project work.
The evidence, however, was not unanimous. Different profession-
al and personal needs of individual faculty and students implied differ-
ing degrees of susceptibility to the resources held by projects. For
some people, these resources were perceived as having only modest bene-
fits which, when balanced by the costs of long-term commitments to pro-
ject administration and substantive project goals, could be foregone
relatively painlessly.
We also asked whether the administrative structure of the School
encouraged participation in funded projects. Here too the responses
varied among the individuals interviewed, as participants had had dif-
fering experiences with that structure and differing expectations of the
rewards and services that the structure should have provided. The facts
of the matter were broadly agreed upon. One fact was that School admin-
istrators, articulated an expectation that projects should not drain the
School of its financial resources and that wherever possible, projects
should be used to assist the School. Sometimes this called for either
direct contributions or opportunities for resource exchanges. At other
times, projects were expected to remove not only themselves but their
associated academic centers from dependence upon School resources. A
further fact was that understandings were sought with funding agencies
permitting the application of project resources to School purposes. The
transformation from project into institutional resources could be made
acceptable to these agencies if it could be shown convincingly that the
aims of projects were congruent with the aims of the School as a whole
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and that the success of a project was closely tied to the success of the
School. Explaining this Piart of the broad strategy, the dean (Allen,
interview, March, 1972) noted that insofar as money is related to the
mission of the organization you get payoffs.” Where agencies accepted
this rationale, project funds were used to support secretaries, adminis-
trative assistants, graduate stipends, and off-shoots of the basic pro-
ject. The key to this flexibility was the creation of programmatic dis-
cretion at the School level by prior negotiation with the funding agency
in question. By establishing these expectations at the project and agency
levels, School administrators supplemented basic University allocations,
enlarging the School's supply of exchangeable resources, creating flexi-
bility of decision-making and options for future directions.
The scale of the School's involvement with funded projects neces-
sitated an administrative support system which the University was either
unwilling or unable to finance. This fact legitimized the dean's argu-
ments for a special allocation of the overhead funds paid to the University
as part of the projects. Negotiated year by year and sometimes reassessed
in light of the School's funded activity during a particular year, the
University's contributions from its research trust fund paid for many
essential services while also increasing the power of the dean, first by
being allocable largely at his discretion, and secondly, by being suffi-
ciently large to act as an "insurance" account to subsidize ventures
where some financial risk was involved.
All of these facts and these claims on resources were derived
from the underlying organizational fact that projects were officially
approved University activities. Approval implied University respecta-
bility, the assurance of quality control of personnel and financial
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matters in the eyes of funding agencies and the general public. This ap-
proval structure legitimized projects and tied them directly to the teach-
ing, research, service, and degree-granting functions of the University.
The consequence of approval was the opportunity for School and University
administrators to make routine claims on project resources, claims which
were not characteristic of unapproved activities such as personal consult-
ing relationships established by individual faculty and students. At the
University level, claims were made in the form of overhead costs written
into proposals and contracts with federal agencies. At the School level,
the supportive relationships between project and School and funding agen-
cy were unwritten but well understood. At both levels, the argument was
that official approval, backed up with administrative and substantive
assistance, warranted repayments.
The expectations of repayment, of contributions, created by the
School’s administration of its funded projects would not qualify as "for-
mal" policy, not being written and then authorized by appropriate offi-
cials. But these expectations appeared to have the same operational
status as did the "formal" structure of approved policies described in
the previous chapter. Here too, expectations were applied on a case-by-
case basis with exceptions permitted when judged appropriate by adminis-
trators. The major difference was that in the case of project contribu-
tions to the School, the legal authority to approve transactions was held
by the project director. In this respect, the School was an applicant
seeking funding. The significance of this structural fact was that it
required the administration to provide sufficient rewards (or, possibly,
sanctions) and a suitable rationale to induce project directors to part
with some of their resources or to refrain from claiming "hard" resources.
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The resulting exchange of commitments and expectations of benefits was
intended to serve as a cementing factor on the loyalties of individuals
to the institution. One possible counter-theory would be that sanctions,
more than rewards, were at work, implying that a faculty of basically
weak, organization-dependent individuals could not resist requests for
project contributions for fear of later retribution. This counter-case
goes beyond the data collected for this study but would seem to be denied
by the evidence of respect for the School from outside observers, the
ability of the School to attract graduate students of high caliber, and
the continuing willingness of funding agencies to support School activi-
ties in which faculty frequently were involved.
Of course, where the dean was himself project director, the con-
gruity of interests was exact. But the issue went beyond personal con-
trol. The ability of a central administration to arrange exchanges and
find resources within the School often justified cooperation because such
exchanges gave projects more choices than they would have had otherwise.
The ability of administrators to by-pass or negotiate University person-
nel, curricular, and logistic procedures was an invaluable resource to
those project staff who were assisted in this way. Assistance in pro-
posal writing, or in establishing funding contacts, or in processing
proposals through University channels also argued for a cooperative
stance. So pervasive was the awareness of the role projects were expect-
ed to take in relationship to the School that project directors accepted
the situation as a given, normal, standard, operating procedure. Few
chose to isolate their projects by using a narrow definition of appro-
priate interaction with the School.
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The focus of this chapter has been on the intentions and accom-
plishments associated with a strategy of using project resources within
the School of Education. It would be wrong to assume that the strategy
and its implementation did not carry problems of their own. The chief
challenge to any administrative design is the classic organizational
dilemma of combining the centrifugal forces of individual personalities
and purposes with the need to find a way of drawing those energies to-
gether in the interests of the organization, as perceived by the princi-
pal policy setters. The distribution of available rewards is the means
of bridging these two sets of needs. Shaping the School's resources to
centrally-perceived interests, and trying at the same time to maintain
a "community" where members identified their own interests with those of
the organization was a task, almost self-contradictory, that could be
managed at best only with sensitivity to the equation of individual needs
and organizational responsibilities that kept the parts willingly parti-
cipating in the welfare of the whole. Conflicts were to be expected.
Periodic reassessments of the methods used to integrate project resources
would be required. Respect for the intentions of both administrators and
other School members would be essential in order to maintain either the
concept of a community of interests or the strategy of using outside
funding to bring that community into contact with American education.
"You have to ask," one project director commented, ". . . could
this project have operated at the School of Education four years ago?
And you'd have to answer, no. The School wouldn't have had the people,
the interest, and other resources." We can not say whether all project
directors shared this view during 1971-1972. Some projects were less
dependent than others upon the overall resources of the organization.
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Yet the fact remained that the number and scale of f a aunded projects at
the School had grown enormously. An orp^n-i - •San zation which had not had many
Projects and had lacked extensive contacts wit-h ^t the nation-wide practice
of education had gained both between 1968 and 1972
.
CHAPTER VI
INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE
—A CONCLUSION
The strategy of institution-building used to develop the School
of Education’s capabilities and reputation for innovation after 1968 de-
pended upon three crucial types of resources. These were: the initial
mandate and continuing support from University policy-makers; the inter-
ests, abilities, and energies of the "new” organization’s administration,
faculty, students, and staff; and the substantial financial resources of
public and private agencies outside the University. All three types
could be described as sub-categories of a general cultural resource, the
ability of a national society to generate individuals, attitudes, and
the material means needed to formulate and pursue the ambitions which
the School’s members set for themselves.
But even if one accepts the notion and necessity of a general
cultural "ethos" making attitudinal resources available, one must attri-
bute the success of specific institutions to very specific actions of
individuals as they implement strategies designed to concentrate and or-
ganize previously diffuse energies. Innovation and reform at the School
of Education of the University of Massachusetts were, in our view, to be
understood in strategic terms as the complex integration of ideas and
action
.
Educational innovation and reform have been given many forms and
many kinds of content. Compared to the range of changes occurring else-
where in American higher education during the 1960 's and 1970’s, the
School was involved in almost every kind of experimentation (Heiss , 1973).
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Internally, through center organization, faculty and student role defi-
nitions, grading and scheduling procedures, course content, governance,
admissions, student and teacher evaluation and so forth the School qual-
ified for recognition as an educational experiment. Externally, through
funded and non-funded projects dealing with many different types of edu-
cational change, the School sought to identify itself with the vanguard
of social reform.
Outside funding was central to the overall mission of the organ-
ization. The nature of this mission, described in the second chapter in
some detail, was clearly stated in the School’s "profile" (University of
Massachusetts, School of Education, 1971b):
Since the fall of 1968, the School of Education.
. . has been en-
gaged in a bold and ambitious attempt to become a focal point of
major, thoroughgoing, reform and revitalization of education in
America [p . 5 ]
.
The project system was the primary tool in that attempt and outside
funding allowed the project system to thrive. While some projects and
programs were carried on without direct outside support, the support
was essential if faculty and students were to be maintained and were to
have the varieties of experiences they thought vital to the curriculum
or the kind of impact they sought on the system of education across the
nation
.
Through the various academic centers and among the School's ad-
ministrative officers, the need to find stipend and fellowship support
for graduate students was defined not simply as a fiscal task, but as
a learning experience in itself, closely related to the ability to con-
ceptualize problems, define feasible solutions, and develop strategies
of implementation. Increasing support from outside funding agencies
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was said, according to the "profile," to reflect society's "confidence
in our competency and goals, as well as providing us with additional
resources with which to pursue our aims [p. 2]."
Outside funding, because its successful pursuit required con-
tinuous contact with both funding agencies and with schools and commun-
ities which could become project sites, also served the important func-
tion of keeping individuals on the Amherst campus alert to the real
concerns of the education profession and the society at large. Without
these contacts to guide its uses, outside funding would have been with-
out most of its content, serving only to support students and staff.
Without the felt need for a broad network of mutually productive rela-
tionships
,
and without the desire to work at important social problems,
however, School members could never have attracted the agencies which
invested their resources in the School’s projects. Without funding,
there would have been far fewer opportunities to do the things those
people had been gathered to do. In the end, there would have been many
fewer people. To say this is to restate Hefferlin’s (1969) conclusion,
already noted in the first chapter:
The flow of resources—their extent, direction, and limitation
—
inevitably is the prime determinant of academic change. The ma-
terial and attitudinal resources that are made available to col-
leges and universities, or that they can make available to them-
selves, will determine their programs [p. 34].
The story of the School of Education during the period of this study,
then, is the story of how its dean and faculty and students were able
to define for themselves several markets for the recruitment of resources
for educational innovation.
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Tracing the flow of project resources has been a means of study-
ing the School of Education as, first, the organizational context within
which project activities were performed, and then as part of several
larger contexts shaping resource distribution at the national and
University levels. We assumed, in selecting this method of analysis,
that both the funds themselves and the structural characteristics of the
organizational channels determining resource distribution could be con-
ceived as complex sets of incentives, either encouraging or discouraging
individual participation in specific activities.
Resource Flow and Reputation
At a time when the project system was criticized for fostering
safe rather than original ideas in science research, one observer (Orlans
,
1962) suggested a straight-forward remedy: "The simplest way.
.
. to get
bold proposals is to invite them, and to reject the safe ones [p. 255]."
The suggestion recognized both the power of agencies to set research di-
rections and the responsiveness of researchers to market forces.
This study of the flow of project funds at the School of Education
during 1971-1972, with its related description of the School's development
from 1968 to 1972, has tried to impress on the reader the importance of
external support in relationship to the organization's overall performance.
Outside funding was available, but equally as important, it was available
from a wide variety of sources, each with its own sets of decision-makers
and its own sets of priorities and criteria. On the one hand, the School
was pressed to shape its interests to the will of the marketplace. On
the other hand, the marketplace was not uniform or dictatorial. Both
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buyer and seller could maneuver In the competition of ideas, personali-
ties, and funds. This is not to say that the competition was perfect.
Clear judgments on the merit of ideas and the capabilities of individuals
are not always possible under the best of circumstances. The risk of
mistaken decisions, absorbed in conventions of assurances such as person-
al familiarity with the applicant or faith in the reputation of an appli-
cant’s institutional associations, may result in biases which inhibit
contributions from relatively unknown persons and institutions. But for
individuals willing to work within these limitations, the diversity of
sources of project support offered many more incentives, much more reason
to hope for success, than a system of resource distribution tied to nar-
rower and fewer sets of funding priorities. Variety of funding sources
was, of course, more than matched by variety of applicants. From an
agency point of view, the School was one among many applicants.
In the present case, we found that the members of the "new"
School were able to forge their identities as innovators and were able
to draw on the marketplace for support of projects in the field of edu-
cation. To do so, required individuals with the ability to establish
their personal credibility with agency representatives, to identify
areas in which agency and applicant had mutual interests, and to create
a rationale for each project, justifying the allocation of resources to
the School rather than to some other organization. The repeated success
of individuals at the School to do this established the basic facts of
the project grant and contract system: that resources from diverse
sources were not randomly distributed, and that with astute planning
and energetic pursuit, a group of individuals could collect and shape
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outside funding to their own purposes, building in the process an or-
ganization’s reputation as an advocate of innovation and reform.
Reputation, we saw, was a central factor in creating the scale
and regularity of resource flow for projects at the School. The reported
funding experiences of projects operating at the School during 1971-1972
could be analyzed according to four different patterns, or configurations,
of behavior related to the essential tasks of establishing credibility,
mutual interests, and a rationale. The four configurations, "pure," "es-
tablished, "surrogate," and "cold," grouped projects according to the
source of the initial contact made on behalf of a prospective project.
In some instances, project opportunities literally "walked" into the
School, while in others, applicants followed "official" proposal proce-
dures. The great bulk of successful projects, however, were developed
out of more extensive contacts with agency decision-makers. These con-
tacts involved repeated explorations of the plans, directions, opportun-
ities, and capabilities of both grantor and grantee. Successful project
funding efforts often began not as crisply defined proposals, but rather
as explorative, tentative discussions based on apparent mutual concerns.
This direct personal contact created the opportunity for direct personal
judgment of the abilities and reliability of individuals to whom agency
resources would be entrusted. Direct contact, supplemented with histor-
ies of past performance and the general reputation of individuals as re-
ported by other observers, was the foundation upon which the bulk of
funding decisions appeared to have been made.
Decisions on funding were also tied to the institutional associa-
tion of the applicant. The University provided operational credibility
to project proposals by establishing standards and controls governing
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the qualifications and actions of individuals participating in projects.
Institutional membership implied also acceptance of the applicant by his
professional peers and the likelihood of similarly qualified assistance
when needed. These many judgments of individual and institutional repu-
tations were made because they were more "rational" predictors of pro-
ject performance than were the project proposals which dominate the
"official" understanding of the funding process. But as a consequence,
this system imposed a special burden of proof upon those who wished to
step outside the standard solutions or inodes of operation.
As a system of resource distribution, the project system encour-
aged those individuals with a talent for making themselves and their ideas
known and respected within an agency marketplace. The talent included
the attributes of intelligence, energy, political astuteness and flexi-
bility, and articulateness, attributes often identified as those of the
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur, however, is sometimes disparaged as a
mere empire builder" when he or she becomes as much concerned with
maintaining an organization's staff and position as with producing the
new knowledge or new programs sought through particular projects. But
if one recognizes in organizations and their reputations the latent
resources by which projects are developed and implemented, then similar-
ly one must place a high value on the skills of leadership and creative
adaptation to social needs found in the successful entrepreneur. Where
the project system was seen in the past as a mechanism for achieving
specific agency-selected objectives, and where the entrepreneur was
seen pejoratively as an underminer of collegiality and as a centrifugal
organizational force, we are now beginning to recognize that the project
system can be a means of identifying leadership talent which can be
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applied to the problems of reorganizing higher education, this change
in perspective legitimizes both the role of the entrepreneur and the
objective of institution-building. Preserving the system from the sins
of excess remains a responsibility of the many parties to major resource
distribution decisions.
At the School of Education, the dean was the central figure ini-
tiating the flow of outside resources to the School. The meshing of his
personal goals with the willingness of the University of Massachusetts
to give the new dean a wide mandate to build a School of national stand-
ing enabled Dwight Allen to approach funding agencies with a credibility
built on both his own past performance as an administrator and advocate
and on the discretionary authority provided in his formal position within
the University hierarchy. By recruiting others who shared his broad pur-
poses of large scale activism, and by reshaping administrative structures
within the School, the dean sought to establish an organization whose
members would both share in and enhance the credibility, discretion, and
resources initially and temporarily vested in him. This further meshing
of individual and institutional identities was an important component of
the success of the School’s project strategy.
Structure and Control
Funding agencies looked to the University for proof of an appli-
cant’s respectability within his profession and for the accounting of
agency funds. University procedures for the approval of project proposals
were designed at least in part to serve the interests of funding agencies
rather than of the University’s own members. Obviously, restrictions of
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institutional association were part of the price individual members paid
in order to qualify for wider recognition outside the University. Equal-
ly, providing accounting services was part of the price the University
paid in order to qualify as a respected operational base for research
and program development, and thus as a recipient of resources.
While there were instances where individuals sought University
association in order to accomplish project goals, the far more typical
pattern was one where the University tie clearly preceded that linking
participant to project. Students joined the University as a source of
credent iall in g and training. Faculty joined the University as a source
of long-term employment in an environment of teaching, research and ser-
vice. For both, project participation was a recognized way of fulfilling
University membership responsibilities. From this perspective, University
structures of project approval were designed for internal regulation
rather than external certification. Similarly, administrative procedures
within the School of Education served the dual purposes of accommodating
the external requirements of the University and the internal coordination
of School programs.
There are three essential points to be made concerning the func-
tion of the organizational structures we have described in this study.
First, it must be recognized that rules and procedures are made to serve
the interests of the persons who authorize them. Generally speaking, the
purpose of routine procedures is to simplify, "solve," administrative
problems; they are administrative responses to perceived pressures. At
the University of Massachusetts during the period of this study, the pro-
posal approval structure was concerned chiefly with matters of personnel
selection, financial payments, and potential political involvements.
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Taken together, these concerns could be grouped under the broader head-
ing of commitments of University resources to project purposes. The
multi-level review of proposals and contracts was intended to screen
proposed relationships between University members and external agencies
for all possible compromises of University resources. This screening
m turn compelled individual members to recognize the policies and in-
terests of the University and to frame individual purposes and practices
within those boundaries. The proposal review process within the University
was, in fact, a form of socialization, inculcating the scruples and pro-
priety of University officials. Thus the associate graduate dean for
research, newly appointed in 1971, could report that in contrast to stor-
ies of conflict which he had heard before assuming his position, within
his own experience proposals from the School of Education did not try to
"pull fast ones." He recognized, however, that the only way to guarantee
this satisfactory state of affairs was to have an office such as his with
a person responsible for reviewing all proposals.
Secondly, it must also be recognized that organizational structure
directs communication to selected individuals, designing patterns of so-
cial interaction. From the point of view of the project applicant, these
patterns represent paths to be followed in order to attain desired out-
comes, such as University approval of a project proposal. They also
represent paths by which the individual may attempt to influence University
policy. The University’s interest in administrative structure is to exer-
cise control over its many component parts. Both parties, therefore, can
be said to employ organizational structure as a means of routinizing
issues that require no new decisions and of testing issues that are be-
ing presented for discussion. One might say that without the excuse
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of outside funding, issues of admissions, salaries, appointments, off-
campus involvements, on-campus reorganization and so forth would not
have been raised because they would have been only hypothetical. With
funding, with the attention and energies of specific individuals directed
toward specific, substantive decisions, a wide range of policy issues
were brought to the attention of University administrators.
The third point to be recognized is that the design of adminis-
trative structures can incorporate crucial incentives or disincentives
for innovative projects. The inclusion of these factors can be either
intentional or unintentional. Even with the best of intentions to serve
all appropriate claims on University approval and resources, a project
approval structure may appear to be an obstacle to the goals of members.
It is in the concerns made operative in administrative structures, rather
than in the rhetoric of public statements, that an organization’s goals
are enforced. For example, a continued lack of response to the needs of
a particular segment of the School's membership— as for example, for a
more timely, less cumbersome, review process— is a clear indication of
the priorities of the organization's administrators. The tension be-
tween seeking to encourage outside funding generally while securing the
coordination of information for administrative purposes, the tension be-
tween the University seeking to define and preserve its own identity
while project staffs seek to make the University an effective agent of
support for their purposes, are inevitable tensions which organizational
structures are meant to mediate. Not only the design of these procedures,
but also the processes by which they are evaluated and changed, incorpor-
ate values which may encourage or discourage, may conflict with or sup-
port, the values which projects and funding agencies seek to implement.
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To put this point another way, one oould say that organizational struc-
tures and their uses reflect the balance of influence within a particu-
lar organization.
Authority and StrateRy
The essence of the organizational strategy at the School of
Education was to draw on diverse outside resources in order to achieve
a freedom of program definition which would not have been possible under
the constraints of State and University budgets. By combining the advan-
tages of funds made available from both State and out-of-State agencies,
the School administration would be able to minimize their disadvantages.
The stability of the one would supplement the flexibility of the other.
Through their association with the School, individuals and projects,
whatever their principal source of direct support, would be able to
share in the extended range of opportunities.
Funded resources supplied incentives of three crucial kinds.
One resource was the appeal of projects dealing with important, pressing
topics. This appeal to the hopes and ambitions of many individuals and
the School’s ability to demonstrate its commitment by offering itself as
a site for innovative activities made the recruitment of graduate stu-
dents and faculty possible. For fall semester, 1971, for example, the
School attracted 1,819 graduate applicants and enrolled 489 of them.
More significantly, even with applications on such a large scale, seventy-
five percent of those accepted actually enrolled (University of
Massachusetts, Graduate School, 1971). In fall, 1972, with applicants
numbering 2,667, the School still enrolled eighty-one percent of those
accepted (University of Massachusetts, Graduate School, 1972).
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This relevance of project topics to the needs of society and
the interests of members was one set of incentives. The opportunities
for individual learning and career preparation which were inherent in
the design and administration of projects were another set. Project ex-
periences were officially integrated into the curriculum of the School
by awarding course credit for project participation. To what extent
project activism proved itself as education was never a closed question,
remaining a constant topic of concern and debate within the School. But
learning by doing was accepted in theory until proven otherwise, and the
determination of educational quality on specific projects was left to
the evaluation of students and their faculty advisors. Moreover, the
learning experiences found in projects were intended to attract faculty
interest also.
Finally, funded projects provided incentives through the finan-
cial benefits of stipends and salaries and non— financial benefits of
travel, secretaries, office space and so forth. All these direct mater-
ial rewards could improve the productivity and professional visibility
of project participants.
Because funded projects held all these incentives, it became a
clear priority of the School administration to encourage students and
faculty to formulate ideas and participate in both the recruitment of
project resources and in the fulfillment of project obligations. While
it was important to find resources, it was also important to find indi-
viduals who could administer those resources. Thus, it was essential
to build within the School an institutional "ethos" which valued pro-
ject work and removed bureaucratic obstacles from the paths of School
members. Inevitably, as we have seen, the needs of School and University
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administration conflicted with projects and were seen as obstacles.
More importantly, however, the obstacles were recognized as small ones
for the most part and the submission of proposals for funding continued,
as did the interest in project activities.
The intent of the School's strategy, of course, went beyond of-
fering incentives and providing a structure and organizational "ethos"
to assist in their pursuit. The aim was also to draw on project re-
sources once recruited in order to multiply the opportunities and visi-
bility for the organization as a whole. In other words, the intent was
to coordinate, integrate, projects as parts of an encompassing plan,
rather than let them disperse into isolated activities of temporary dur-
ation with benefits restricted to their immediate participants. This
coordinative
,
integrative authority would have to come from outside the
projects themselves.
The project system has been criticized in the past because by
establishing direct linkages between faculty and funding agencies, it
was said to undermine the ability of administrators and faculty groups
to govern their organizations. On the one hand, university administra-
tions have grown in order to absorb the management responsibilities
brought on by sponsored research and training programs. On the other
hand, project grants have increased the independence of grant recipi-
ents from central administration and faculty control (Arnold, 1968;
Orlans
,
1962).
At the School of Education, the administrative role of the dean
was asserted as a centripetal force coordinating and redistributing re-
sources. The formal authority of the dean within the University hier-
archy was reinforced by his special relationship to that hierarchy , a
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relationship derived from understandings reached at the time of his ap-
pointment and reformulated over several years by the course of events
and additional commitments of University support, both political and
financial. All members of the School depended upon the dean for the
maintenance of their experimental mandate within the University. As the
principal strategist of the School’s uses of outside funding, and as the
School’s principal recruiter of project funding, the dean was also a
central authority in the maintenance of the project system. Continuing
leadership in the School's relationships with University officials, ex-
ternal funding agencies, school districts, international educational or-
ganizations, and the education profession, could not but serve to rein-
force the dean's authority within the School regardless of the official
delegation of internal decision-making to student-faculty committees.
Centrality to the flow of resources placed the dean in an envi-
able position as a decision-maker. With official responsibility for
much of the School's resource base, and with a clear understanding of
the agency expectations to which resource use would be held accountable,
he knew when and to what extent resources could be committed to specific
purposes. This "very cherished power of any administrator [Allen, in-
terview, April, 1972]" created tensions. The School Council and indi-
vidual members of the School could easily see on-the-spot decisions as
thoughtless, or intentional, disregard for the governance structure.
Yet, being in no position to claim authority over a flow of information
and resources unique to the personality rather than to the position of
the dean, the Council could not exercise discretionary power of its own.
Caught in this tension, members who observed this behavior could
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oscillate between acceptance and resentment of periodic unilateral deci-
sion-making. Acceptance was encouraged to the degree that the decisions
proved to be benevolent ones.
Within the University and the School, it was well understood
that the unusual talents of the dean made possible the successful con-
centration of formal and informal authority. It was the expectation of
this individual success that had convinced the University to allow the
new dean the discretion to reshape the "old" School. Within the "new"
School, a similar expectation, or hope, bridged the apparent contradic-
tion of the dean s wide-ranging freedom to make decisions affecting the
School and the similar freedom of School members to develop their own
interests and projects. As the dean fulfilled these expectations with
actual performance, rapidly expanding both the School’s resource base
and its national visibility, he was, as we have seen, able to solidify
his authority with the assistance of the University's return of overhead
through several special allocations and with direct and indirect contri-
butions from the projects themselves.
The Future of a Strategy
It cannot be assumed that the success bred of several years as-
sured a relative permanence of institutional relationships. Changes in
the funding marketplace, changes in the political acceptance of the
School’s projects, changes in personnel within the School and University
would have major impact on the long-term viability of the institution-
building strategy described in this study. Survival would reflect the
continuing accuracy of judgments which assumed that social conditions
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existed which permitted such a strategy to succeed and that these condi-
tions could be harnessed to the development of a vital school of educa-
tion. The dependence on outside project funding was intended to make
the School's members vulnerable, and therefore alert, to outside influ-
ences. All members would be quick to know of shifting currents directly
affecting their careers.
The members of every organization seek to protect themselves from
disasters. As the School's reputation grew and became established as an
outgrowth of many short-term projects, one might have expected to witness
efforts to protect the newly vested interests from the risks inherent in
relying on transitory resources. One might expect to see the School's
members trying to insulate themselves from the possible loss of substan-
tial outside funds and from the possible loss of the dean himself. In
fact, as the School grew and brought national attention to the University,
faculty positions were absorbed into the "hard" State budget and commit-
ments were made of University space for School offices and activities.
Faculty, it was recognized, needed the security of "hard" support within
a University that would not commit itself to support "soft" faculty be-
yond the terms of their grants. Students, on the other hand, with lower
financial expectations and far shorter residency expectations, could
more easily absorb the fluctuations of funding built into the project
system.
As students and faculty became more differentiated in regard to
their dependence upon the project system, one might also expect some
differentiation as regards their loyalty to it. For students, the sys-
tem had meant more than financial support. Projects had provided the
strongest rationales for the reconceptualization of faculty and student
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responsibilities within the School, for the continuing redefinitions of
academic areas of interest, for focusing attention social problems need-
ing solutions rather than on more removed academic observations of those
problems, for, in sum, the restructuring of the School. Without funding,
graduate students would have far fewer options from which to seek finan-
cial support related to their program interests, with campus-related
teacher training supervision being the principal source of assistantships
In many ways, faculty life without the pressures of a project "ethos"
would have been less hectic and more encouraging of other kinds of re-
wards. Faculty could be tempted to reestablish for themselves a system
of publishing and conferences parallel to their professional peers else-
where. Decreased dependence on the dean and the project system for re-
sources could only be counteracted by careful recruiting of new faculty
dedicated to the activist concerns of the School's earlier experience
with outside funding.
Maintaining a membership of persons who valued innovation would
be the first requirement of any strategy to institutionalize the opera-
tional style of the School of Education as this study found it in 1971-
1972. Maintaining a system of incentives providing appropriate rewards
for participation in innovative activities would be the second require-
ment. Assuring that these requirements are fulfilled, and that the or-
ganizational "ethos" is maintained, remains the chief responsibility of
creative administration.
Outside funding, we have argued, was necessary in order to over-
come internal University resistances to change. By defining the School
as an experiment, and then by allowing outside resources to subsidize
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the experiment, the University administration was able to by-pass much
of the divisive internal debate which would have necessarily preceded
reallocations of University resources. Instead of preceding, and there-
by blocking, action, these debates could now take place concurrently
with the activities. Opinions could be challenged and changed by ex-
ample and precedent rather than by precept. Further, other changes in
curriculum and organizational practice to which the University may have
had no serious objection actually happened only because of the press of
events motivated by live projects. From this perspective, funded pro-
jects were less important because they were funded than because they
were concrete projects with expectations of performance established both
within and outside the University. A merely internal project could be
dropped and forgotten. One with the press of outside accountability and
visibility gained a commensurate importance. As the School's reputation
became more established, the project system remained the principal guar-
antee that the School’s responsiveness to social issues would not dimin-
ish. The flow of outside resources from School projects had proved it-
self an invaluable stimulus to action.
The flow of resources, we have noted, performed two different
functions in regard to goal formation. On the one hand, if gained with
sufficient freedom from external restraints, or if gained under terms
which coincided with personal interests, project resources were powerful
incentives for the pursuit of individual goals. On the other hand, the
very availability of resources could be an equally powerful incentive
for the reassessment and substitution of individual goals. Getting out-
side funding, the goal of grantsmanship , was at a professional academic
level only a partial means to the reform of the School and the reform of
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American education. A longer range question posed by this study, how-
ever, must be whether the very ethos of the project orientation, combined
with the formal and informal structural bias toward project activism
could come to undermine the reformist goals, substituting for them a fas-
cination with the techniques of grantsmanship
. This again is a question
of balance and judgment. It is a question of whether a large group of
individuals, reacting sharply to the persistent tendency of professional
post-secondary educators to remove themselves from the conflicts of so-
cial reform, could organize themselves in ways which encouraged immersion
in those conflicts while still maintaining perspective on the larger
social and educational issues involved. Immersion in conflict could be
an intense curriculum for individual learning. Assuring that the choice
of conflicts and the method of immersion were educationally valuable,
however, would require great determination in asserting the social goals,
the organizational identity, of the "new" School of Education as sets of
standards by which new opportunities for resources and experiences could
be judged by a periodically changing membership.
Recommendat ions
Adaptive organizations should increase motivation and thereby effec-
tiveness, because they create conditions under which the individual
can gain increased satisfaction with the task itself. Thus, there
should be a harmony between the educated individual’s need for tasks
that are meaningful, satisfying and creative and an adaptive organi-
zational structure [Bennis & Slater, 1968, p. 74].
The broad purpose of this study was to describe the principal
uses of the flow of outside project funding as incentives for innovative
behavior within a single higher education organization. Being essen-
tially descriptive, the study was not designed to provide management
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Planning information related to the structure of resource flow. Nonethe-
less, some such information was gathered, or suggested, by the nature of
the investigation. This result was not coincidental as both the study of
relationships between resources and innovation and the analysis of manage-
ment systems share the concern of making organizations more efficient and
satisfying tools for their users. Our present comments will be directed
to three audiences, three users of the resources described in this study:
the School of Education, the University of Massachusetts, and the non-
University funding agencies.
Recommendations for the School
Periodic assessments of review procedures
Pr°i ect interviews revealed concerns regarding project interac-
tions with the School and University administrations. These concerns
repeatedly touched on various aspects of issues discussed earlier, those
of time, personal, finance, and political sensitivity. Frequently, these
individuals had ready suggestions on how a particular problem could have
been remedied. In some instances, the researcher was explicitly per-
ceived as a possible transmitter of these suggestions to various admin-
istrators. More meaningful than any list of project-related problems,
however, was the clear implications that project staffs sometimes felt
that communication between themselves and various administrators on pro-
cedural issues was less available, and perhaps less welcome, than it
should have been.
A periodic, probably annual, assessment of School procedures for
the review of project proposals, personnel and financial decisions and
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other matters would give the School a broader perspective on the problems
encountered by project staffs. Institutionalizing such a formative eval-
uation would give projects a routine forum for their views and place
problems in a management, rather than a crisis, environment. The methods
of evaluation could be a combination of anonymous questionnaires and
group meetings, or whatever format appeared most suitable to the various
parties. The suggestion of this review technique assumes that represen-
tatives of both projects and School administration would be sincere in
their desire to improve the internal functioning of the project system
and realistic in their expectations of what changes could be made. The
evaluation process itself should reinforce that sense of sincerity and
minimize the gap between expectations and reality. Moreover, to the de-
gree that the findings of the assessments were distributed throughout
the School, they would also help educate other faculty and students to
the purposes, problems, and opportunities which project activities brought
to the School.
Wider distribution of grantsmanship information
Project development and grantsmanship entered the School’s cur-
riculum when individual students and faculty set to work on specific
projects. While the School's overall project orientation created a fair-
ly effective informal network of information on these topics, steps taken
toward a more formal distribution system might have payoffs exceeding the
limited costs of time and effort which would be needed.
Grantsmanship is a learned skill and with some thought and plan-
ning, it could become in part a taught skill. One experienced grantsman
on the faculty, for example, when asked how he knew how to assess his
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chances of arranging a government contract for a funded project, said
(Fortune, interview, June, 1972) that it was "just a judgment.
. . don't
know how it is developed, but 1 do know I didn't have it when I began."
Regular seminars might provide the opportunity and incentive for experi-
enced grantsmen to conceptualize their experiences and describe concrete
examples which would help other members of the School gain an initial
sophistication with the problems of project development. Again, it
should be feasible to develop some publishable materials out of these
seminars. These introductory efforts at contract and grants education
would encourage more school members to take the next step of learning
by doing, that is, by seeking project funding.
Evaluating the achievements of the project system
Outside funding for School projects was conceived as a means to
certain organizational and educational goals. The members of the School
need to know if the project system as a whole is taking them in the di-
rections they want to go, or if changes are required. Informal, seat-
of-the-pants judgments of this type are made almost daily by individual
members. However, we would suggest that more systematic examination of
selected objectives would result in improved organizational adaptiveness
to a changing environment and changing member needs. The goals requir-
ing monitoring can be stated as questions.
Are funded projects supplying the resources needed to maintain
an activist School of Education? At one level, this question refers to
logistics of student support, "soft" faculty positions, travel and
equipment funds, secretarial support and so forth. Information of this
kind is already provided by the normal accounting processes of the School
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and University. But the flexible use of logistic resources may be more
important to the School than the gross amounts. The University’s inten-
tion to absorb special trust allocations into the regular budget is well
known, as is its intention to stabilize the growth of the School’s stu-
dent body. Both these facts mean that the School will be progressively
more frozen to its existing program commitments and less able to respond
on short notice to new opportunities. The School's reputation was built
at a time when new faculty and students could commit themselves to new
directions using new resources. Where once the School was in a position
to allow almost any option, limitations of space, of faculty time, of
student manpower, and of University approval of further growth meant
that new options now raised the challenge of redistributing existing re-
sources. The project system, with its impermanent time frames, and the
center organization, with its cross-disciplinary problem-solving focus,
were intended to counteract the rigidities of internal boundary forma-
tion. But, are these structural factors working according to plan?
Are funded projects providing the intended kinds of contacts
with educational problems and experiments in the United States and
abroad? Projects were intended to build a "reality base" of contacts
with off-campus groups, individuals and agencies. It is possible that
over time, the particular interests of people at the School may narrow
unconsciously and serious gaps may be created in the School's relation-
ships with its environment. Opportunities to absorb very large scale
projects may channel excessive amounts of the School's
energies to relatively narrow directions. On the other hand, in an era
of increasing organizational specialization, the failure to concentrate
on some broad area of involvement may leave the School without resources
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of sufficient scale to have the major impact desired. In the event of
some future restriction of national-level resources available to the
School, it may prove appropriate to refocus the School's leadership
abilities on the reshaping of the educational system within the New
England region and use the visibility of its existing reputation as lev-
erage for wider publicity and resource recruitment. It is suggested
that ways be found to keep these issues before the attention of the
School's members.
Are funded projects providing learning experiences for their
participants and is that learning being shared or repeatedly reinvented?
Some persons placed a very high value on the learning that took place
through the development and administration of projects. Others were
highly skeptical of what they saw as either constant "wheel inventing"
or as mere exploitation of student labor for routine, low-learning pur-
poses. This study has not attempted to evaluate the learning content
of project activities. We have seen, however, that the University ac-
cepted the argument that learning-by-doing was at the educational core of the
project system. As a consequence, individualized project experiences
were allowed to qualify for academic credit as benefiting students and
fulfilling the educational function of the University. Without this
rationale, and the many hours of student manpower it made available, the
project system and the School's reputation for innovation would have
collapsed. After five years of operation, an evaluation of the educa-
tional content of the project system is in order. Evaluative criteria
should represent the goals of the project "curriculum" experiment rather
than only the content of traditional modes of instruction.
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Are funded projects providing symbolic and dramatic values at-
tracting national attention and indicating to reform-minded observers
that important social innovation is possible? We have seen that the
School’s course of action from 1968 to 1972 had justified the University's
expectation of bringing national attention, and even prestige, to the
Amherst campus. National visibility was a product in its own right, one
valued by national funding agencies seeking extended repercussions of re-
form from their investments. To the extent that members of the School
sought leadership roles in their profession, the visibility of experimen-
tation meant that some of the most important lessons taught were meant
not for the immediate School community, but rather for sometimes uniden-
tified audiences throughout the world. The failure of the School to lead
by example could be reason enough to reexamine the validity of the pro-
ject system. More likely than failure, of course, would be the mistaken
selection of an area for project work or the mismanagement of a major
project.
Recommendations for the University
Periodic assessments of review procedures
At the University level also a routine, uncomplicated survey of
project staff concerns with the functioning of the approval structure
for proposals and project-related requests would reveal shortcomings or
misunderstandings needing attention.
Wider distribution of grantsmanship information
If, as it appears, the University administration values the
recognition and the direct and indirect resources which come its way
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through sponsored projects, then encouraging efforts to find outside
funds is rational behavior. In point of fact, by creating the office
of the associate graduate dean for research with centralized responsi-
bilities for grants information, the University has been taking just this
course of action. The next step beyond the creation of a central proposal
review and data collection office could be the more active dissemination
of information about funding opportunities and about the personal skills
individual faculty and students should acquire to improve their chances
of success. This kind of dissemination can be simple or elaborate, rang-
ing from wide distribution of memoranda to more personal contact through
departmental meetings and funding seminars. Effort can be made to have
agency representatives speak to campus groups.
Improved developmental efforts
The ultimate responsibility for creating an environment favorable
to project activities rests with the higher levels of University adminis-
tration. The leadership which a dean or department chairperson can pro-
vide within his or her administrative unit must be offered by appropriate
University officials where an entire campus or group of campuses is con-
cerned.
At the University level, as at the School level, the development
of funding presents two basic problems. One problem is that of finding
ways to recruit resources. The other problem is that of assuring that
the resources, and the manner in which they are recruited, serve the or-
ganizational and individual purposes for which they were intended.
Resource recruitment, whether for students, or faculty, or alumni
donations, or for the monies of public and private agencies, is a highly
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developed competency at most American colleges and universities. The
University of Massachusetts, scrambling during the 1960's to utilize
coherently the vast infusions of State appropriations, had through the
period of this study relatively neglected the development of sponsored
research, as indicated by the fact that the University ranked eighty-
fourth and eighty-eighth among American universities and colleges re-
ceiving research and development funds from the federal government dur-
ing fiscal years 1970 and 1971 respectively (National Science Foundation,
1971, 1973). Solutions to this problem are in a pattern already described,
ranging from the establishment of liaison offices in Washington, to plac-
ing faculty on agency review panels, to use of Congressional contacts,
and other forms of improving the flow of information and mutual benefits
between campus and agencies (Willingham, 1971).
More at the heart of this study, however, is the problem of using
resources to encourage innovation in higher education. To the degree
that resource recruitment becomes the province of a central administra-
tion, it may be expected that the uses of those resources will particu-
larly fit priorities defined at that level. To the degree that a central
administration encourages and assists the initiatives of persons lower
in the official hierarchy, it may be expected that the university organ-
ization will tolerate a diversity of priorities. The strength of the
School of Education lay in the fact that although the dean was himself
the principal force in the School's funding strategy, an "ethos" of op-
portunity encouraged many more individuals to define their interests and
seek support for them. First year students were as welcome to submit
proposals and receive School assistance in doing so as were tenured
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faculty. Extending that "ethos" to the University as a whole would be ,
major challenge to any administration. Fortunately, the report of the
Committee on the Future University of Massachusetts (Alden, et al.).
Issued in December, 1971, recommended that an active, reforming mission
should guide the University's uses of resources:
The role of universities is under debate all over the country. Somesay unrversities can survive only if they assume a new involvementthe s °cie ty around them. Others maintain that such involvementwould destroy the effectiveness of universities in freely pursuingand creating new knowledge. ... We believe universities shouldbe responsive rather than disengaged, appliers as well as creatorsof knowledge, questioners as well as conservers of values [p. SI].
Proper utilization of the project system, we would argue, could be of
major assistance in implementing this belief.
Recommendations for the Agencies
Because this study took only a limited look at the relationships
between funding agencies and university-based projects, the recommenda-
tions will not deal with procedural aspects of that relationships. In-
stead, we will reserve our comments to two broad issues as they appear
from the perspective of research focusing on a single higher education
^ T ^ ion
,
one which has benefitted in the past from project resources
awarded from diverse funding agencies.
Continued use of the project grant and contract system
Money, to state the obvious, is an invention and tool of human
purposes. The sine qua non for the creative use of financial resources
in institutional reform and innovation, in education or elsewhere, is
creative leadership. The problem derived from these assertions is that
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ot shaping the delivery and accounting of financial resources
which encourage creative leadership to make itself known and
in ways
felt. Out-
side project funding, this study has held, can be used as incentives for
innovative behavior. This result is precisely what was intended by the
formation of many philanthropic foundation. Our emphasis here would be
on the expansion of the project strategy as an incentive for reform and
as a means of identifying leadership talent. Other uses of the project
funding mechanism may be appropriate. For example, in the same way that
the new external degree programs credential the off-campus and even non-
academic learning experiences of their students, so administrative struc-
tures could be created which would provide accounting and credentialling
services for education projects targetted for non-University popu-
lations and locations. Recognizing the talents of individuals who can
organize innovative projects and who can organize the administrative and
support systems upon which individual projects depend would add
another, and in our view crucial, dimension to the traditional criteria
of research and teaching by which members of the education profession are
judged. Legitimizing creative leadership is perhaps the most important
reform that agency money can buy.
At the same time, the question of proper balance of incentives
within the nation’s post-secondary education system must remain open to
careful scrutiny. Suggestions such as that by the Newman task force
(Newman, al_.
,
1971) that the States supply at least one-third of each
campus budget on a project basis raise concerns that a new professional
elite could be created. Some may respond that this elite already exists
in the form of national "grantsmen" at every major university. But the
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present dominence of more academic criteria has been a restraining in-
fluence. Balance remains the central issue, one which will have to be
studied and decided at many levels. Meanwhile, our broad view is that
the enlarged use of the project grant and contract system offers oppor-
tunities for effective innovation in education.
Expand the diversity of funding agencies
The ability of incipient leadership talent to achieve operational
flexibility within a university environment is enormously enhanced by the
availability of outside funding. But the diversity of funding opportuni-
ties is as important as basic availability. Diversity ensures that free-
dom at one location is not paid for by ultimate dependence at another.
Essentially, a diversity of agencies means that resource allocation de-
cisions take place within a flux of multiple priorities. Diversity of
funding ensures that debate on the issues of educational organization and
experimentation will continue, that individuals with ideas and institu-
tions with programs can seek support in an intellectual marketplace. The
competition of ideas should be played for real stakes in anticipation of
real outcomes.
Diversity of funding will become increasingly important to the
nation’s educational system as that system becomes more rationalized from
an administrative point of view. Publically supported colleges, univer-
sities, and other forms of post-secondary education are playing a domi-
nant role in shaping the United States educational resources. Standard-
ization of management practices, faculty organization, campus architecture,
and student curricular options is the underlying threat which has bred
the present interest in innovation. The creation of more, and larger,
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public and private agencies whose responsibility is to elicit, review,
support, and evaluate alternative programs will be an essential step in
preserving and expanding the diversity which has been the strength of
the nation's higher education system. In the past, that diversity has
been based on a foundation of sectarian and private interest giving. In
the future, it appears, the secularization and professionalization of
colleges and universities must be matched by a professionalization of
giving. The trick will be to preserve diversity of giving and avoid the
potential uniformity of state control. Creating and maintaining a na-
tional network of incentives for innovation in education is, therefore,
one of this study's principal recommendations. It is also a topic which
calls for further study and advocacy.
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Documents" file.
Suzuki, R. Memorandum to R. D. Cruff, May 26, 1972. In files of School
of Education Service Fund.
Teacher Preparation Program Council. Memorandum distributed within
School of Education, n.d. (1971).
Treasurer, University of Massachusetts. Memorandum to A. W. Purvis,
July 30, 1963, in files of the School of Education Service
Fund.
University of Massachusetts, Office of the Treasurer. Gifts and grants
summary—June 1971. Internal administrative document, 1971.
University of Massachusetts, Office of the Treasurer. Gifts and grants
summary for the nine-month period ending March 31, 1972. Inter-
nal administrative document, 1972.
University of Massachusetts, School of Education. School of Education
faculty. Internal administrative document, November 1, 1971.
University of Massachusetts, School of Education. Assistantships 1971-
1972. Internal administrative document, November 12, 1971. (d)
University of Massachusetts, School of Education. Budget requests fis-
cal years 1972 and 1973. Internal administrative document,
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University of Massachusetts, University Business Manager. Administra-
tive instruction. (B-ll-1) July 14, 1971.
Interviews
The in depth, focused interview was the principal technique of
data gathering. After seeking the advice of committee members and other
experienced researchers both within and outside the School of Education,
it was decided to approach prospective interview subjects informally,
almost always by telephone. Occasionally, a first appointment of a few
minutes left time only for a brief explanation of the researcher's pur-
poses and the arrangement of a second appointment. Interviews of
University administrators and funding agency officials were all arranged
by telephone, except in one case where a chance meeting developed into
an extended discussion and informal interview. In one instance, the
dean's assistance was sought in arranging an agency interview. In at
least one other instance of which the researcher was aware, an interview
subject spoke to the School's dean to ascertain the researcher's purposes
and credibility prior to the actual interview. Within the School of
Education, the researcher, a graduate student in his third year at the
School, was better known to some interviewees than to others. These
conditions, as well as the personalities of subjects and researcher as
also the status of project concerns at the time of interview would have
affected the level of trust and frankness in answering many pertinent
questions
.
For these reasons, absolute confidence was not placed in the
results of any one interview. Confidence in the contents of the study
248 .
depended upon the comparability of many interviews, although the text
may refer to one or a few in which a particular point was revealed with
special clarity. To achieve this broad comparability, it was essential
that very few project staffs would choose not to cooperate with the study.
In point of fact, directors or principal investigators of all projects
participated, some with more enthusiasm, more interest, more concern for
detail, or more forthrightness than others. At the same time, the re-
searcher's own concern for information of particular topics changed as
the overall framework of information needed was filled in and confirmed.
An Organizational Resources Study" outline was devised in the course of
initial interviews to assist the researcher in covering all important
topics during each interview. This outline may be found in the appendix
following this section. Subjects were not asked all questions contained
in the outline. Rather this was a guide for the interviewer. Interviews
with School, University, and agency administrators varied with the offi-
cial role of the individual and his familiarity with School projects.
The basic purpose of these interviews was to outline the individual's
personal contact with projects according to frequency, purpose, and or-
ganizational consequences. Additional information concerning policy
implications was also sought in some cases.
Interviews were conducted informally. That is, they were held
at locations and times of the subject's own choosing, usually during
normal day-time hours at a project or faculty office, but occasionally
at early morning or evening, in a University cafeteria, a home living
room, or an available empty classroom. The researcher would ask per-
mission to take notes and would then proceed to take a detailed contin-
i
uous record of the interview, both questions and responses, nearly
249
.
verbatim. One interview, conducted in a moving car, was tape-recorded
and based on a series of written questions presented to the subject at
the start of the trip.
School of Education Interviews
D. W. Interview
.
Amherst, Massachusetts, April 3, 1973.
D. W. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 27, 1972.
D. W. Interview Amherst, Massachusetts, September 5, 1972.
D. W. Interview Amherst, Massachusetts, March 29, 1972.
D. W. Interview Amherst, Massachusetts, July 20, 1972.
D. W. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, October 25, 1972.
:, K. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 11, 19 72.
Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 26, 1972.
Bender, R. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, January 13, 1972.
Bender, R. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, February 11, 1972.
Bergstrom, J. Interview. Boston, Massachusetts, November 20, 1972.
Bierwirth, J. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 24, 1972.
Bing, J. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, April 28, 1972.
Christensen, P. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, April 19, 1972,
Clark, F. T. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, November 13, 1972,
Clark, R. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, March 4, 1972.
Clark, R. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, April 6, 1972.
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Conway, W. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, April 19, 1972.
Conway, W. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 11, 19 72.
DeTurk, P. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, April 24, 1972.
Durant, W.
,
and Hammar
,
J. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 15
19 72.
’
Dye, L. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, July 6, 1972.
Eachus
,
T. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 19
,
1972.
Eiseman, J. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, April 27, 1972.
Ertel, K. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 19, 1972.
Evans
,
D
.
Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, June 1, 1972.
Eve, A. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, April 13, 1972.
Flight, D. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 5, 19 72. (a)
Flight, D. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 1, 19 72. (b)
Fortune, J. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, June 22, 1972.
Fortune, J. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, August 3, 1972.
Gentry, A. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, November
,
1972.
George, D. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, March 29, 1972.
George, P.
M.
Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 17, 19 72. (see
Rudman)
Gorth, W. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, April 10, 1972.
Gorth, W. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, July 20, 1972.
Hambleton
,
R. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, April 29 , 1972.
Hammar, J. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 15, 1972. (see
W. Durant)
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Harris, E. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 18, 1972.
Hinckley, J. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, July 14, 1972.
Ivey, A. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 4, 1972.
Jordan, D. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 25, 19 72.
Lauroesch, W. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 30, 19 72.
Lopez, G. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, April 13, 1972.
Mackin, R. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, June 20, 1972.
McCoy, R. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 25, 1972.
Morrison, G. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 8, 1972.
Nichols, R. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, April 20, 19 72.
Oliver, B. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 24, 1972.
Peck, R. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 24, 1972.
Reed, H. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 11, 1972.
Rios, A. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 17, 1972.
Rossman, M. Interview
.
Amherst
,
Massachusetts, May 22, 19 72.
Rudman, M.
,
Wilson, P.
,
and George, P. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts,
May 17, 1972.
Seidman, E. Interview
.
Amhers t
,
Massachusetts, March 24, 19 72.
Seidman, E. Interview Amherst , Massachusetts, January 23, 1973.
Tutman, W. Interview
.
Amherst
,
Massachusetts, May 23, 19 72.
Urch, G. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 17, 19 72.
Wilson, P. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 17, 1973. (see
M. Rudman)
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Weinstein, G. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, April 27, 1972.
Wyman, R. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, May 22, 19 72.
University of Massachusetts Interviews
Bischoff, D. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, November 15, 1972.
Camarino, P. W. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, July 19, 1972.
Camarino, P. W. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, December 12, 1972.
Campion, T. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, August 28, 19 72.
Edelman, P. Interview. Boston, Massachusetts, November 17, 1972.
Gluckstem, R. L. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, July 26, 1972.
Gulko, W. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, January 22, 1973.
Johnson, K. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, July 26, 1972.
Maus
,
W. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, July 20, 1972.
Myers, S. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, July 24, 1972.
Roeder, R. Interview. Amherst, Massachusetts, August 29, 1972.
Funding Agency Interviews
Davies, D. Interview
.
Washington
,
D .C
.
,
June 6, 1972.
Frinks, M. Interview Washington, D.C .
,
June 6
,
1972.
Meade, E. J., Jr. Interview. New York, October 16, 1972.
Smith, W. L. Interview. Washington, D.C., June 9, 1972.
APPENDIX
"Organizational Resources Study" Interview Outline
why and how of getting outside funding
Getting funds as a goal.
1) Why was outside funding sought for this project?
a) what project needs could be met?
b) what School of Education needs could be met?
2) Why was funding sought from this agency?
a) any history of prior contact?
b) why did the agency decide to fund this project?
c) was funding a result of negotiated arrangement, compe-
tition
,
or what?
d) what does the agency (and its members) get in return?
Means of getting funds.
1) In relation to the funding source, what were the steps lead-
ing to funding?
a) what was the nature of initial contact with the agency?
b) did the agency agree on content and budget before the
proposal was written?
c) what changes, if any, were made to meet agency objec-
tions ?
d) was there a request for proposal? If so, when in rela-
tion to submission of final proposal?
2) In relation to the cooperating organizations involved in the
project, what steps led to funding?
a) what was the nature of initial contact?
b) did these organizations contribute at all to the design
of the content, scope or budget of the proposal?
c) what changes were made, if any, to meet objections raised
3) In relation to the School of Education, what were the steps
and procedures leading to funding?
a) were content and budget checked with anyone in the School
administration before the proposal was written?
i) how was support for the School of Education included
in the budget, if at all?
ii) is there anyplace where the "School of Education"
is represented, where you saw criteria as to what
is or is not an appropriate involvement for the
School?
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b) In addition to any ways already mentioned, at what pointdoes the development of a proposal bring you into con-
tact with the various deans?
i) what changes if any were made to meet their objec-
tions and suggestions?
c) Was the project reviewed, formally or informally, by
people in your Center, before it was submitted?
i) by whom?
ii) what criteria were used, and what suggestions?
d) Was it reviewed by the School Council or the Executive
Committee before it was submitted?
i) what criteria were used, and what suggestions?
ii) what changes made, if any?
4) What is the origin of your involvement in the project?
a) originator or recruited?
i) if recruited, by whom and for what reasons?
ii) why did you want to be involved?
b) your responsibilities re:
i) idea development,
ii) contact-making,
iii) proposal-writing,
iv) funding honchoing,
v) implementation,
vi) administration
c) Who else has had major involvement with the project and
your role in it?
i) any connection between these people and funding pro-
cess ?
5) Prior to funding, what was the involvement of the University
administration, either Whitmore, Boston or both?
a) who?
b) were content or budget reviewed? If so, what criteria?
c) what changes were made?
C. What were the consequences of using these procedures to obtain
funding and identify acceptable purposes?
1) What are the advantages and disadvantages of existing pro-
cedures regarding fund-raising and project approval at the
School and University levels?
a) What major or not so major obstacles and assistance did
you encounter?
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b) Is there anything you would want to avoid or revise?
c) Was there any monitoring of where you were in the funding
timetable and procedural steps?
i) Did all the procedures seem to make sense?
d) Were there any points where your project was actively en-
couraged or discouraged?
e) What effects did the review and handling of the proposal
or contract within the School, and University, have on
the content, scope, and/or timing of the project?
2) What were the advantages or disadvantages of agency handling
of the proposal procedures?
a) obstacles and assistance
b) effects on scope, content or timing?
3) What identifiable consequences are there of the identifica-
tion of your proposal with the School of Education?
a) What is the importance of "reputation?"
i) when are you made aware of this factor?
b) In what ways does the School's wide involvement in funded
projects assist or interfere with your efforts?
c) Within the School, are you evaluated on your ability to
get funding?
i) when, under what circumstances?
ii) what criteria are applied?
4) To what degree is the ultimate design of your project proposal
influenced by the project staff, the administration of the
School, the University, the funding agency, or some other
groups ?
II. The why and how of spending outside money.
A. Spending money as a goal.
1) What is the project supposed to accomplish with its money?
(see proposal and reports)
2) What are the funding agency's expectations for the project?
a) what official and unofficial outcomes, products, returns?
b) How are you made aware of these expectations?
3) Does the School have any expectations for this project?
a) What outcomes does the School expect?
b) How are you made aware of these expectations and by whom?
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4) Does the University have any expectations for the project?
a) What are they?
b) How are you made aware of them and by whom?
5) What about the expectations of cooperating groups?
a) What are they?
b) How are you made aware?
6) What are your own expectations at this point of what
a) the project is supposed to accomplish?
b) will accomplish?
B. Means of spending funds.
1) Where did the project staff come from?
a) who recruited them?
i) faculty, doctoral students, others?
ii) from existing resources or specially recruited?
iii) full or part time?
2) What resources have been supplied to the project by the
School and University?
a) staff, space, equipment, secretaries, duplicating, travel,
supplies, telephone, students, etc.?
b) How did you arrange to get these?
3) Since being funded, in what ways has the project had contact
with the University, both Whitmore and Boston?
a) what issues and frequency?
b) who see or deal with?
c) How does the University monitor the project?
4) Since funding, what contact has the project had with the
funding agency?
a) what issues and frequency?
b) who see or deal with?
c) How does the agency monitor the project?
5) Since funding, what contact has the project had with the
School of Education administration?
a) what issues and frequency?
b) who see and deal with?
c) How does the School monitor the project?
6) Since funding, how have project resources contributed to
the School of Education?
a) Have the Deans made any requests for assistance?
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telephone, space, duplicating, secretarial support?
11 ) use of students or faculty to help with school pro-
grams and projects? Special events?
b) Has the project assisted other Centers or programs?
c) Were these various forms of assistance
i) built into the project at proposal funding point?
ii) routine requests, unburdensome or not?
iii) if involving budget, known to agency?
iv) congenial or pressured?
c) What did the project get in exchange for its services?
7) Is the project a vehicle for any School or staff activities
in addition to those of the project itself? Examples?
a) teacher training or other undergraduate work?
b) graduate study and dissertations?
c) faculty research?
d) summer salaries or Continuing Education income?
e) publications and consulting lectures etc.?
f) conferences and travel?
8) What contacts and relationships have been established with
groups other than the funding agency and the University as
a result of this project?
a) how did these happen?
b) basis for further funding projects?
C. Consequences of using these procedures.
1) What are the advantages and disadvantages of the procedures
regarding spending project monies at the School and University
levels ?
a) What obstacles and assistance did you encounter?
b) Is there anything you would want to avoid or revise?
c) Where did you encounter criteria of what is and is not
acceptable expenditures of project funds?
i) who applied and criteria and when?
2) What is the value of the University setting for your project?
a) In what ways is the accessibility of School and University
resources—space, staff, supplies, etc.—related to having
outside funding?
b) Are you evaluated— formally or informally—on the basis
of your participation in funded projects?
i) when are you aware of this?
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c)
d)
Reviewing University and School
regarding projects with funding,
overall purposes of them?
i) who benefit?
ii) by doing what?
administrative procedures
what do you see as the
Could the project have been run without
setting? the University
3 ) What are the advantages and disadvantages of usingfunding for projects at the School of Education?
outside
a) Could the project have been run without funding?
b) How does the temporary nature of funding affect project
activities and staff involvement?
i) e.g. short time perspective, hasty activities, use-
ful deadlines, etc.?
ii) sense of starting from scratch or building on past?
c) What are the advantages and disadvantages to you of work-
ing with such projects?
d) Do you see any consequences to the School as a whole of
a heavy reliance on outside funding?

